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ABSTRACT
Emerging Operational Contracts in Competitive Markets
by
Liang Ding
Chair: Roman Kapuscinski
This dissertation consists of three essays, each dealing with an emerging type of
operational contracts. The rst essay considers a resource exchange model where
the eects of collaboration and competition are intertwined. Exchanging resources
often improves utilization and is intended to increase protability of involved rms.
However, it does not guarantee success in competitive settings. More ecient use
of resources might actually leads to increased competition. We explore how resource
exchange contracts impact the rms and consumers. The results indicate that the
resource exchange tends to benet both rms and the consumers in most situations,
except for the extreme situations where simultaneously competition is strong and the
purchasing cost is either very low or very high.
The second essay focuses on vertical pricing control contracts that manufacturers
use to coordinate online and oine retailers. Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) policy
requires all retailers to sell at the price suggested by manufacturers. Minimum Ad-
vertised Price (MAP) policy is less strict, as it allows retailers to sell at lower prices
than the manufacturer suggested, as long as these lower prices are not advertised.
x
This essay studies which of these two policies is more benecial to each member of
the supply chain. We show that manufacturers prefer MAP policy when the cus-
tomers' valuations vary signicantly and the information search requires signicant
eort. The MAP policy is also favorable to retailers and consumers under similar
market conditions.
The third essay concerns the contractual issues when energy service companies
(ESCOs) provide energy eciency projects to residential clients. While performance
based contracts have been proven successful in public, commercial, and industrial
sectors, ESCOs face challenges in the residential sector. Residential clients often
change consumption behavior after the project, which makes the real energy savings
dicult to measure. Additionally, residential clients are much more risk averse and
vulnerable to uncertain outcomes of projects. We show that piecewise linear contracts
perform reasonably well. To further improve protability, ESCOs can either reduce
uncertainty of technology involved or develop the ability to verify post-project energy
eciency. We also make recommendations in monetary incentives and regulations
from policy makers' perspective.
xi
CHAPTER I
Introduction
Many companies continuously strive to reexamine their relationships with their
customers, suppliers, and even competitors, in an eort to restructure their oerings
of products and services. As a result, innovative contracts among players in supply
chains are considered, introduced, and tested. Many of these initiatives are guided
by traditional wisdom and are based on intuitive understanding of relevant forces.
However, with increasing interactions among rms and more dynamic and competi-
tive markets, some seemingly intuitive solutions may not work. My research focuses
on a subset of contracts that either emerge or gain popularity in the industry and
helps to extend the traditional business models and push supply chains towards more
protable or more sustainable approaches.
My dissertation consists of three essays, each dealing with an emerging type of op-
erational contracts. Chapter II considers a resource exchange model when the eects
of collaboration and competition are intertwined. Recently, an increasing number of
rms are engaged or are planning to get engaged in various types of partnerships with
other companies, some of the partners being their competitors. This essay studies
the combined eect of collaboration and competition, where collaboration is through
trade of rms' resources (predominantly inventory). While trade leads to potentially
higher resource utilization and could increase rms' protability, a number of eco-
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nomical and legal concerns may arise. In short term, the potential for selling to
another rm creates an incentive to invest in more resources. However, higher initial
investments may lead to more intense price competition between rms. In the longer
term, the selling rm may also be concerned that the competitor after obtaining ad-
ditional resources will not only increase sales, but also may retain some of the new
customers. Independently, from legal perspective, collaboration between competitors
may violate the antitrust laws. In practice the legality of such contracts is seldom
challenged, but when such questions arise the eect of these agreements on consumer
surplus is examined. We explore whether/when a resource trade contract can help
one or both rms and how it aects consumer surplus. We show that when markets
are deterministic, the rms do not have incentive to trade inventories as they are
able to anticipate the demand. When rms face uncertain markets, the inventory
trade is very likely to help and the eect may be quite signicant. In markets that
are independent, rms always benet from inventory trade agreement. Even when
competition is present, such resource exchange is often a win-win solution. This is,
however, not the case when the rms face dramatically dierent market sizes or costs
are at the extremes (either very low or very high). In such cases, either one or both
rms, or the consumers may be worse o due to trading.
Chapter III focuses on pricing control contracts that manufacturers use to coor-
dinate online and oine retailers. During last twenty years, many brick-and-mortar
retailers have been facing competition from online retailers and local discounters.
This inuences the behavior of customers who are able to experience products in a
brick-and-mortar store but purchase the products online at lower prices. With online
stores eectively free-riding on brick-and-mortar retailers' demand generation eort,
the sales of demand generators decrease and they have lower incentive to promote
or even carry such products. For manufacturers, however, brick-and-mortar retailers
play a crucial role by showcasing and advertising products to customers, so that the
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customers are aware of the products. Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) and Mini-
mum Advertised Price (MAP) are two commonly used policies intended to protect
retailers' margin. Under RPM policy, the manufacturer sets a minimum price for
each product and requires all retailers not to price below it. Under MAP policy,
manufacturers sets a \suggested" retail price to all retailers. While retailers can sell
at lower prices, they are not allowed to advertise a price lower-than-suggested retail
price. In this essay, we build a stylized model to study and compare the performance
of RPM and MAP under various market situations. In particular, we explore which
policy is more benecial for the manufacturer, retailers and consumers. We nd that
MAP policy is favorable to the manufacturer when the search cost (for identifying the
price and availability of the product) is high and consumers are very heterogeneous
in their valuation of the product. Otherwise RPM policy would outperform MAP
policy. Brick-and-mortar retailers and consumers also benet from MAP. But they
prefer MAP with even higher search cost and larger variance in consumer valuations,
compared to the manufacturer. Online retailers would always prefer MAP policy over
RPM policy.
Chapter IV focuses on energy service companies (ESCOs) and the contracts they
engage in to provide energy eciency projects to residential clients. Energy eciency
is one of the most ecient approaches to reduce energy cost and reduce environmen-
tal impact of energy production. Many energy eciency projects are performed by
ESCOs. A core part of ESCO's business are performance based contracts, in which
payment terms are determined as a function of energy savings achieved in the un-
derlying projects. Despite of success in public, commercial, and industrial sectors,
ESCOs are involved in fewer projects in the residential sector. There are a few widely
acknowledged challenges that contribute to under-developed business in the residen-
tial sector. The rst challenge is that, the energy eciency project often leads to a
changed consumption behavior after the project is implemented, which makes the real
3
energy savings dicult to measure. The second challenge is that, residential clients
are much more risk averse and less willing to accept uncertain outcomes of projects.
The third one is that, lack of monitoring protocols leads to ESCOs' moral hazard
problem. This essay studies the contract design problem with particular attention
to the residential sector. Results suggest that in the residential sector, coordinating
contracts in general do not exist. That said, we show that piecewise linear con-
tracts perform reasonably well. To improve protability, ESCOs can either reduce
uncertainty of technology involved or develop the ability to verify post-project energy
eciency. Clearly, policy makers also have an interest in promoting energy eciency
projects. We demonstrate how regulations and monetary incentives help to decrease
ineciencies in the relationships involving ESCOs and to reduce environmental cost.
4
CHAPTER II
Inventory Exchange: Collaboration and
Competition
2.1 Introduction
Collaboration and sharing of resources are widely practiced in single rms with
multiple locations or divisions. However, trading of inventory or of capacity is also
a surprisingly common practice across companies, including rms competing in the
same markets. Similar to a single-rm case, it has potential to improve resource
utilization and to increase protability of involved parties. However, such practices
raise some hesitations due to either economic or legal reasons. From economical point
of view, despite the direct benet of pooling resources and using them more eciently,
trade of resources creates new incentives and externalities in competitive settings. For
example, the rms with the prospect of selling resources to other rms may invest up
front in more of these resources, which may lead to more intense price competition.
Also, providing other rms with additional resources may lead to higher service level
at the competing rms and result in some customers permanently switching to the
competitor in the long run.
In addition to economic dis-incentives, from legal point of view, when two rms
collaborate, there is a concern that their benet may come at the expense of consumers
5
and may violate the antitrust laws. The common violations of the antitrust laws
(primarily captured in Sherman Act in the United States) are price xing, bid rigging,
and territorial allocation. These are based on law-and-economics literature, uniformly
accepted as illegal and referred to as the per se rule. Since other situations are not
clearly classied, they all need to be judged on a case-by-case basis.1 The US Justice
Department states that: \If any anticompetitive harm would be outweighed by the
practice's pro-competitive eects, the practice is not unlawful. Virtually all antitrust
oenses likely to be prosecuted by a United States Attorney's oce will be governed
by the per se rule."2
In practice, a number of companies experiment with various forms of collaboration
with other rms, one of them being resource exchange.3 For example, in 2013, AT&T
(the second largest provider of wireless services in the US) bought $1.9 billion in
spectrum from Verizon (the largest provider of these services). Although it raised
concerns from both regulators and customers about the concentration of spectrum
among big operators, the trade was approved. Federal Communications Commission
stated \This is a big win for consumers, ..., who will see more competition and more
choices." On a dierent scale and in a dierent timeframe, inventory exchange is
widely practiced among car dealers selling the same brand of cars. If one dealer
runs low or is out of a specic model, he/she routinely purchases cars from other
nearby dealers. We observe some form of inventory or capacity trading in many other
industries including cargo carriers (trade of freight capacity), providers of industrial
gases (trade of industrial gas between distributors), nancial institutions (nancial
loans), and manufacturers of the spare auto parts (trade of nished goods).
In this paper, we focus on a specic type of collaboration through trade of inven-
1The absence of clear rules outside the listed here per se rule was repeatedly stated by legal
experts whom we interviewed at the University of Michigan. This is also consistent with general
sources, such as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United States antitrust law#Rule of reason.
2http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title7/ant00007.htm
3Resources may include inventory or capacity, or other means of value generation.
6
tories, which often may also be re-labeled to trade of capacities. Our objective is to
compare potential benets with potential costs and understand the trade-os. For
that purpose, in our model, two rms operate in markets with partially substitutable
products. They independently order their inventories, before uncertain demand is
realized. When demand, or credible signal of demand, becomes known, the rms may
trade (buy or sell) their inventory to each other. Then, they independently price and
sell the products in their markets.
In order to capture the range of potential concerns, we model both short-term
and long-term eects of trade that the rms need to account for. Market dependence,
where price in one market may inuence demand in another market due to partially
substitutability of products, plays a direct role in short term.
In longer term, the rms are concerned with another set of externalities of their
current decisions. Even when the rm selling the resources is generously compensated
for them, higher service level at the rm buying the resources may have long-term
externalities, such as inertia of consumers. That is, the customers may be viscous and
will stay with the same rm in the future with high probability, or more customers
using the product or purchasing from a rm helps to disseminate information about
the rm and may translate into future demand (\word of mouth" eect). In our
paper, such externalities are labeled as reputation eect. Reputation is one of the
main drivers of consumers' inertia and defection to the competing rms, see Reichheld
and Sasser (1990).In this paper, we examine the impact of both market dependence
and reputation concerns on rm's decision to enter into inventory trade contracts.
In this context, we are exploring the following questions: (1) When should rms
collaborate with other rms by trading inventories? (2) What is the eect of a
potential trade on the initial quantity investment? (3) What is the eect of trading
on consumer surplus? (4) When trading is benecial for both the rms and consumers
versus when the regulators should be concerned about negative consequences of such
7
collaborations?
To answer the rst question, our model considers several key factors, such as degree
of market dependence, signicance of reputation eects, relative sizes of markets,
production costs as well as the uncertainties of demand in these markets. We nd that
the rms may be strictly worse o by entering into trade agreements when markets
are deterministic, except when costs are very low. On the other hand, if the demand
is uncertain and markets are of similar sizes, the rms will benet from trading, unless
the purchasing cost is either very low or high. If, however, the rms face signicantly
asymmetric markets, the benets are unlikely: One rm can intentionally increase its
initial investment in inventory, not primarily to sell in its own market, but hoping
to increase prots primarily through the trade with other rms. As a result of such
speculative purchase, either one or both rms may be worse o due to trading. High
market dependence or signicant reputation tend to decrease the benets of trading.
We answer the second question by comparing the order quantity in the presence
of potential trade with the order quantity without the possibility of trade. The
initial investment in inventory is driven by two forces: trade allows the rms to
count on availability of the resources from the other rm and, thus, get closer to
centralized rm's inventory decisions. On the other hand, both market dependence
and reputation concerns drive these investments away from the centralized quantity
investments.
Interestingly, the consumers also prefer rms to trade, except in markets where
purchasing costs are extremely low. Consumers benet from rms trading resources
in two ways: First, trade allows rms to reallocate units to meet demand and avoid
the situation where one rm has leftovers while the other market still has potential to
sell. Second, the trade option in most cases drives up rms' initial ordering quantity,
which leads to lower prices and more consumers being served. This logic fails when
the purchasing cost is extremely low. Under such situations, competitive rms would
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order enough inventory to completely, or nearly completely, cover their own market
even without trade contract and the rms choose to trade inventory in order to
restrain price competition.
Recall that rms benet from trade contract when purchasing costs are neither
very low nor very high. Thus. from a regulator's perspective, we nd that the trade
contract ends up being a win-win solution when the purchasing cost is in the moderate
range. The cases where both the rms and consumers are better o span quite a wide
range of scenarios.
2.2 Literature Review
Three sub-streams of literature are relevant to our problem and approach: (a) lit-
erature that deals with joint pricing and purchase-quantity decisions, (b) risk pooling
through transshipment and resource-exchange literature, and (c) reputation models.
In our paper, the rms make both purchase quantity and price decisions. A
newsvendor model with price-dependent demand is rst studied by Whitin (1955). A
thorough review of literature on inventory and pricing models can be found in Chen
and Simchi-Levi (2012). Most of the work on this topic focuses on making inventory
and price decisions simultaneously in centralized settings under demand uncertainty.
Bernstein and Federgruen (2005) and Zhao and Atkins (2008) are among those who
study inventory and pricing decisions in competitive markets. Van Mieghem and Dada
(1999) present a model analyzing price postponement and discuss how competition,
demand uncertainty, and the timing of decisions inuence the results. They assume
that rms are competing in quantities they bring into market, which are then sold
at the market clearance price. Wang and Kapuscinski (2009) extend their model,
allowing rms to set prices directly (in addition to choosing quantities) where market
substitution is price-based. None of these papers, however, considers the option of
resource exchange (trading).
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Risk pooling among retailers/suppliers, especially in decentralized settings, is re-
lated to inventory trade in our study. The basics of risk pooling is due to decreas-
ing coecient of variability whenever multiple, not perfectly correlated streams of
demand are combined. The recent pooling papers include Bish and Wang (2004),
Chod and Rudi (2005). In our study, two independent retailers exchange invento-
ries and thus it is most relevant to the substream of literature that focus on risk
pooling through transshipment between decentralized retailers. Transshipment liter-
ature often explicitly considers transportation, pricing and coordination issues, see
e.g., Rudi et al. (2001), Granot and SoSic (2003), Hu et al. (2007), which partly
decreases attractiveness of pooling. Paterson et al. (2011) provide a comprehensive
review of inventory problems with lateral transshipments. Most of these papers con-
sider centralized retailers, or decentralized retailers in non-competitive markets. In
such settings collaboration (trade) is a natural choice, as it improves protability of
all participants. In this stream of papers, Zhao and Atkins (2009) is closest to our
work. It considers transshipment between competing retailers. The authors nd that,
when transshipment price is high and competition is weak, then transshipment ben-
ets all rms, which is consistent with our ndings. This literature assumes that the
transshipment prices need to be set up front and typically investigates the existence
of coordinating transfer prices. Our paper does not focus on coordinating contracts.
We consider the eect of collaboration on the rms and on the customers, when the
trading price is determined endogenously (which leads to dierent behavior), and the
retail price is set in response to demand realization. In this sense, our work com-
plements Zhao and Atkins (2009). Unlike other papers in this stream, we include
both short-term and long-term competitive forces by investigating immediate prots,
and also the eect of current sales on future market shares through reputation eect.
None of the papers, including Zhao and Atkins (2009), nds that the rms may be
worse o due to trading, while we show that strategic interactions may lead to such
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an outcome. Most importantly, we study the eect of trade on consumer welfare,
which has important legal implications for rms and regulators. Chod and Rudi
(2006) consider some elements that are also relevant to our paper. They assume that
the trading price is a result of the negotiation between two decentralized rms. In
their paper, to determine the trading price, both price equilibrium and bargaining
equilibrium are considered. The paper concludes that both price and bargaining equi-
librium can lead to higher expected prots compared to no-trade case. Their results
are, however, limited to independent markets and, also, based on constant-elasticity
demand models. Eectively, there is no price competition and the interaction is only
through the transfer of resources. Chun et al. (2013) consider bargaining equilibrium
in a competitive setting. Their focus is on nding ecient algorithms for various net-
work structures and they assume that the initial capacity is exogenously set rather
than a decision variable. Also, these papers do not consider potential consequences
of trade on rms' future sales and consumer welfare.
An important feature of our model is that rms' current decisions inuence the
rms' future market sizes and future revenues, through externalities of current deci-
sions (reputation). This type of externality has been broadly studied in Economics
literature. Kovac and Schmidt (2014) provide a review of this area. Bensaid and
Lesne (1996) and Anari et al. (2010) point out that the current sales have positive
inuence on the future demand, and they label this eect as network externality or
historical externality. With such externality, rms intend to price lower in early stages
to gain market share. Similar conclusion is reached in modeling papers. Kovac and
Schmidt (2014) study a market with two rms and constant number of customers.
In both Caminal and Vives (1996) and Kovac and Schmidt (2014), rms compete for
market share through pricing decisions and when considering future market share,
they show that the current pricing decisions tend to be more competitive (lower).
Reputation eects are also considered in operations settings through market-size ad-
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justments. Hall and Porteus (2000) consider a multi-period game, where two rms
make capacity decisions and compete for market share. In their model, market size is
adjusted in response to the current-period sales (stockouts). Liu et al. (2007) extend
their model to a general demand function and innite horizon, while Olsen and Parker
(2008) allow rms to carry inventory and to backlog customers. Our reputation model
borrows the adjustment structure from this literature. While these papers model and
study future market dynamics, none of them considers collaboration among compet-
ing rms.
In addition to analyzing dierent research questions, from technical point of view,
this is the rst paper, to the best of our knowledge, that incorporates both short-
term trade-os with long-term externalities (reputation) for retailers who consider
inventory collaboration in competitive settings as well as study consumer welfare
implications of short-term and long-term eects.
2.3 Model
We consider two rms, indexed by i; j = 1; 2 (i 6= j), operating in two possibly
dependent markets. The market size for rm i is wi = i + "i, where i is the mean
and "i is a random shock with zero mean. Both i and distribution of "i are common
knowledge. Demand di in each market depends on the realized market size wi and
both rms' prices pi and pj:
di = (wi   pi + (pj   pi))+;
where  reects the sensitivity to price and  represents competition or substitution
level, as dened in McGuire and Staelin (1983).
To simplify the notation, we let a =  +  and b =  and re-write rm i's
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demand as:
di = (wi   api + bpj)+:
We use a and b as the market parameters throughout the whole paper except when
we explicitly evaluate the eects of competition and substitution levels, .
Firms make three decisions in the following sequence:
Ordering. First, both rms simultaneously make the ordering decisions: Firm i
orders qi units of inventory at unit cost c. The unit cost is identical for both rms.
Trading. After the market uncertainty "i is realized, two rms have an oppor-
tunity to trade their inventories. The trade process is modeled as a Nash-bargaining
equilibrium. Let qi be rm i's inventory level after the trade.
Pricing. Both rms independently decide their selling prices pi's and collect
revenues from customers. We denote si = minfqi; dig as the sales of rm i. The
revenue from the current-period sales is pisi.
4
We allow the current-period decisions to inuence the future prots through rep-
utation eects. Specically, we follow Hall and Porteus (2000) (as well as their exten-
sions) to model the future prot as a function of the current-period demand. Denoting
the future market size by ~i, the long-term eect of current demand is reected as
follows:
~i = i + (di   dj);
where  2 [0; 1) is the strength of the reputation eect (or other externalities).  = 0
corresponds to the case where the current sales have no long-term eects,  ! 1
4To reect the reality that rms have exibility to change price after they have observed market
signal and exchanged inventory, we allow rms to set prices after the trading stage. In such situation,
rms can match demand and supply by either adjusting prices or exchanging inventories. Setting
prices after demand realization is an appropriate model, when for example the selling season is long
enough or when the retailers do not announce the prices in advance. This is preferred by retailers
although not necessarily feasible in some situations. In other situations, prices are announced up-
front and cannot be changed later. Without pricing to inuence demand after random market shock,
such situations are very close to traditional transshipment literature and are studied in Zhao and
Atkins (2008, 2009).
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corresponds to a situation where current sales have strong inuence in the long term.
The future revenue is approximated as a function of future market size ~i. To keep
the model tractable, we assume the future revenue is ~i, where  can be interpreted
as the customer lifetime value.5
The objective of the model is to evaluate the feasibility and benets of collabora-
tion, through inventory trading, to the rms and also to study the eect of trading
on consumer surplus. To achieve this, we consider three scenarios. First, we establish
a benchmark for our analysis centralized scenario, where one central controller makes
all decisions. The second scenario is the fully decentralized case, no-trade scenario,
where the competitors do not coordinate their decisions nor collaborate. The third
scenario, trade scenario, is our focus: although the rms make ordering and pricing
decisions independently, they can trade their inventory after the demand is realized
but before the pricing decisions are made.
The three scenarios are formally introduced in the following subsections. We
then analyze these scenarios in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. The centralized, trade, no-
trade scenarios are denoted by C; T;N , respectively. Also let p; t; o represent pricing,
trading, and ordering stages. We dene Xxi as rm i's revenue at the beginning of
stage x (2 fp; t; og) in scenario X (2 fC; T;Ng) and dene Xx as the total revenue
of rms at the beginning of stage x in scenario X.
2.3.1 Centralized Scenario
We analyze each scenario starting with the last stage, i.e., pricing, and then follow
with trading (if applicable), and nally ordering. In the pricing stage, the inventory
levels are already chosen and random shocks are realized. The centralized revenue in
5This model is supported by empirical studies such as Chevalier and Mayzlin (2006) who empir-
ically study the word-of-mouth eect in online book industry. They conclude that more consumer
reviews, which can be viewed as a proxy for previous sales, lead to higher sales in the future.
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the pricing stage is given by
Cp(q1; q2) = max
p1;p20
2X
i=1
(pisi + ~i) = max
p1;p20
2X
i=1
pisi + (1 + 2): (2.1)
Consider the trading stage
Ct(K) = max
q1+q2=K
Cp(q1; q2): (2.2)
In the ordering stage, the controller chooses the total initial inventory K. The
revenue function in the ordering stage is, thus,
Co(K) = E"1;"2Ct(K) (2.3)
and the central controller solves
max
K
Co(K)  cK:
2.3.2 No-Trade Scenario
In no-trade scenario, rms make decisions competitively. In the pricing stage, for
given inventory and random shocks, each rm chooses its price by solving
max
pi
fpisi + ~ig: (2.4)
Let the equilibrium outcome of the pricing stage be p(q1; q2) and let the correspond-
ing equilibrium revenue for rm i be Npi (q1; q2). We will establish the existence of
the equilibrium later. Since trading is not allowed in this scenario, rm i's revenue
in the ordering stage is
Noi (q1; q2) = E"1;"2
Np
i (q1; q2) (2.5)
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and each rm solves
max
qi
Noi (q1; q2)  cqi:
2.3.3 Trade Scenario
When rms are allowed to trade, the pricing stage is exactly the same as in the
no-trade scenario.
Recall that qi stands for inventory before the trade and qi after the trade. Trade
quantity is endogenously determined through Nash bargaining equilibrium, where
the rms choose how to reallocate their inventory and how to allocate the benets
resulting from reallocation.
Nash bargaining game is one of the most common approaches to study decision
making among independent parties that involve elements of negotiation and collabo-
ration. In Nash bargaining game, two competitors decide the outcome of the game,
given established up-front rules for dividing the benets. Readers are referred to
Muthoo (1999) for more details and further references. A number of papers in Op-
erations Management literature use Nash bargaining solution to analyze the Nash
bargaining game (Nagarajan and Sosic 2008, Chod and Rudi 2006, Kuo et al. 2011).
In the Nash bargaining solution the benets above disagreement point are divided
equally among the parties. We adapt this approach. In our context, the disagreement
point for each rm is the revenue the rm would collect if no trade would take place
(for given quantities q1 and q2 owned by the rms). Consequently, Nash bargaining
equilibrium in our setting will maximize the sum of the rms' revenues, anticipating
the outcome of price competition in the next stage:
Tt(K) = max
q1+q2=K
2X
i=1
Npi (q1; q2): (2.6)
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Each rm's revenue function after random shock realization is
Tti (q1; q2) =
1
2
Tt(q1 + q2) +
1
2
Npi (q1; q2) 
1
2
Npj (q1; q2): (2.7)
In the ordering stage, rm i's revenue is
Toi (q1; q2) = E"1;"2Tti (q1; q2): (2.8)
Thus, each rm solves
max
qi
Toi (q1; q2)  cqi:
A critical element of the analysis is evaluation of trade on consumer surplus, which
is the focus of the next section.
2.3.4 Consumer Surplus
Consumer welfare is one of the most important criteria for regulators to identify
collaboration agreements that violate anti-trust laws. Therefore, in addition to the
rms' prots, we also evaluate the consumer welfare, in order to identify situations
that might be problematic from antitrust point of view. Singh and Vives (1984)
formulated the total consumer utility in a competitive market as
U(s1; s2) =
1
2(a2   b2)(2(aw1 + bw2)s1 + 2(aw2 + bw1)s2   as
2
1   as22   2bs1s2);
where wi is the market size and si is the sales. While seemingly complicated, this
utility function is consistent with the linear demand function si = wi  api + bpj and
has been routinely used in the literature (Amir and Jin 2001, Lin and Saggi 2002,
Hsu and Wang 2005). That is, when consumers make decisions maximizing their
consumer surplus, U(s1; s2)   p1s1   p2s2, the resulting demand function is linear.
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Expressing explicitly sales si as a function of prices pi and pj,we have
6
CS = U(s1; s2) p1s1 p2s2 = 1
2
a(p21+p
2
2) bp1p2 w1p1 w2p2+
(w1 + w2)
2
4(a  b) +
(w1   w2)2
4(a+ b)
:
(2.9)
2.4 Deterministic Market Sizes
We start our analysis with the deterministic setting, where market sizes are known
up front. The deterministic setting allows us to identify and describe the critical
trade-os and establish some of the important results, which will be later used and
extended in the stochastic setting. We solve the problem using backward induction
and start with the pricing stage.
2.4.1 Pricing
We rst present the pricing-stage outcomes for all three scenarios. The price
equilibrium is the same for the two decentralized scenarios (trade and no-trade) given
the same starting inventory levels at the beginning of the pricing stage, but dierent
than for the centralized one. The following lemma shows the existence and uniqueness
of the pricing equilibrium in each scenario.
Lemma II.1. With deterministic market sizes (w1; w2) and given after-trade inven-
tory levels (q1; q2), we have
(1) Centralized pricing: There exists a unique optimal price pair (pC1 ; p
C
2 ).
(2) Decentralized pricing: Assume the rms consider prices such that demand does not
6The denition of Singh and Vives (1984) extends the traditional denition used in independent
markets. For independent markets, b = 0, and the total consumer surplus becomes:
CS =
1
2a
[(w1   ap1)2 + (w2   ap2)2]
which is the total consumer surplus for the linear demand function wi   api. Notice that this is the
demand when individual consumer willingness to pay is uniformly distributed over [0; wi=a] in each
market.
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exceed the available quantity. There exists a unique equilibrium price pair (pX1 ; p
X
2 ),
where X = N; T .
All of the proofs are in the appendix. Note that the condition in part (2) of the
Lemma II.1 is not very restrictive, given deterministic demand. It assumes that rms
do not choose extremely low prices such that the demand is larger than the available
inventory.
q¯1
q¯2
R1
R2 R3
R4
(a) Centralized pricing
q¯1
q¯2
R1
R2 R3
R4
(b) Decentralized pricing
Figure 2.1: Pricing outcomes as a function of after-trade inventories. R1 is the region
with left-over inventories, R2 with all inventory sold at market clearance
prices, and R3 and R4 are regions where one of the products is sold at
the clearance price and the other rm has leftover products.
The closed-form solutions of equilibrium and optimal prices are provided in Ap-
pendix A. Based on these solutions, Figure 2.1 illustrates pricing policies for cen-
tralized and decentralized scenarios as a function of after-trade inventory levels. In
both cases, there are four regions of after-trade inventory levels (q1; q2) with dierent
equilibrium outcomes. In Region 1, both rms end up with leftovers. Consequently,
the prices do not depend on after-trade inventories. In Region 2 all inventory is sold
and the prices are market-clearing ones. In Regions 3 and 4, one of the rms has
leftovers, while the other sells all inventory. The market clearing constraint for one
market eectively determines both prices in this region.
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In the decentralized pricing game the rms price weakly lower (more aggressively)
than in the centralized case. Lower pricing results in higher sales and, consequently,
the area where market clearance takes place (Region 2) is larger in the decentralized
game. The shaded area in Figure 2.1(b) corresponds to region R2 for centralized case.
In the shaded area, the decentralized prices are identical to centralized prices, while
outside of this region, at least one of the decentralized prices is strictly lower.
2.4.2 Trading
Trading inventory takes place in the centralized scenario and in the trade scenario.
We rst describe how a central controller reallocates the total inventory, K, to the
rms after random shocks are realized.
Centralized Scenario
Lemma II.2. In centralized scenario, rm 2's after-trade (allocation) inventory, q2,
is as follows
q2 =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
[w2=2; K   w1=2] if w1 + w2  2K
0 if w1   w2  2K
K if w2   w1  2K
2K w1+w2
4
otherwise
:
Firm 1 obtains the remaining (K   q2) units at the end of the trading (allocation)
stage.
The resource allocation is driven by the dierence of the margins in two markets.
When market sizes are both large and not extremely dierent, the inventory is allo-
cated in such a way that the two markets have equal margins (this is the last row
dening q2 in Lemma II.2). If one of the rms has a noticeably larger market size,
allocating all inventory to the larger market is benecial as even a single unit in the
smaller market would not be able to provide as high margin as customers in the larger
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market. But, when both market sizes are relatively small, even after the rms opti-
mally allocate their inventory, there will be leftovers (Region 1). Since the location
of leftover units does not matter, in this case there exist multiple optimal solutions,
resulting in the same prot. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2 (a) for two equal-sized
markets w1 = w2. In Region 2, where total inventory is small, the inventory will be
allocated equally between two rms (as shown by solid line) and all inventory will be
sold.
Since left-over inventory can be freely reallocated between rms, the revenue is
expressed as a function of total inventory and has the following property.
Lemma II.3. Ct(K) is nondecreasing and concave in K.
Concavity of prot function simplies some of the proofs of the subsequent results.
While Lemma II.3 holds in centralized settings, we will see that, for decentralized
trade scenario, prot function is not concave in the total inventory. Moreover, the
indierence to allocation of left-over inventory does not hold anymore.
Trade Scenario
The trade option provides an opportunity for decentralized rms to adjust inven-
tory. The adjustment involves a payment dened by Nash Bargaining Solution, which
works as follows. Whenever there is an opportunity to increase the total prot, the
rms will reallocate the inventory and divide the surplus equally.
The following lemma describes the total revenue (for two rms) when trade is
allowed. The revenue is unimodal, but not concave in the total inventory K. First,
however, dene K1 as the sum of quantities at the common point of all four regions
for the decentralized case (Figure 2.2(b)).
Lemma II.4.
(1) Tt(K) is continuous and unimodal in K. There exists w1+w2
2
 K0  K1, such
that Tt(K) is concave for K  K0, and constant for K > K0.
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q¯2
R1
R2 R3
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(a) Centralized trading
q¯1
q¯2
R1
R2
R3
R4
(b) Decentralized trading
K0
K0
K1
K1
Figure 2.2: Trading outcomes. Solid line and shaded region indicate: (a) allocation of
inventory in centralized scenario, (b) trading equilibrium for decentralized
trade scenario.
(2) For K  w1+w2
2
, the resulting inventory allocation is the same as in centralized
solution.
The interesting behavior described in Lemma II.4 can be explained using Figure
2.2(b). For this illustration we assume equal market sizes w1 = w2. When the total
inventory is low (q1 + q2  K0), trade results in market clearance. In this case, the
rms sell equal quantities, which is exactly how a centralized rm would allocate
the inventory, shown as solid line in Region 2. (When market sizes are not equal,
the allocation also coincides with the centralized solution, even though the quantities
are not equal.) Thus, despite the anticipated price competition, trading does not
distort the allocation away from the centralized solution up to inventory level K0.
However, for q1 + q2 > K0, the behavior changes. The rms allocate the inventory in
an asymmetric manner, where one rm provides a moderate amount of inventory in
its market and sells its entire inventory, while the other rm has leftovers, shown as
vertical solid line in region R4. Interestingly, for all inventory levels above K0, the
sales do not change while inventory increases. For inventories q1+ q2 between K0 and
K1, the behavior is similar to the case with leftover inventories, even though without
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trading, there would be no leftovers in Region R2.
If decentralized rms mimicked centralized rms and allocated their units pro-
portionally to the market size, they would compete intensively in price and end up
with fairly small prots. Instead, decentralized rms agree to transfer a portion of
inventory to one market while leaving smaller inventory in the second market. As a
result, the rivalry is less intensive and both rms are better o. This suggests the
possibility the trade option might decrease consumer welfare, which we discuss below.
Consumer Surplus in Trade Scenario
To evaluate the eect of trading on consumer surplus, we need to understand the
eect of ordering quantities (initial inventory), and also the eect of trading given the
same ordering quantities. We start with the latter one and, for now, we x the total
inventory at K = q1 + q2. The following lemma describes how the surplus changes as
a result of inventory reallocation.
Lemma II.5. Let the total inventory K = q1 + q2 be xed in the trading stage. The
consumer surplus is (1) In R1, constant in q1; (2) In R2, convex in q1 and minimized
at q1 = K=2; (3) In R3, decreasing in q1; and (4) In R4, increasing in q1.
Given total inventory K, the consumer surplus as a function of rm 1's after-
trade quantity is plotted in Figure 2.3(a) for low K and (b) for high K. In case
(a), the potential allocations fall into regions R2, R3, and R4 in Figure 2.2(b). As
long as rms do not have leftovers (region R2), the consumer surplus is convex in the
allocation and reaches its minimum level (within region R2) when two markets have
the same sales (Lemma II.5). This is because, any asymmetric allocation, implies
lower price in the market with higher allocation (for more customers) and this eect
dominates the increase of the price in the market with fewer customers, which results
in a higher consumer surplus. When allocations become very asymmetric, we enter
region R3 or R4. With most of inventory in one market, that rm does not use
market clearance price any further, which leads to a higher price in the small market
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and sometimes also higher price in the large market. Thus, the consumer surplus
decreases as allocations become extremely asymmetric.
For case (b) with high-total-inventory (Figure 2.3(b)), when the allocation is
asymmetric, the allocation falls into region R3 or R4 in Fig.2.2(b). Similar to the
low-inventory case, not attempting to sell out the inventory leads to a higher price,
resulting in a decrease in consumer surplus. However, when the allocation is close
to symmetric, high levels of inventory in both markets result in leftovers in both
markets (region R1), where the prices in both markets and the consumer surplus are
independent of the allocation.
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Figure 2.3: Consumer surplus as a function of allocation of total inventoryK between
two rms. (a) is for low K, while (b) is for high K.
The rms, rather than consumers, choose how to allocate the inventory. While
the rms become better o, the eect of trade on consumer surplus (given initial
inventory) is not obvious. A stylized numerical example in Table 2.1 illustrates various
possible outcomes. In symmetric setting, if rms' initial inventory is (4, 0), consumer
surplus is maximized. However, rms will trade to equally divide their inventory.
This decreases the consumer surplus. In asymmetric setting, suppose that initial
24
inventories are (2, 2). If the rms do not trade, both rms and consumers suer. If
trade takes place, the allocation becomes (1,3) to match the market sizes. Consumer
surplus is increased, though not to the highest possible level.
Symmetric wi Asymmetric wi
No trade Trade No trade Trade
w1; w2 10,10 10,10 10,14 10,14
q1; q2 4,0 4,0 2,2 2,2
q1; q2 4,0 2,2 2,2 1,3
p1; p2 6,10 8,8 8,12 9,11
1; 2 24,0 28,4 16,24 17,25
CS1; CS2 8,0 2,2 2,2 0.5,4.5
Table 2.1: Consumer surplus before and after trade.
2.4.3 Ordering Stage
Theorem II.1 below characterizes the optimal ordering policy for the centralized
scenario. Theorem II.2 characterizes ordering solutions for no-trade and trade sce-
narios, assuming that the rms are symmetric. We discuss the asymmetric case in
Section 2.5.2.
Theorem II.1. In the centralized scenario, there exists a unique optimal inventory
level KC. Assuming (without loss of generality) w1  w2, we have
KC =
8>><>>:
w1+w2 2(a b)c
2
if c  w2
a b
max
n
aw1+bw2 (a2 b2)c
2a
; 0
o
if c > w2
a b
:
Note that in symmetric centralized settings, the optimal solution reduces toKC =
maxfw   (a  b)c; 0g.
We next consider the decentralized rms, and assume that the rms are symmetric
(w1 = w2  w). We analyze symmetric equilibria.7
7In our extensive numerical study, we have not observed any asymmetric equilibria for symmetric
rms.
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Theorem II.2. Consider two symmetric rms (w1 = w2  w).
(1) No-trade scenario: there exists a unique equilibrium qNi :
qNi = min

max

(a+ b)w + (a2   b2)(   c)
2a+ b
; 0

; w

:
(2) Trade scenario: there exist cost thresholds c1  c2, such that there are two equi-
libria for c 2 [c1; c2] and, otherwise, the equilibrium is unique. Specically, we have
(2)(a) (Low equilibrium:) For c  c1, qTi = max
n
(a+b)w+(a2 b2)( c)
2a+b
; 0
o
is an equi-
librium.
(2)(b) (High equilibrium:) For c  c2, qTi = min
n
(a+b)w+2(a2 b2)( c)
2a
; aw+(a
2 b2)
2a b ; w
o
is an equilibrium.
(2)(c) For c 2 [c1; c2], both rms obtain (strictly) higher prots in low equilibrium.
Theorem II.2(1) provides the equilibrium order levels of decentralized rms with-
out trade. By comparison of equilibrium quantities with KC, it is easy to verify
that the rms in no-trade scenario order more than those in centralized scenario
(qNi  KC=2). Due to the competition in both current and future periods, the rms
behave more aggressively, rst buying more inventory and, then, selling it at lower
prices. The centralized rms, being aware that low price in one market will hurt the
prot in the other one, price less aggressively (they set higher prices) and order more
conservatively.
In the trade scenario, uniqueness and nature of the equilibrium depend on the
procurement cost of the rms. There are two potential equilibria in this case: low
equilibrium and high equilibrium (the order quantity in low equilibrium is lower than
the one in high equilibrium, therefore the name). Except the interval where c 2
[c1; c2], the equilibrium is unique. Theorem II.2 indicates that low equilibrium order
quantity is the same as no-trade equilibrium (which itself is larger than the centralized
solution). High equilibrium order quantity is even higher. We can show that the low
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equilibrium Pareto dominates the high equilibrium. Therefore, in the rest of the
paper, we assume the rms always choose low equilibrium for c 2 [c1; c2].
In deterministic settings the rms can fully predict their future market condition
at the time they order. Thus, one might argue, that instead of relying on exchange
of goods in the trading stage, they should order whatever will be needed later. This
is indeed true when cost is suciently high, c > c1 when the rms order the same
quantities as in the no-trade case (and then trade does not take place). However, when
cost is small enough, c < c1, without trade option, rms order what they (correctly)
foresee to sell and there are no leftovers. With trade option, rms order more (high
equilibrium). This is illustrated in Figure 2.4(a) for c < c1.
Ordering more cannot be attributed to the desire to sell the additional units
to competitor. A rational rm knows that the competitor also increases her order
quantity and will not need any extra inventory. Interestingly, the main driver of
purchasing more inventory is increasing rm's own disagreement revenue and, thus,
its bargaining power. This behavior takes place when inventory is inexpensive and
the cost of leftover is relatively small.
Recall that the disagreement points are based on the no-trade outcome. Clearly,
there are no leftovers in the no-trade equilibrium. Consider now the eect of a
deviation from this equilibrium (which becomes relevant when trade is allowed): If one
rm increases its inventory, this rm's prot decreases. If the increase in inventory is
suciently small, the rm sells all inventory and, therefore, the price must decrease.
However, the other rm, whose inventory is unchanged, is hurt as well. It has to
respond by lowering price. Since the rst rm is able to change both quantity and
price while the second rm changes only price, the rst rm suers less from this
deviation. When rms now have the potential to trade, they recognize that ordering
higher inventory, decreases the disagreement point of competitor more than their own
disagreement point. Thus, with low cost of inventory, \over-ordering" exists. This
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mechanism, based on the bargaining equlibrium, reinforces anecdotal stories, where
rms choose actions that are suboptimal and hurting themselves, as long as these
actions hurt even more their competitors.
Prot
When both rms adopt this strategy, their behavior resembles prisoner's dilemma:
two symmetric rms would purchase extra inventory which is guaranteed to be left
over. Also, despite their intent to increase the bargaining power, the rms over order
by the same amount and end up having equal bargaining power. As the result of over-
ordering the price competition is intensied and the rms eectively waste money on
inventory, which ends up being unsold. Consequently, the existence of trade option
may lead to lower prots for both rms.
Theorem II.3. There exists a threshold c0 such that both rms are worse o in trade
scenario compared to no-trade scenario if and only if c0 < c < c1.
Theorem II.3 is illustrated in Figure 2.4(b). For c < c1 trade takes place. The
rms over-order inventory and later allocate it asymmetrically. The rm with smaller
inventory sells its entire inventory, while the other one has left-overs. When inventory
is left over, we label this allocation as \high-inventory trade." This helps the rms to
reduce the competition and benets both of them. In deterministic settings, two rms
trade inventory if and only if the high equilibrium is played. As a result, over-ordering
and high-inventory trade always take place together.8 When there are no left-overs
after trading, we dene this situation as \low-inventory trade." In deterministic case,
low-inventory trade does not take place.
Trading benets the rms, while over-ordering hurts them. Though over-ordering
takes place for all c < c1, this is not sucient to make rms worse o. When the cost
8Although over-ordering and high inventory trade take place together in the deterministic case, it
is useful to dene over-ordering and high inventory trade separately, since in the stochastic case, they
may inuence rms' prots in the opposite direction And as high inventory trade can take place even
though the rms order the same amount they would order in no-trade scenario (no over-ordering).
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Figure 2.4: Solutions in the deterministic setting. (a) order quantity; (b) prot; (c)
consumer surplus. Parameters: w = 10; a = 1:4; b = 0:4; = 14;  = 0:5.
is very low (c < c0), the extra inventory is inexpensive and the benet from inventory
coordination through trade dominates the investment in inventory and the rms are
better o. However, when cost is somewhat higher (c0 < c < c1), the over-ordering
becomes slightly more expensive, and then the purchase cost dominates the benet
from inventory coordination and both rms become worse o.
Consumer Surplus
Recall that if the purchasing cost c  c1, the rms always choose low equilibrium,
where they do not trade, and consequently the consumer surplus is identical in trade
and no-trade scenarios. Therefore, we focus on c < c1 and analyze how over-ordering
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and high-inventory trade inuence consumer surplus. With trade option, rms will
order more, which intuitively should increase consumer surplus (over-ordering eect).
On the other hand, when rms trade, they want to reduce the competition in the
pricing stage, which may decrease consumer surplus (high-inventory trade eect).
With both eects, trade may actually lead to either higher or lower consumer surplus
than no-trade scenario.
Theorem II.4. There exists c3 2 [0; c1] such that trade scenario has higher consumer
surplus than no-trade scenario if and only if c 2 (c3; c1).
Though it is possible that trade option increases or decreases both prot and
consumer surplus, in our numerical study, we observe that the total surplus (sum of
the rm prots and consumer surplus) is always lower with trade option compared to
the no-trade case. In deterministic settings, trade option never benets all parties.
Comparative Statics
As we have noted earlier, as long as there is some competition (either price com-
petition in the current period or competition for future market share), the rms are
more aggressive in the pricing stage and their prots are smaller than those for the
centralized rm. In this section, we study in greater detail how the equilibrium out-
come changes as a function of market substitution  (recall a = + ; b = ) and
reputation eect .
Theorem II.5. Assume a symmetric setting.
(1) In centralized scenario: order quantity, prot, and consumer surplus are not in-
uenced by either  or .
(2) In no-trade scenario: order quantity and consumer surplus are non-decreasing
and prot is non-increasing in both  and .
(3) In trade scenario: As long as rms stay in high (low) equilibrium, order quantity
and consumer surplus are non-decreasing and prot is non-increasing in both  and
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.
As market substitution , or reputation eect , or both increase, decentralized
rms are involved in a ercer rivalry compared to centralized case. Thus, in both
trade and no-trade scenarios, the rms order more and oer lower prices, which leads
to lower protability and higher consumer surplus. This, however, holds only if the
rms stay in the same type of equilibrium in trade scenario.
Summary of Deterministic Model
In deterministic markets, trade option may help or hurt rms or consumers and
the critical factor is the cost. If cost is not very low, trade option leaves the rms
with the same prot and consumers with the same surplus, because the rms order
exactly what they will sell and eectively no trading takes place. When cost is very
low, however, both the rms and consumers are inuenced by the trade option, due
to a combination of over-ordering and high-inventory trade eects. For extremely
low cost, the rms over-order but due to the high-inventory trade, they can adjust
inventory and prices so that the rms are better o, while the consumers are worse
o. When inventory cost is somewhat higher, the same forces are in eect, but due to
somewhat-higher inventory cost, the rms over-ordering becomes more expensive and
the rms are worse o, while the consumers may be worse or better o. Eectively
trading has bigger (positive) impact when inventory cost is very low, while over
ordering has bigger (negative) eect when inventory cost is higher. Note that these
two eects (over-ordering and trading) exist if and only if the rms compete either
for current sales or future sales (either  or  is positive).
2.5 Stochastic Market Sizes
Now we consider the case when the rms' market sizes are uncertain. As the
trading and pricing decisions are made when market sizes are already known, these
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decisions are exactly the same as in the deterministic model. Since the ordering
decisions are made before observing the market sizes, they are our focus.
Before analyzing the general model, we consider the eect of uncertainty in a
special setting, where the two markets are independent, i.e.,  =  = 0. This allows
us to establish a benchmark and isolate the eect of uncertainty on inventory from
the eect of competition. Recall that in deterministic case without competition, the
over-ordering and high-inventory trade would not take place. Therefore, trade and
no-trade scenarios result in the same prots and consumer surplus.
2.5.1 Independent Markets
The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in the ordering stage in all three
scenarios are established in Theorem II.6. We continue to state the results for the
symmetric case even though the results in this section continue to hold for asymmetric
settings.
Theorem II.6. Assume  =  = 0.
(1) Centralized scenario: There exists a unique optimal solution KC.
(2) No-trade scenario: There exists a unique optimal solution qNi for rm i.
(3) Trade scenario: There exists a unique equilibrium (qT1 ; q
T
2 ).
Let KX be the total ordering quantity in scenario X (X 2 fC; T;Ng). Below we
describe the relationship among these quantities.
Theorem II.7. Either KC  KT  KN or KC  KT  KN holds.
A typical relationship among order quantities is demonstrated in Figure 2.5(a),
with order quantity for trade option located between centralized and no-trade order
quantities. The underlying dynamics resembles risk pooling in the classical newsven-
dor model: When cost is low, we intuitively have high service level. With no trade,
safety stock of a centralized rm is lower than that of two decentralized rms. With
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Figure 2.5: Solutions in stochastic setting with independent markets. Presented as
percentage of that in centralized scenario. Parameters: w  U [10; 40]; a =
1; b = 0; = 0;  = 0:5.
trade option, independent rms do not reach the eciency of a centralized rm, but
they have opportunity to \help" each other and, thus the order quantities (and the
corresponding safety stock) decrease. When cost is high, similar logic applies: two
decentralized rms with trade option can bring the safety stock closer to the one of
centralized rm. Though not as eective as centralization, trading leads to better
decisions (closer to the centralized total inventory) when markets are independent.
Prot
Theorem II.8. In independent markets, the rms' prot with trade option is always
(weakly) higher than without trade option.
The traditional risk pooling includes two related benets: (1) transferring inven-
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tory across locations, when needed, and (2) more appropriate investment in total
inventory. The same two benets apply in our model. Even if the orders were forced
to be the same as for rms with no trade option, rms with trade option can trade
their inventory to better match the market size. Additionally, the rms will order
quantities closer to the quantities that a centralized rm would order. In our paper we
study these two eects (ordering a dierent quantity and trading) separately because,
when markets are competitive, they may have opposite eects on protability. We
call the rst one (ordering a dierent quantity) as \inventory pooling" and the sec-
ond one (trade of inventory without changing the original order sizes) as \inventory
trade."
The following example illustrates each of these eects: Consider demand function
qi = wi   pi and market sizes (w1; w2) equal to (12,20) or (20,12), with equal proba-
bilities. The purchasing cost c is 14. In no-trade scenario, the equilibrium quantity
is qNi = 1 with price p
N
i = 11 in the small market and p
N
j = 19 in the large market.
The revenue is 11 and 19, respectively. The expected prot for both rms is 1. To see
the eect of low-inventory trade, we keep the initial inventory unchanged at one, but
allow rms to trade. The trade equilibrium is to allocate two units to the large market
and zero units to small market, which results in the expected prot for both rms
equal to 4. In the trade scenario, rms will order slightly more, with qTi = 1:33 due
to risk pooling eect. Their expected prot is even higher at 4.44. In the centralized
scenario, two rms will order three units in total and each rm obtains a prot of 4.5.
Numerically we observe that, when the two markets are independent, prot with
trade option is very close to that in the centralized scenario. In examples we exam-
ined, it is common for the trade option to capture 98% of the eciency loss due to
decentralization. This is illustrated in Figure 2.5(b).
Summary of Four Mechanisms Eecting Prots and Consumer Surplus
We have idened four mechanisms that drive the changes to prots and to con-
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sumer surplus when trade option exists. The rst two, strategic over-ordering (to in-
crease bargaining power) and risk pooling inuence the size of the initial orders. The
other two take place in the trading phase, low-inventory trading and high-inventory
trading. Obviously, these mechanisms are not completely independent. For example,
due to strategic over-ordering, rms order more and as a result, high-inventory trade
is more likely.
Strategic over-ordering. Having an option to trade, the rms do have an
incentive to order more, solely to gain bargaining power in trading phase, rather than
to increase sales. As described in Section 2.4.3, over-ordering takes place when the
purchasing cost is very low and the markets are competitive (either b > 0 or  > 0
or both are positive).
Inventory pooling. When cost is low (high), rms with trade option order
less (more) compared to no-trade rms. This behavior takes place when there exists
market uncertainty.
The two mechanisms above inuence order quantity. The following two mecha-
nisms, high-inventory trading and low-inventory trading, were described in Section
2.4.3. They take place in the trading phase, after market uncertainties are resolved.
High-inventory trade. Firms trade inventory, but after the trade there is still
left-over inventory.
Low-inventory trade. Firms trade inventory, but after trade there are no left-
over units.
We will use all four mechanisms to explain the rm decisions and consumer surplus
in the rest of the paper.
Consumer Surplus
With no competition, for symmetric rms, consumer surplus increases due to trade
option, but in asymmetric settings it may decrease.
In symmetric settings, the intuitive behavior is as follows: the quantities that
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two decentralized rms order are equal to each other. With trade option, rms do
reallocate inventory in response to market size realizations and any deviation from
the equal distribution of available inventories, that does not lead to leftovers, benets
consumers (Lemma II.5).
Interestingly, this dynamics (low-inventory trade) may decrease the expected con-
sumer surplus when rms are not symmetric, with one rm having higher expected
sales than the other one. In asymmetric settings, especially when the small rm or-
ders very few units, for many realizations of demand, some inventory is transferred
from the big rm to the small rm, which results in less asymmetric allocation and
leads to lower consumer surplus compared to no-trade option.9
Now, let us take in consideration that the initial order quantities are not the same
in trade scenario and in no-trade scenario. In trade scenario, risk pooling brings the
decentralized inventory closer to the centralized one, but this means that rms with
trade option may order either more or less, compared to no-trade scenario, depending
whether cost is high or low. In independent market case, ordering more always
increases the consumer surplus, while ordering less hurts the consumer surplus. Since
higher inventory benets the consumers in independent markets, the combined eect
of low-inventory trade and risk pooling, increases the consumer surplus in most cases,
when rms trade inventory.
Interestingly, the consumer surplus in the trade scenario may even be higher than
that in the centralized scenario, see Figure 2.5 (c): when cost is small the rms order
more than in centralized case and are able to reallocate the inventory after market
sizes are observed selling to more consumers at lower prices. Since the rms' prots
are almost as high as in the centralized case, trading units between decentralized rms
9To illustrate this phenomenon, consider the extreme case where small rm faces very low market
size (say zero) with high probability and non-trivial market size with small probability. Let the cost
be high enough so that the small rm would order zero units, while the large rm has large enough
market size and places a positive order. In this case, the inventory trade takes place only when
the small rm faces positive market realization. If the rms trade, the allocation becomes less
asymmetric and, as discussed above, consumer surplus is lower.
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may, in such cases, be more desirable from consumers' viewpoint than centralization.
Summary of Stochastic Model - Independent Markets
To summarize, the best candidate for collaboration is when the markets are inde-
pendent and, thus, the competitive pressures due to pricing or future market share do
not exist. The trade allows the rms to adjust their inventories (low-inventory trade)
after uncertainty is realized according to their needs (market sizes), which benets
the rms. The rms are able, to obtain further benets by adjusting their initial
order levels through risk pooling. Both rms and consumers are better o with trade
in symmetric markets, but when markets are very asymmetric, consumers may be
worse o while rms are still better o.
2.5.2 Dependent Markets
Market dependence and reputation eects are reected through b > 0 and  > 0,
respectively. In the general model with both market dependencies and market uncer-
tainty, it is very challenging to characterize the equilibrium analytically. To make the
analysis more tractable, we assume that the market sizes are independent random
variables and follow the same uniform distribution (wi  [l; u]). We characterize the
equilibria for each of the market dependencies (one at a time) in Theorems II.9 and
II.10.
Theorem II.9. Assume that there exists short-term market dependence but no rep-
utation eect (b > 0;  = 0).
(1) Centralized scenario: There exists a unique optimal solution KC.
(2) No-trade scenario: If a  1:24b and u  4l=3, there exists at least one pure strat-
egy equilibrium (qN1 ; q
N
2 ).
(3) Trade scenario: If c  c(a; b; l; u), there exists at least one pure strategy equilib-
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rium (qT1 ; q
T
2 ), where
c(a; b; l; u) =
8>><>>:
au al+bu
2(a2 b2) , if u  3l
(7a+5b)u3 (27a+3b)lu2+(45a 21b)l2u (33a 27b)l3
12(a2 b2)(u l)2 , if u > 3l
:
The conditions in Theorems II.9 are not very demanding. For example, the con-
dition in Part (2) is easy to interpret. It requires the price sensitivity not to be very
large (b  a=1:24) and existence of some uncertainty (upper bound and lower bound
of market realizations are at least 1
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of the mean). Our numerical results suggest that
even when the necessary conditions are not satised, there always exists at least one
pure strategy equilibrium in both trade and no-trade scenarios.
Now we consider the case with the reputation eect.
Theorem II.10. Assume that there exists reputation eect, but no short-term market
dependence (b = 0;  > 0).
(1) Centralized scenario: There exists unique optimal ordering quantity KC.
(2) No trade scenario: There exists a unique equilibrium (qN1 ; q
N
2 ). Furthermore,
qNi is the dominant strategy for rm i (that is the value of q
N
i does not depend on
qj).
(3) Trade scenario: There exists at least one symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
(qT1 ; q
T
2 ).
Theorem II.10 only requires symmetry of markets and it continues to hold when
market distributions have general distributions and are possibly correlated.
The general model (b > 0;  > 0) is analytically intractable. Therefore, the
existence of equilibrium in a joint model (b > 0;  > 0) and the properties of equilibria
have to be tested numerically. Based on extensive numerical study, in both trade and
no-trade scenarios, the equilibrium always exists (even when the conditions imposed
in Theorems II.9 and II.10 are not satised). In order to understand how robust the
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eects identied in the previous sections are, we conduct the comparative statics and
study prot and consumer surplus behavior through an extensive numerical study.
In our study all results assume that two rms are symmetric until we explicitly relax
this assumption at the end of the section.
2.5.3 Dependent Markets - Comparative Statics
We are primarily interested in understanding the eect of trading on rms' prots
and consumer surplus. We use four mechanisms introduced earlier to explain both
prots and consumer surplus. We rst describe the eect of cost and market variabil-
ity. Then, we focus on the role of competition, by looking at the eect of substitution
(market dependence) and of the strength of reputation.
Eect of Cost and Variance
In Observation II.1 and corresponding Figure 2.6(a) we illustrate the change of
prot of the rms as a function of purchasing cost and market uncertainty. The
darker gray area denotes the cases where the prot or the consumer surplus in trade
scenario is higher compared to no-trade scenario.
Observation II.1 (Eect of Cost on Prot). When markets are competitive ( > 0,
 > 0), both rms benet from trade option, except:
(a) when the cost is fairly low; or
(b) when the cost is very high (but not so high that the rms sell nothing) and there
is strong reputation eect.
Point (a) of Observation II.1 eectively mimics the logic of the deterministic case,
described in Theorem II.3: when cost is low, the rms are worse o. For the area when
the rms are worse o (light gray area in Figure 2.6), over-ordering is the dominating
eect and high-inventory trade only partially eliminates (decreases) the disadvantage
of over-ordering. However, for super low costs, we have a dierent outcome: While
39
Cost
D
em
a
n
d
V
a
ri
a
n
ce
M
ea
su
re
d
b
y
(u
−
l)
Profit in trade scenario is higher.
Profit in no-trade scenario is higher.
Consumer surplus in trade scenario is higher.
Consumer surplus in no-trade scenario is higher.
Cost
D
em
a
n
d
V
a
ri
a
n
ce
M
ea
su
re
d
b
y
(u
−
l)
Figure 2.6: Prot(a) and consumer surplus(b) as a function of cost and demand vari-
ance.
over-ordering persists, the cost of over-ordering is not high, and the rms continue to
benet from trade.
Observation II.2 (Eect of Cost on Consumer Surplus). When markets are com-
petitive ( > 0;  > 0), consumer surplus increases due to rms having trade option,
except when the purchasing cost is very low.
Observation II.2 is illustrated in Figure 2.6(b). The behavior is driven by forces
described in Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2. When cost is very low, the high-inventory trade
eect is strong, which helps rms but drives consumer surplus down. Otherwise, the
low-inventory trade is the dominating eect, which increases consumer surplus, while
also helping rms.
Combining Observations II.1 and II.2, inventory trade contract is a win-win so-
lution for rms and consumers when cost is in the moderate range. Based on our
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extensive numerical analysis, the results described in Observations II.1 and II.2 and
shown in Figure 2.6 are consistent across all parameters we tested.
Observation II.3 (Eect of Variance). When cost is moderate (win-win for the rms
and consumers), the higher the variance, the more rms and consumers benet from
trade.
This is an intuitive outcome. When cost is moderate, the main impact is from risk
pooling and low-inventory trade. While pooling (adjustment of ordering quantities)
may slightly help, the main driver is frequent low-inventory trade, which benets both
rms and consumers. High variance makes the low-inventory trade occur more often.
Eect of Competition
Market dependence,  and reputation,  directly inuence ordering quantities
and, consequently, the trading phase. When either  or  increases, the competition
intensies and decentralized rms typically order more, as seen in Figure 2.7, and
then lower the prices, which results in lower prots. Consumers benet from more
intensive competition and consumer surplus increases. These behaviors are consistent
with those in the deterministic scenario.
Only exceptions to the monotonicity of the initial order quantity in  and  are
similar in nature to those in the deterministic setting, where rms switch from high
equilibrium to low equilibrium. However, instead of a jump, in stochastic case the
order quantity may smoothly decrease over a narrow range.
Below we characterize the eect of  and  on rms' prots and consumer surplus.
Observation II.4 (Eect of Competition -  and ).
(1)(Size of Benet for Firms and Consumers) When cost is in moderate range (win-
win takes place), the benet of trade for the rms (rm prots) and consumers (con-
sumer surplus) shrink as  increases.10
10The rms may be worse o when cost is very high. This observation applies to the moderate
range of costs.
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Figure 2.7: Comparative statics in  and .
(2)(When Firms Prefer Trading) As  increases or  increases, the better-o (for
rms) region becomes smaller.
The driving force for Observation II.4(1) is quantity ordered, as illustrated in
Figure 2.8. When  increases, decentralized rms (with or without trade) tend to
order more. Consequently, the benet of trade is smaller, as rms can usually satisfy
their demands using their own inventory. The consumers benet from more intense
competition, but as quantity ordered increases, the incremental benet of trading
decreases.
Part (2) expands on part (1): if the benet of trading decreases in , then the
region when trade is benecial also shrinks. The eect of reputation () is similar.
With higher  the rms also tend to order more { they compete to gain future prots.
When either of these forces (corresponding to  and ) increases, the order quantities
increase and high-inventory trade takes place more often, which lowers the consumer
surplus, as rms choose to have leftovers. However, as we describe below, at the same
time the prices the rms charge keep declining.
We also explicitly compare prices for trade and no-trade scenarios below.
42
(a
)O
rd
er
Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
q∗i ’s in Trade and No-trade scenarios almost overlap.
(b
)P
ro
fi
t
0 2
β
(c
)C
o
n
su
m
er
S
u
rp
lu
s
 
 
Trade
No trade
Centralized
Figure 2.8: Eect of . Parameters: w  U [10; 40]; = 1; c = 20; = 10;  = 0:5.
Observation II.5 (Price).
(1) In independent markets, the average selling price in trade scenario is always less
than or equal to the average price in no-trade scenario;
(2) In dependent markets, the average selling price in trade scenario is usually higher
(lower) than the average price in no-trade scenario when the cost is low (high).
Recall that the trade option shifts quantity upwards (downwards) when purchasing
cost is high (low). When cost is high, the order level of no-trade rms is low, but
trade rms order slightly more than no-trade rms.
In independent market, since trade rms order more than no-trade rms, their
prices should be even lower than the no-trade rms, reinforcing the decrease in prices.
When cost is low, the inventory level is high but trade rms order slightly fewer units.
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Although lower inventory may push prices to levels that are higher than no-trade
rms' prices, this eect is secondary and it is dominated by that the trade rms have
fewer leftovers (as explained above) and lower prices.
In dependent markets, trade rms provide lower prices for moderate to high cost
for the same reason as in independent markets. When cost is low, the high-inventory
trade eect matters and makes prices higher.
2.5.4 Asymmetric Markets
Now we relax the symmetry assumption. We focus on the case when two rms can
have dierent expected market sizes. In asymmetric settings equilibrium is not guar-
anteed. We, therefore, numerically test how prevalent such behavior is. Three key pa-
rameters are b 2 f0:1; 0:2; 0:4; 0:6; 0:8g,  2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10g, c 2 f0:1; 1; 5g.
Other parameters are xed at 1 = 10; 2 = 2; a = 1;  = 1, resulting in total of
150 combinations. This case is intended to illustrate a huge asymmetry in market
sizes (ve to one). Equilibrium exists in 117 of combinations (78%) in no-trade sce-
nario, and 126 combinations (84%) in trade scenario. However, if market size has
10% standard deviation, the statistics increase to 91% and 92% in no-trade and trade
scenarios. To see the eect of asymmetry, we consider more moderate 2 = 4. In
such a case, equilibrium is even more likely to exist. With deterministic market sizes,
equilibrium is found in 91% and 93% in no-trade and trade scenarios. With 10%
standard deviation, in 100% and 97% of cases, respectively. Thus, the equilibrium
may not exist, but this tends to happen with all of the following factors taking place
at the same time: two markets are very asymmetric, market uncertainty is very low,
and also both b and  are large. (If either b = 0 or  = 0, the equilibrium always
exists.) Therefore, we are able to conduct a numerical study to compare who benets
from trade in asymmetric settings for large set of relevant parameters.
Observation II.6 (Asymmetric Market Sizes - Eect of ). When  > 0, the large
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rm benets less (gets hurt more) in absolute terms from the inventory trade than the
small rm does.
Observation II.6 is illustrated in Figure 2.9. The x and y axis are the expected
market sizes of rms 1 and 2. Firm 1 is better o with the trade option in the dark
gray area, while otherwise it is worse o.
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Figure 2.9: Eect of asymmetric market sizes. Parameters: wi  U [35i; 75i]; a =
1:2; b = 0:2; c = 30; = 10;  = 1.
The following numerical example explains why this happens. Consider a deter-
ministic case with the following parameters  = 1; = 1; = 0;w1 = 20;w2 =
30; c = 8. Equilibrium in the no-trade scenario is qN1 = 7:33; q
N
2 = 10:67; 
N
1 =
35:85; N2 = 75:85; p1 = 14:89; p2 = 17:11. Equilibrium in the trade scenario is
qT1 = 7:75; q
T
2 = 10:25; 
T
1 = 37:32; 
T
2 = 74:84. The inventories and prices after
trade are q1 = 6:5; q2 = 11:5; p1 = 15:17; p2 = 16:83. Clearly, the large market has
higher margin, which implies higher selling price. The small rm, therefore, can sell
inventory to the large rm at a price higher than its purchasing cost and, anticipating
this outcome, the small rm intentionally orders more than it needs. The large rm
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facing such a situation chooses trade with the smaller rm for the following reason:
The large rm is aware that typically it will buy inventory from the small rm, but if
it refused to trade, both rms would have to lower their prices. The large rm, with
higher volume of sales, would suer more and actually, the cost of buying (unneces-
sary) inventory may often be lower than the loss of prot due to decreased price. We
observe this behavior for most parameters.11
Observation II.7 (Asymmetric Market Sizes - Eect of ). When  > 0 and the
small rm's order quantity is small, the small rm benets less (gets hurt more) in
absolute terms from the inventory trade contract than the large rm does.
The above dynamics is driven by small order quantity for the small rm in the
trade scenario. In such a case, the inventory of the small rm is not threatening to the
large rm. The large rm can order more and it benets due to risk pooling (when
cost is high risk pooling means ordering more). Eectively, the large rm can play a
strong hand. It orders more and, thus, can satisfy more (in expectation) of its own
customers. Moreover, the increased quantity that the large rm orders can be sold
to the small rm (when the market realization of the small rm is high). The small
rm may benet from trade, when its market realization is high (satisfying its own
demand and decreasing reputation losses), but the benet is small since the small
rm is charged high unit price for the traded inventory.
When both  and  are positive, combined eect of the two observations above is
illustrated in Figure 2.9. We see that in extremely asymmetric settings, trade rarely
benets both large and small rms, and the more symmetric the rms are, the more
often both rms benet from trade.
Throughout the analysis of asymmetric rms, we have kept here the assumption
that both rms share benet of collaboration equally, as this is the dominant model
11In some extreme cases, the balance of benets may change, but it requires cost of purchase c to
be very high, reputation eect  to be strong, as well as market uncertainty to be very high.
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for Nash bargaining game. However, in addition to market sizes, one may consider
another source of asymmetry that comes from unbalanced bargaining powers, i.e.,
one rm gets a larger portion of the benet than the other. In such cases, the less-
powered rm has little incentive to engage and, thus, rms are less likely to reach an
agreement to collaborate. In the extreme case, a rm who gets zero benet will not
participate in any inventory exchange.
Summary of Stochastic Model - Dependent Markets
In the last two subsections, we considered the rms that eectively compete with
each other either to increase the current-period prots or future market share. We
have consistently seen that the cost plays a pivotal role for both the rms and con-
sumers. For intermediate range of costs, trading may benet both the rms and the
consumers. This is when risk pooling and low-inventory are the two dominant eects.
Intuitively, one would expect that one of these parties (the rms or the consumers)
should be better o. Our results indicate that both are better o. When cost is very
low, the over-ordering may hurt the rms and high-inventory trade may also hurt the
consumers. This indicates low potential for trading in goods with very high margin.
For high costs, the consumers always benet from trade, but when the reputation
eect is very high, the rms typically are worse o. When market sizes are asym-
metric the benet for the rms decrease, compared to the symmetric case. We may
see either one or even both rms worse o, suggesting that the trade is more likely
between rms of similar sizes.
Regulators routinely take the consumers' point of view when deciding about le-
gality of business practices. We see that in the overwhelming majority of situations,
consumer surplus increases. Only at very low costs, the consumer surplus decreases.
Thus, from point of view of competitive forces and reputation eects, this model
would indicate fairly broad endorsement for allowing rms to collaborate through
trade.
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the question whether and when companies should collaborate
with other rms. We focus on a specic type of collaboration through inventory or
capacity trade contracts. The expected benets of collaboration are intuitive: the
rms should be able to improve resource utilization and are expected to increase
their prots. However, it is also expected that there might be negative externalities,
or potential drawbacks. These may come in both short term and long term. In
short term, if two markets are \dependent," where the products sold by two rms are
partially substitutable, the rms compete through pricing. The potential for selling
goods to competitor provides an incentive to increase initial orders and eventually
leads to more aggressive pricing. Also, selling inventory to competitor may translate
into a more-permanent shift of consumers from one rm to another, inuencing future
market shares. Combination of short-term and long-term dynamics makes it dicult
to assess whether the benet of inventory collaboration is net positive and if so, when
this is the case. It is also critical whether the net benet for consumers is positive, as
consumer welfare is at the core of all anti-trust decisions. While the current antitrust
law uses clear principles, current practices indicate that most of the collaborative
practices fall in the area where the verdict is based on the examination of gains and
losses of rms and consumer welfare.
Our paper considers a simple model that includes both short and long term eects.
We show that when markets are deterministic (or very close to being deterministic),
the rms do not have an incentive to get involved in inventory trade (except in the case
of extremely low costs). The demand in such cases is predictable and the rms can
order the needed quantities. If rms open themselves to a partnership that involves
trading, they actually may get worse o, as they create new incentives to build excess
inventories. Agreements in such situations, while unlikely, would lead to increase of
consumer welfare.
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If companies face uncertain markets, the inventory trade contract is more promis-
ing and the eects may be quite signicant. In markets which are fairly independent,
companies always benet (obtain higher prots), when they trade inventory. More-
over, in such situations, the consumer surplus is also higher, except when one market
is larger than the other by a very signicant margin. These benets are driven by
standard inventory pooling and inventory adjustment practices.
When competition is present, rms of similar sizes often benet from trading
inventory. They are worse o only when the purchasing cost is either very low or
very high. Both very low or very high costs lead to excessive inventories compared
to no-trade case. The trade contract increases consumer surplus in majority of cases,
as long as the purchasing cost is not very low. Therefore, the trade contract ends
up being a win-win solution when the purchasing cost is in the moderate range.
Market uncertainty increases the benets of trade to both the rms and also to the
consumers. When rms face signicantly asymmetric markets, either one or both of
the rms may be worse o due to trading. Consequently, the rms are unlikely to
collaborate in such markets. Our model conrms behavior observed in practice, where
we do not see many rms of dramatically dierent sizes being engaged in any type
of inventory exchange. It also provides a more precise tool from legal point of view
highlighting and, possibly eliminating the cases where consumer surplus is increased
versus threatened.
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CHAPTER III
Minimum Advertised Price Policy: Economic
Analysis and Implications
3.1 Introduction
As technology advances, it has become unprecedentedly easy for shoppers to col-
lect price information from dierent retailers. Due to the proliferation of online retail-
ers and discount stores, many brick-and-mortar retailers suer from eroded margins.
Customers are able to experience the product in one store but make the purchase
from another retailer, which oers lower price but does not provide product demon-
stration or auxiliary services. Brick-and-mortar retailers typically cannot match the
price of low-cost competition, since they incur higher overhead costs due to higher
rent, number of employees who provide in-store assistance, and advertising. As a
result, brick-and-mortar retailers stop promoting or even carrying products which are
involved in such price competition that results in lower prots. For manufacturers,
however, brick-and-mortar retailers are an important channel through which prod-
ucts are showcased and promoted to customers. Low-cost retailers are not capable of
playing this role due to their lack of resources such as space and service personnel.
Therefore, manufacturers would have hard time reaching to a large market without
brick-and-mortar retailers which invest resources into demonstrating and advertising
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their products.
Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) policy is a widely used mechanism in many
industries including patent medicine, electronics and fashion. It can help manufac-
turers control retail prices and thus protect the margin from being eroded. Under
RPM policy, the manufacturer sets a minimum price for the product and requires all
retailers not to price below it. Since the Supreme Court ruled to judge RPM under a
rule-of-reason standard rather than being per se illegal in 2007 (see Gundlach 2010,
for the legal status of RPM), an increasing number of manufacturers have embraced
the RPM policy. Now RPM policy can be found in many product categories from
toys and electronics to fashion and home improvement. For example, Tarr (2014)
indicates Sharp uses RPM policy to price some of its high-end televisions. When the
authors of this article checked the price of the popular 80-inch TV (model number:
80UQ17U), it was retailing for the $3999 (as of Feb 26, 2015) in all reputable retail-
ers, including BestBuy, Sears, Amazon.com, etc. Sales agents at Sears (as well as
Sears.com) even indicated that additional discounts did not apply to that particular
television by the following statement: \Due to high levels of quality, style and per-
formance, the price is set by manufacturer and additional discounts do not apply."
The standard justication given by the practitioners and the existing literature for
manufacturers' use of the RPM policy is that by setting the minimum selling price,
brick-and-mortar retailers' margins are protected and they are no longer threatened
by their low-cost competitors and, thus, can spend more eort on consumer acqui-
sition. Meanwhile, the price restraint also creates a barrier for low-cost retailers to
compete. As consumers expect price to be the same in all retailers (in a perfectly
competitive market), they tend to make purchase at brick-and-mortar retailers where
they can test the product before purchase and enjoy better customer service. There-
fore, RPM policy tends to benet manufacturers and brick-and-mortar retailers at
the expense of low-cost retailers.
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Recently, another vertical price restraint mechanism, Minimum Advertised Price
(MAP) policy, has gained increased popularity. Under MAP policy, manufacturers
set a \suggested" retail price. Retailers can sell at any price, but they are not allowed
to advertise prices lower than the MAP price. To be precise, retailers cannot list
any price lower than MAP price next to the product on either their catalogue or
website. Instead, they may ask customers to \call for price" or \click for price."
MAP was originally used as a mechanism to decrease the change of legal action
(MacKay and Smith 2014): Before Supreme Court's decision in 2007, RPM was
ruled as per se illegal, while MAP was not. Use of MAP provided additional legal
exibility while achieving similar outcome. The 2007 decision caused a signicant
shift, as both RPM and MAP are considered \legal" and, thus, to the major obstacles
to their implementation disappeared.The volume of research papers and business
articles referring to MAP and RPM has increased and most noticeably, several legal
rms promote the use of MAP and RPM by oering advice how to use it. The
authors' experience is also that we see an overwhelming increase in click/email-for-
price phenomenon, which might be inuenced both by its legality and by the fast
growing Internet-based retail. MAP may be implemented in multiple ways. For
example, one Canon lens (EF-S 17-55mm f/2.8 IS USM) is listed at $879 (as of Feb
26, 2015) across all authorized distributors. One retailer states that lower price is
available but cannot be listed due to Canon's pricing policy. One of the authors lled
out a price request form and emailed this authorized distributor and was quoted
a price of $819 for exactly the same lens. While obstacles to implementing MAP
and RPM eectively disappeared, it seems that the use of MAP has experienced
unparallel growth. E.g., iIt is dicult to nd a website with no \click-for-price." It
may still be argued that MAP is easier to defend or implement, we instead focus
on economic benets of choosing one versus the other.Managers have argued whether
MAP policy benets only brick-and-mortar stores at the expense of low-cost retailers,
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or it is benecial to both. Under MAP those consumers who value their time more
than others would buy in brick-and-mortar retailers rather than putting forth eort
to search for a lower price. Other consumers, who have more time to search, can
experience the product in brick-and-mortar retailer but eventually buy from low-cost
retailers.
The debate between RPM and MAP policies exists not only among managers but
also among legislators, who mostly focus on the impact of price restraining policies
on consumer surplus. Some legislators point out that RPM policy makes brick-and-
mortar retailers more protable, which then enables them to provide better service
to consumers. But others have argued that MAP policy makes available lower prices
and more options to consumers. So far there is no clear answer to which policy is
more of consumers' interest.
In this paper, we build a stylized model to study the performance of RPM policy
and MAP policy under various market situations. In our model, we consider one
manufacturer supplying one product to two retailers. The manufacturer rst chooses
between RPM policy and MAP policy, and then sets the wholesale price and the
retail price. One of the retailers models brick-and-mortar retailers that are able
to generate demand through advertising, in-store assistance and other supporting
customer services. The other retailer represents low-cost retailers who do not generate
demand but serve consumers who are willing to search for the low price oered by
these retailers. We call the rst type the regular retailer or retailer 1. The second
type is referred as the free rider or retailer 2. We also use retailers to refer to both
of them. Under RPM policy, both retailers sell at the same public price suggested by
the manufacturer. Under MAP policy, the regular retailer sells at the price suggested
by the manufacturer, while the free rider oers a lower price which can be found at
a cost by consumers. Consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous in their incomes.
Their valuation of the product and their time value are both associated with their
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income level. They buy from whichever retailer oers a higher nonnegative net utility.
In this context, we ask the following research questions: (1) Which policy, RPM or
MAP, performs better for the manufacturer? (2) Under which policy the retailers
earn higher prot? (3) Under which policy consumers have higher surplus? (4) If any
party (typically the manufacturer) in the supply chain is able to contract the required
search cost leading to the free rider under MAP policy, what would be the optimal
search cost?
We nd that there is no dominant policy for the manufacturer. MAP policy
outperforms when the customer's valuations are very heterogeneous and the search
cost is high. In general, the regular retailer serves high-end customers, while the
free rider serves low-end ones. With high heterogeneity and high search cost, the
manufacturer eectively expands the market and segments it, without losing surplus
from high-end customers. In other situations, under MAP the regular retailer loses
signicant number of customers to the free rider and, thus, has little incentive to create
demand. RPM policy is, in such situations, more protable for the manufacturer. In
terms of the retailers' preference, not surprisingly, RPM policy is never preferred by
the free rider as the free rider earns zero prot under RPM while MAP policy allows
the free rider to compete. Interestingly, the regular retailer also prefers MAP over
RPM when customers' valuations span a large range and the search cost is high.
Under MAP policy, the presence of free rider encourages the manufacturer to lower
the wholesale price to increase the market share and the lower wholesale price benets
the regular retailer. Consumers benet from MAP policy when the valuations have
either very small or very large variance. When the variance is very large, MAP policy
allows the free rider to serve low end customers, who would not be served otherwise.
When the variance is very low, the manufacturer and regular retailer can take away
most surplus under RPM policy by setting retail price close to every customer's
willingness to pay. Under MAP policy, however, the customers buying from the free
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rider continue to enjoy a signicant surplus. Finally, we nd that the manufacturer,
retailers even consumers prefer strictly positive search cost which enables the market
segmentation.
3.2 Literature Review
This work is closely related to the research on vertical restraints. Among var-
ious types of vertical restraints, the most popular ones are franchise fees, quantity
forcing, closed territory distribution, and price restraints. Highly cited (Mathewson
and Winter 1984) describes the landscape of vertical restraints. More recent paper
(Rey and Verge 2008) approaches the same topic from practical (legal) point of view
and identies the same types of restraints.Franchise fees are a payment of a xed
fee on top of any variable purchase cost. Quantity forcing is a provision in which-
manufacturer mandates a minimum/maximum purchase quantity. Closed territory
distribution species a geographical area that each retailer is allowed to serve. Many
of the above mechanisms may achieve channel coordination in their settings, but they
attempt to overcome dierent frictions. Franchise fees are eliminating (or in practice
decreasing the eect of) double marginalization. Quantity forcing may be used for
multiple reasons, but often they also enforce minimum purchase thus, again, over-
coming the smaller purchase due to higher price (double marginalization). Closed
territory distribution is used mostly to protect franchisees or other retailers in order
to guarantee minimum prot for them. Price restraints may be the broadest among
these categories. We focus on price restraints in a market with heterogeneous cus-
tomers and evaluate how use of RPM or MAP may help the manufacturer. Most of the
other papers use Hotelling setting with otherwise homogeneous customers and could
not (at least easily) apply to settings with dramatically dierent delivery channels.
Therefore, instead of broadly considering all types of vertical restraints, this paper
focuses on and compares the two major mechanisms of price restraints - RPM and
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MAP. Commonly used by manufacturers, RPM has been studied for a few decades.
Telser (1960), Marvel and McCaerty (1985), Mathewson and Winter (1998) and
Klein (2009) are among the papers that qualitatively analyze pro-competitive and
anti-competitive eects of RPM in dierent historical periods. There is also a vol-
ume of theoretical literature on this topic { an insightful summary can be found in
MacKay and Smith (2014). In this literature, a number of authors emphasize that
RPM is intended to improve non-contractible service by restricting price competition.
Mathewson and Winter (1983, 1984) consider a non-contractible service in the form
of advertising eort, where only customers informed by the advertising eort make
purchases. However, as a result of information spillovers, informed customers may
purchase goods or services from rm other than the one investing in advertising and
educating consumers. Mathewson and Winter (1983) studies RPM and models con-
sumers' heterogeneity in search cost, which allows discount retailers to free-ride the
service oered by advertising retailers with a lower but hidden price. They suggest
RPM be used to eliminate the service free-riding and, thus, to improve the manufac-
turer's prot. In Mathewson and Winter (1984), consumers vary in their distance to
the retailers, but do not search. With both information spillover and imperfect price
competition, retailers tend to price lower than optimal and invest too little in the ser-
vice. The paper shows that RPM, along with a xed fee (such as a franchising fee),
leads to supply chain coordination and achieves joint prot maximum. Winter (1993)
interprets the service as the in-store assistance that enhances shoppers' experience.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their locations (in a Hotelling framework) and also
in their valuations of in-store assistance. Similar to Mathewson and Winter (1984),
without any price restraints, retailers price too low compared to the optimal price
for the whole channel and underinvest in service. The paper shows that RPM can
correct this distortion. Other papers such as (Marvel and McCaerty 1984, Bolton
and Bonanno 1988, Perry and Porter 1990) using dierent models also show that
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when retailers compete in both price and non-price attributes, RPM helps recover
the supply chain from setting sub-optimally low prices.Our RPM model follows the
spirit of economics literature by considering the same forces as most RPM papers. It
may be interpreted as special case of Mathewson and Winter (1984), with one dif-
ference in that the manufacturer does not charge xed fee to retailers. The xed fee
actually does not change the conclusions of Mathewson and Winter (1984) and could
be included in our model as well. However, our focus is on comparison with MAP,
which is not modeled in Mathewson and Winter (1984) or in the later papers that
build on Mathewson and Winter (1984). Including the xed fee would obviously com-
plicate our analysis, without necessarily changing the insights. We conrm through
numerical study that the results, conclusions, and the insights in this study continue
to hold in the more general setting.
The literature on vertical price restraints primarily focuses on RPM rather than
MAP. To our knowledge, there are only two analytical studies, Kali (1998) and
Cetinkaya (2009), that dierentiate MAP from RPM. Kali (1998) employs the same
spatial demand model as in Winter (1993) but extends it by including retailers' adver-
tising decision and manufacturer's subsidy decision. Cetinkaya (2009), on the other
hand, models multiple retailers whose advertising eort has positive externality for
other retailers. Regardless of the modeling choice, both papers dene MAP as a ver-
sion of RPM where the manufacturer subsidizes retailers' advertising expense. They
show that a combination of RPM and the subsidy can maximize the channel prot,
while RPM individually is insucient. Both papers assume that any of the retailers
cannot sell at lower-than-MAP price even it is not advertised. In our paper, however,
we model MAP exactly as implemented in practice, i.e., retailers under MAP policy
can price lower than the manufacturer suggested price but cannot advertise the low
price. MacKay and Smith (2014) studies both RPM and MAP (as dened in practice)
across multiple products empirically. It shows that there are observable dierences
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between products sold under RPM and MAP policies in terms of prices and quan-
tities sold. Our paper, to our knowledge, is the rst attempt to formally model the
free-riding behavior and is the rst theoretical work that predicts that existence of
free riders may be benecial to manufacturers under certain circumstances.
RPM and MAP are used to increase retailers' sales eort, and often also to re-
strain prices. Sales eort is also studied in contexts dierent than vertical restraints.
We describe these papers below, even though none of them deals with the central
questions of our paper of manufacturer choosing between RPM and MAP contracts.
Taylor (2002) and Krishnan et al. (2004) consider supply chain coordination with sales
eort. Iyer (1998) and Tsay and Agrawal (2000) focus on the supply chain dynamics
when a manufacturer sells through two competing retailers, both of which have to
decide their eort levels. Sales eort may be in form of dissemination of product
information to attract consumers. Butters (1977) models multiple sellers, who send
their price to random consumers at a cost. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) and Sober-
man (2004) extend this model by introducing spatial dierentiation of consumers and
study the impact of market competition. Iyer et al. (2005) studies advertising strat-
egy that allows competing rms to target advertising to dierent groups of consumers
within a market. All the above papers assume that the consumers are passive (they
do not search for alternative sellers) and focus, instead, on characterizing the equilib-
rium strategy of retailers: advertise or not advertise. In our paper, consumers actively
search for price information incurring a search cost and we focus on manufacturer's
choice of RPM and MAP.
The search behavior is studied by Burdett and Judd (1983), Stahl (1989), Salop
and Stiglitz (1977). In Burdett and Judd (1983), Stahl (1989) consumers incur a
positive cost for each additional price quote, while in (Salop and Stiglitz 1977) con-
sumers pay a one-time fee to collect price information from all retailers. A detailed
review of both approaches can be found in Baye et al. (2006). These papers focus
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on characterizing price competition without studying the supply chain dynamics and
sales eort.
A few papers study both the sales eort of retailers and consumer search. Janssen
and Non (2009) studies the role of informative advertising when consumers are able to
search. They show that equilibrium advertised price can be higher than unadvertised
price because it spares consumers of some search cost. In Desai et al. (2010) and
Iyer and Kuksov (2012), retailers have to decide not only the advertising strategy but
also service levels. While advertising is solely informational, consumers gain positive
utility from the service and this is unconditional on making any purchase. Their
models allow consumers to enjoy the service at one location but purchase at the
other, with additional search cost incurred. Though our model combines retailers'
sales eort and consumer search as well, the focus is on the manufacturer. The
advertised price and advertising strategy are both determined by the manufacturer
rather than retailers as assumed in papers listed above. While sales eort is well
studied, our paper is the rst to characterize MAP with a consumer search model
and we focus on manufacturer's perspective rather than retailers'.
3.3 Model and Preliminary Results
We study a supply chain composed of a manufacturer and two retailers: a brick-
and-mortar retailer and an online/low cost retailer. The brick-and-mortar retailer
(regular retailer) can generate demand through activities such as advertising, in-store
assistance and other supporting customer services. The free rider do not generate
demand but can serve the consumers informed by the regular retailer. The sequence
of events is as follows.
Stage 1: Manufacturer chooses price restraining policy: RPM policy or MAP
policy.1 Manufacturer also decides the wholesale price w and the suggested retail
1The manufacturer does not generate any demand. If the manufacturer does not impose price
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price p in either policy. It is assumed that the manufacturer is unable to discriminate
retailers through wholesale price due to either legal or economic reasons. This is
a common assumption in literature studying one manufacturer supplying multiple
retailers, as seen in Iyer (1998), Tsay and Agrawal (2000), Desai et al. (2010), Iravani
et al. (2013).
Stage 2: Given the oering from the manufacturer, the regular retailer decides the
size of the demand, denoted by , which is generated at a cost, 1
2
2. The cost includes
expenses made to items such as support services, advertisement, and overhead. Other
papers that study sales eort (e.g., Soberman 2004, Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Desai
et al. 2010) also use similar quadratic cost functions to model the cost of sales eort.
We also test other forms of convex cost structure. While analytically intractable, we
conrm that all lessons in this paper continue to hold through numerical study in
Section 3.6.2. Without loss of generality, we normalize  to one. The free rider and
the manufacturer are not capable of providing such services, and therefore, all the
demand is assumed to be generated by the regular retailer in our model.
Stage 3: The regular retailer sells at the suggested retail price p under either
policy. The free rider sells at the suggested price under RPM policy but sets its own
selling price, p2, under MAP policy.
A consumer's valuation for the product is given by v + (1  v)x where 0  v  1
and x is uniformly distributed, x 2 [0; 1]. x is the consumer's value of time which
is positively correlated with the income level of a consumer. Similar to models of
Janssen and Non (2009) and Iravani et al. (2013), both consumer's product valua-
tion and time value are proportional to her income level. The implicit assumption is
that the consumers' valuation of product and their value of time are perfectly corre-
lated. The situation with imperfect correlation is considered and evaluated in Section
constraints, since the products are perfect substitutes, retailers undercut each other's price and at
equilibrium the regular retailer has no incentive to generate demand. As a result, every party in
this game earns zero prot.
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3.6.1. Without loss of generality, we can normalize consumers' valuation between v
and 1, using v to vary the heterogeneity in consumers' valuations. As v increases
(decreases), the market becomes more homogenous (heterogeneous) in terms of con-
sumer valuations for the product. If a customer, with time value x, buys from the
regular retailer, she pays price p and earns a surplus of v + (1   v)x   p. If this
customer decides to buy from the free rider under MAP policy, she has to spend 
units of time searching for the hidden price p2. The search cost is x, resulting in net
consumer surplus v + (1  v)x  p2   x. The consumer buys from the retailer that
oers higher non-negative surplus. If both surpluses are negative, she does not buy.
With this consumer specication, the demand for each retailer can be derived.
Given the regular retailer's price p and the free rider's price p2, let di(p; p2) denote
the percentage market share. Since the total number of consumers in the market is
, the number of customers served by retailer i is di(p; p2). The explicit expressions
for di(p; p2) is presented in Table 3.1. In the rest of the paper, we simply use di and
drop the arguments (p; p2) unless there is any ambiguity.
Condition d1 d2
+ v < 1; p  v + 
p2  p  p v1 v 1 p1 v 0
p    p2 < p  p v1 v 1  p p2 p p2   p2 v1  v
v  p2 < p   0 1  p2 v1  v
p2 < v 0 1
+ v < 1; v  p < v + 
p2  p  p v1 v 1 p1 v 0
v  p2 < p  p v1 v 1  p p2 p p2   p2 v1  v
p    p2 < v 1  p p2 p p2
p2 < p   0 1
+ v  1; v  p
p2  v 1 p1 v 0
p  p v
1 v  p2 < v 1 p1 v v p2+v 1
p    p2 < p  p v1 v 1  p p2 p p2
p2 < p   0 1
p < v
p2  p 1 0
p    p2 < p 1  p p2 p p2
p2 < p   0 1
Table 3.1: Market share function di(p; p2).
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3.3.1 Centralized Supply Chain
We rst model a centralized supply chain as a benchmark. In a centralized supply
chain, the manufacturer chooses retailers' prices and the demand generation eort.
There are three decision variables: demand generated , price at regular retailer p,
price at free rider p2. The manufacturer's problem is to maximize the total prot C ,
sum of revenues from both retailers minus the cost of demand generation:
max
p;p2;
C = (pd1 + p2d2)   1
2
2: (3.1)
3.3.2 RPM Policy
Under RPM policy, both retailers' prices are set by the manufacturer at p. We
assume that all customers, if they make any purchase, buy from the regular retailer
when prices are the same. Given price p, the market share of the regular retailer
(p  v is assumed because pricing lower than v leaves positive surplus to consumers
and the retailer can increase revenues by increasing the price at least to v) is equivalent
to d1 =
1 p
1 v . The regular retailer's prot, 1, is given by
1 = d1(p  w)  1
2
2:
It is easy to show that the prot function is concave in . Solving the rst order
condition in  for the regular retailer, we obtain the optimal number of customers to
generate as
 = (p  w)d1:
Finally we consider the manufacturer's problem. The manufacturer sets the whole-
sale price w and RPM price p such that its prot (wholesale price times the total sales
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to the retailers), M , is maximized:
RPM = max
w0;pv
RPM = w
d1 =
w(p  w)(1  p)2
(1  v)2 : (3.2)
3.3.3 MAP Policy
Lastly we state the problem under MAP policy. We formulate the problem start-
ing with stage 3, the free rider's pricing problem and proceed to stage 2 (demand
generation) and 1 (wholesale price and suggested retail price selection) respectively.
Free Rider: p2
At the nal stage of the game, the free rider makes pricing decision given wholesale
price, regular retailer's price and total consumer demand, (w; p; ). The free rider's
problem is to maximize its prot 2:
max
p2
2 = d2(p2   w): (3.3)
Note that  is determined by the regular retailer earlier so it is a constant here. For
dierent tuples of (w; p; ; v), the free rider responds in very dierent ways, depending
on whether it competes with the regular retailer for a portion of the consumers, or
whether it intends to cover the whole customer spectrum. We dene 'competition' in
this paper as follows: Two retailers are competing, if there exist a customer who gets
strictly positive surplus buying from either retailer. According to this denition, when
retailers are not competing, there may be customers who receive positive surplus when
they purchase from one of the retailers but not from both retailers. Apparently the
free rider's response depends on the wholesale price w and the regular retailer's price
p. We rst dene regions in w and p and then characterize the free rider's decision, p2,
in each region. Regions are dened as follows (see Figure 3.1 for a graphic illustration
63
of regions):
S11 = f(w; p) : + v < 1; p > v + ;w < 2v +   1g ;
S12 = f(w; p) : + v < 1; p > v + ; 2v +   1 < w < 2p    1g ;
S13 =

(w; p) : + v < 1; p > v + ; 2p    1 < w < p    1  p
1  v

;
S14 = f(w; p) : p < v + ;w < p  2g ;
S2 =

(w; p) : + v < 1; p    1  p
1  v < w < p  + 
1  p
1  v ;
w > 2v +   p  1  p
1  v

;
S31 =

(w; p) : + v < 1; p  + 1  p
1  v < w < p

;
S32 = f(w; p) : + v  1; v < w < pg ;
S4 =

(w; p) : + v < 1; 2v   p < w < 2v +   p  1  p
1  v ; p < v + 

;
S5 = f(w; p) : + v < 1; p  2 < w < 2v   p; w < pg[
(w; p) : + v  1; p  2 < w < p+ 2v   p
1  v ; w < p

;
S6 =

(w; p) : + v  1; p+ 2v   p
1  v < w < 2p  v + 2
v   p
1  v

;
S7 =

(w; p) : + v  1; 2  2  v < w < v; v + (1  v)(v   w)
2(+ v   1) < p < 1

:
In Figure 3.1, note that the regions are dened dierently whether  + v > 1 or
not. A customer with time value x has product valuation v+(1 v)x. As x increases,
consumer's valuation for the product increase as well as her search cost x. If she
buys from the regular retailer, her surplus is v + (1   v)x   p. If she buys from the
free rider, paying p2, her surplus is v + (1   v)x   p2   x = v + (1  v   )x   p2.
If  + v > 1, the search cost increases faster than the consumer's valuation in x.
Therefore, the consumer surplus from the free rider is decreasing in x, i.e., the free
rider attracts customers who have time value lower than the threshold, (v  p2)=(v+
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(a) v + α < 1
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
w
p
(b) v + α ≥ 1
S1
S3
S5
S6 S7
Figure 3.1: Illustration for Si's.
  1). As a result, the two retailers can be either local monopolists (customers who
have medium time value are not served by either retailer) or competitors (medium
time value consumers are served by one of the retailers and receive positive surplus),
depending on whether customers in the middle range are served by any of the retailers.
If +v  1, the consumer's valuation of product increases faster in x than her search
cost and the surplus is increasing in x. This means the free rider nds it protable to
serve customers whose time value is greater than the threshold. Therefore, high-end
customers are appealing to both retailers, If the free rider stays in the market, it is in
competition with the regular retailer (high-end consumers gets positive surplus from
either one of the retailers).
For each region, the free rider's best response, p2, is summarized in Table 3.2.
2 We
dene S1 as the union of S1k, k = 1; 2; 3; 4, because we will see later that the manu-
facturer's prot is zero in all four regions. Similarly, we also dene S3 = S31
S
S32 as
they are the same from the manufacturer's viewpoint. The dynamics can be very dif-
ferent from one region to another and have signicant impact on the manufacturer's
2p2 is derived by plugging d2(p; p2) from Table 3.1 into its prot function (3.3).
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decision. Therefore, these regions are frequently referred in both the main body of
the paper and the proof. It also worth noting that all regions are dened as open
sets. The p2 for a tuple (w; p; ; v) on the boundaries between regions are derived by
taking limit from left in w.
Region p2 d1 d2 Characteristics
S11 v 0 1
Regular retailer has no demand.
S12
1+w 
2
0 1  w
2(1  v)
S13 p   0 1 p(1  v)
S14 p   0 1
S2
w+p+v p pv wv
2(1 v)
2 p v
2(1 v)   p w2 p w2   w v2(1  v)
Low-end customers not served.
Two retailers compete for demand.
S31 p   (p v)1 v 1 p1 v 0 Free rider has no demand.
S32 v
1 p
1 v 0
S4 v 1  p v p v All customers served.
Two retailers compete for demand.S5
p+w
2
1  p w
2
p w
2
S6 p   (p v)1 v 1 p1 v p v1 v
All customers served.
Two retailers do not compete.
S7
p+w
2
1 p
1 v
v w
2(+v 1)
Medium range customers not served.
Two retailers do not compete.
Table 3.2: Solution to the free rider's problem and resulting market share.
The free rider's price p2 has the following properties.
Lemma III.1.
(1) p2 is non-decreasing in w;
(2) p2 is non-decreasing in p, except when 1   v  ; p  v; p   2(p v)1 v < w 
2p  v   2(p v)
1 v ;
(3) p2 is non-increasing in .
As the wholesale price w increases, the free rider has to increase its price in order
to maintain a proper margin. When w is high enough ((w; p) 2 S3), the free rider will
not participate the game and the manufacturer replicates the outcome under RPM
policy. As the regular retailer's price p increases, the free rider faces less competition
and is able to charge a higher price. There is an exception though. When the retailers
serve all the customers but have no competition (d1 + d2 = 1), the free rider would
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not lower its price any more as it is very costly to compete with the regular retailer.
If, however, the regular retailer raises its price and gives up some customers in the
middle, the free rider would set a lower price capturing those customers until all
customers are served again. The last part of the lemma says that as it gets harder
to search for the free rider, free rider has to lower its price to give customers extra
incentive to search.
Regular Retailer: 
The regular retailer chooses the optimal sales eort or advertisement level. In our
model, this is equivalent to choosing the level of total demand :
max

1 = d1(p  w)  1
2
2: (3.4)
Solving the rst order condition, we obtain optimal number of customers  = (p  
w)d1.
Manufacturer: w and p
In the rst stage of the game, the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w and
the suggested retail price p:
MAP = max
w;p
MAP = w
(d1 + d2) = w(p  w)d1(d1 + d2): (3.5)
Recall that di is a function of p and p2. Substituting p

2 from Table 3.2, we write M
as a function of only (w; p; ; v). Depending on the region (w; p) falls in, we dene
M = Mi; if (w; p) 2 Si; i = 1; :::; 7:
In each region, the manufacturer's prot is given as follows:
M1 = 0;
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M2 =
w(p  w)[(2  p  v)  (1  v)(p  w)][(1  v)(2  p  w)  (2  p  v)]
4(1  v)2(1    v) ;
M3 =
w(p  w)(1  p)2
(1  v)2 ;
M4 =
w(p  w)(+ v   p)

;
M5 =
w(p  w)(2+ w   p)
2
;
M6 =
w(p  w)(1  p)
1  v ;
M7 =
w(p  w)(1  p)(2p+ 3v + 2  w   2p  2pv + wv   v2   2)
2(1  v)2(+ v   1) :
3.4 Results
In the previous section, we formulated the problem under dierent policies and
studied the behavior of the retailers with the manufacturer's decision given. The
manufacturer faces a market characterized by (; v). In this section we rst study the
manufacturer's optimal decision given a certain market condition. Then we compare
RPM and MAP policies from the perspective of each party within the supply chain.
3.4.1 Centralized Supply Chain
First we analyze the manufacturer's prot in a centralized supply chain. The op-
timal prices set by the manufacturer and the demand generated are given in Theorem
III.1 and graphically shown in Figure 3.2.
Theorem III.1. The optimal prices of the regular retailer and free rider and the total
demand generation are:
(a) If + 2v  1, p = 1=2; p2 = (1  )=2;  = 1  v4(1  v) ;
(b) If + 2v > 1 and + v  1, p = v + =2; p2 = v;  = =4 + v ;
(c) If +v > 1 and (1 2v) (1 v)2 <= 0, p = 2v 2v+v2+1
2
; p2 =
3v 2v +v2+1
2
;  =
4v 2v+v2+1
4
;
(d) If (1  2v)  (1  v)2 > 0, p = 1=2; p2 = v=2;  = v
3 v2 v +1
4(1 v)(1  v) .
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The optimal prot is C =
1
2
2:
0 1 2
0
1
α
v
A
B C
D
Figure 3.2: Optimal solution in centralized supply chain.
The centralized manufacturer does not exclude the free rider even though it can-
nibalizes the high-margin sales through the regular retailer when  + v > 1. This is
because the free rider serves additional low to middle range customers, the portion
that the regular retailer cannot serve due to higher price. The search cost here is used
as an instrument to segment customers. Thus the centralized manufacturer achieves
higher prot than a situation when it only sells through the regular retailer.
Figure 3.2 demonstrates behavior of the manufacturer in  and v. In region A,
though both retailers have positive sales, the low-end customers are not served. This
is because their valuations are too low, and even the free rider cannot protably set
a price appealing to them. The other reason that prevents the free rider to price
low is that small search cost, which makes it harder to dierentiate customers. If
the free rider lowers its price, demand of the regular retailer is cannibalized easily
due to low search cost which results in low demand generation. In region B, all the
customers are covered as the supply chain faces both higher customer valuation and
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higher search cost. In both region C and D, the manufacturer makes the two retailers
local monopolists. In region C, all the customers are served because the customer
valuation is relatively high. Otherwise, in region D, it is very costly to cover all the
customers. As  + v > 1, the free rider targets customers whose valuation is smaller
than a threshold. Therefore, the customers in the middle range are ignored in region
D.
The analysis of the centralized supply chain illustrates the key idea of how the
presence of free rider can help improve the protability. As the prices and demand
generation are determined centrally, demand generation is not tied only to the regular
retailer's prot and the cannibalization is not a big concern. In reality, more than
often the manufacturer is able to contract only the regular retailer's price, but not the
eort level (demand generation) or the free rider's price. We next study the dynamics
in a decentralized setting.
3.4.2 RPM Policy
The solution to the RPM policy is given by the following theorem.
Theorem III.2. Under RPM policy, the manufacturer's optimal suggested retail
price, wholesale price and prot are
p = max

1
2
; v

; w =
p
2
; RPM =
(1  p)2p2
4(1  v)2 =
8>><>>:
1
64(1 v)2 , if v  12
1
4
v2, if v > 1
2
:
One element in our model is that the regular retailer is the only party that gen-
erates demand. If the manufacturer increases w, each unit contributes more revenue
but the regular retailer's margin decreases, discouraging the demand generation ef-
fort. If the manufacturer increases p, the regular retailer's margin becomes higher,
but its market share becomes lower. The manufacturer chooses a price higher than
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the wholesale price that balance these two eects. Under MAP policy which we ana-
lyze next, multiple eects complicate the trade-os, however the rationale on how w
and p inuence the manufacturer's prot remains the same.
3.4.3 MAP Policy
Under MAP policy, the manufacturer's prot functions, Mi, are prohibitively
complicated so that closed form solutions are not available. In this section we focus
on the manufacturer's behavior under MAP policy and its impact on each player.
Manufacturer's Decision
To understand the manufacturer's decision, rst we study the special case when
v = 0 to identify the intuition of the manufacturer's behavior and then we extend
the analysis to the general case. The following Lemma shows that when the markets
are very heterogeneous and the search cost is small, RPM policy strictly dominates
MAP policy. For higher search costs, optimal MAP policy is equivalent to the optimal
RPM policy. Indeed, Lemma III.3 shows that optimal wholesale price and suggested
retail price converges to those under the RPM policy as search cost increases.
Lemma III.2 (Assume v = 0).
If  < 1
2
, MAP < 

RPM ; Otherwise, 

MAP = 

RPM .
Lemma III.3 (Assume v = 0).
wMAP is decreasing in ; p

MAP is increasing in .
Lemmas III.2 andIII.3 along with Theorem III.2 immediately lead to the following
result.
Theorem III.3 (Assume v = 0).
1=4 = wRPM  wMAP  pMAP  pRPM = 1=2.
When v = 0, the MAP policy never outperforms the RPM policy. When   1
2
,
the search is too costly, and free rider cannot protably charge a lower price than the
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suggested retail price. In other words, the volume of sales with a higher suggested
retail price along with the lower wholesale price (to incentivize the free rider to enter
the market) bring lower prots to the manufacturer. Therefore, when   1
2
the
manufacturer chooses exactly the same wholesale price and retail price as those under
RPM policy. When  < 1
2
, the manufacturer decreases the margin of the regular
retailer to deter the free rider from entering the market. This is because a small 
allows the free rider to easily cannibalize the market share of the regular retailer.
Hence the regular retailer has little incentive to generate demand. Although it also
has negative impact on demand generation, narrowing the margin protects the market
share of the regular retailer from erosion. Overall, it still results in lower prot than
that under the RPM policy.
When v is positive, the intuition remains the same and we can state the following
theorem.
Theorem III.4.
(1) lim!0 pMAP   wMAP = 0;
(2) lim!1 pMAP = p

RPM ; lim!1w

MAP = w

RPM .
A representative comparison between optimal w and p under the two policies is
plotted in Figure 3.3. When  is small ( < 0:4 in Figure 3.3), the manufacturer
oers narrower margins to the regular retailer. As  increases to innity, both w
and p converge to those under RPM policy. Then we only need to ll the gap what
happens when  is in the middle range.
As shown in Theorem III.2, under RPM policy, the manufacturer chooses w =
0:25 and p = 0:5, independent of the value of . When  is moderate to large ( > 0:4
in Figure 3.3), the entry of the free rider does not cannibalize much market share of the
regular retailer but the free rider serves additional low-to-middle valuation customers.
Instead of narrowing the margin to deter the free rider, the manufacturer widens the
margin to support the free rider. This helps the manufacturer to reach more customers
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Figure 3.3: w and p under RPM and MAP policies. Parameter: v = 0:35.
through free rider, as well as eectively eliminate competition between the retailers
if there is any. There are two ways to widen the margin: increasing retail price p and
decreasing wholesale price w. When  is medium (0:4 <  < 0:9 in Figure 3.3), there
is still competition and the manufacturer would increase the retail price p. Note that
in this case, the manufacturer does not decrease the wholesale price to widen the
margin. When there is competition between the retailers, decreasing wholesale price
allows the free rider to decrease its price and cannibalize regular retailer's market
even further. On the other hand, increasing p induces the regular retailer to serve
higher valuation consumers, reducing the competition. When  is high ( > 0:9
in Figure 3.3), there is no competition between the retailers and some customers in
the middle range are not served. In such situations, it would be benecial for the
manufacturer to increase the margin by decreasing the wholesale price w. Since there
is no competition in this case, increasing the retail price reduces the regular retailer's
market share, but does not change free rider's optimal behavior. However, decreasing
the wholesale price induces free rider to serve more customers by decreasing its price.
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This additional demand generates more prot compensating the loss due to lower per
unit revenue.
It is crucial to fully understand the manufacturer's behavior, as many of the
analysis hinge on it. The manufacturer's decision under MAP policy is summarized
as follows. When  is very small, the manufacturer narrows the margin to deter
the free rider from entry. As  becomes larger, the manufacturer starts to widen
the margin to encourage the free rider's entry. It increases the retail price p when
 is moderate, and then gradually transits to decreasing the wholesale price w as 
increases. As  goes to innity, both w and p converge to the optimal decision under
RPM policy.
Manufacturer's Prot
The manufacturer's prots under MAP and RPM policies have the following two
properties over the customer valuation v and the search cost .
Lemma III.4. lim!1 MAP = 

RPM .
Lemma III.4 says that when the search cost is large enough, optimal MAP policy
(optimal wholesale price and retail price) and the outcome are the same as RPM
policy. The intuition is that when the search cost is extremely high, customers will
not search for the free rider, regardless of their valuation. RPM policy behaves like a
special case of MAP policy where the search cost is innite.
Lemma III.5. Both RPM and 

MAP are non-decreasing in v.
Lemma III.5 states that as consumer valuation heterogeneity decreases, the man-
ufacturer's prot increases. Although very intuitive, this is not a trivial result. If
the manufacturer chooses a suboptimal strategy (w; p) under MAP policy, the prot
could be even lower with a higher v. Consider a scenario where the manufacturer sets
both w and p too high and two retailers are local monopolists ( + v > 1). When v
increases, the free rider chooses to raise the price so much that its demand is lower
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than before. Though the demand for the regular retailer is higher, the overall eect
on the manufacturer's prot is negative. However, a prot maximizer manufacturer
never faces such situations.
The following theorem answers one of our main research questions: Which one of
the policies, RPM policy or MAP policy, is more protable to the manufacturer?
Theorem III.5 (Condition: + v  1).
(1) If   1, there exist 1  2, such that:
(1a) MAP < 

RPM if and only if 1   < 1;
(1b) MAP > 

RPM if and only if 1 <  < 2;
(1c) MAP = 

RPM for other .
(2) If   1, there exist v1  v2, such that:
(2a) MAP < 

RPM if and only if v2 < v  1;
(2b) MAP > 

RPM if and only if v1 < v < v2;
(2c) MAP = 

RPM for other v.
(3) If + v  1, all thresholds continue to exist, except v1.
Figure 3.4(a) provides graphic demonstration of the policy that the manufacturer
prefers. Clearly the threshold policy does not always hold when + v < 1.
The manufacturer's preference depends on the heterogeneity of the market and
how dicult the search is for the consumers. When v is small and  is large, it is
very hard for the free rider to get any customers. As a consequence, even under MAP
policy, the manufacturer chooses the w and p such that the free rider is unable to
protably enter the market. The outcome is exactly the same as that under RPM
policy. As v increases or  decreases, it becomes easier for the free rider to survive.
Under such situations, the manufacturer accommodates the free rider to segment
customers: the regular retailer serves high valuation consumers with high search cost
while the free rider serves consumers with lower valuation consumers who have also
low search cost. The manufacturer even widens the margin compared to the optimal
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under RPM policy so that free rider prots. Though competition may exist, the
free rider mainly targets the low to middle range customers while the regular retailer
serves the high valuation customers. If v increases (consumers are more homogenous)
or  decreases (search is less costly) even further, free rider cannibalizes more of the
regular retailer's market share, which results in less incentive to generate demand.
Unlike the centralized supply chain, the manufacturer cannot control the free rider's
price. Instead, under MAP policy the manufacturer has to narrow the margin in
an eort to mitigate the regular retailer's demand cannibalization. Under such a
situation, often the manufacturer earns higher prots using RPM policy than selling
through the free rider under MAP policy.
Retailers
Though the price restraint policy is eventually determined by the manufacturer,
the retailers should also understand the consequences of either policy on their bottom
line. The retailers may be able to negotiate with the manufacturer about the contract,
and in some cases they can even inuence the manufacturer's decision by withdrawing
their business. For example, Babies\R"Us cancelled orders from some of its suppliers
as the suppliers refused imposing price restraining policies on Internet retailers which
have cost advantage over Babies\R"Us ((Pereira 2008)).
It is easy to see that the free rider prefers MAP policy over RPM policy under
which it always gets zero prot. Intuitively, one may believe that the regular retailer
should prefer the RPM policy as it eectively elimates the competition, leaving the
regular retailer as the monopolist in the market. The theorem below, however, only
partially conrms this intuition.
Theorem III.6 (Condition: + v  1).
The region where the regular retailer prefers MAP is a subset of the region where the
manufacturer prefers MAP.
The theorem shows the property given  + v  1, while it still holds in the rest
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Figure 3.4: Policy preference for each player.
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of the region as we observe in Figure 3.4(b). The insights come in two folds. First
of all, the regular retailer is less likely to prefer the MAP policy, compared to the
manufacturer. Moreover, surprisingly, the regular retailer prefers MAP policy when v
is low to medium and  is large. When  is small, though the manufacturer narrows
the margin to deter the free rider from entry if the supply chain switches from RPM
policy to MAP policy, the prots of the manufacturer and the regular retailer still
decline. As  gets larger, the manufacturer starts to prefer MAP policy and increases
the retail price p to support the free rider. The loss of sales through the regular
retailer is compensated by the sales through free rider. The regular retailer, however,
loses sales and end up with lower prot, though the margin is slightly higher. This
explains why as  increases, the manufacturer is more likely to benet from MAP
policy than the regular retailer. As  increases even more, the manufacturer starts to
decrease the wholesale price w in an eort to incentivize the free rider to participate.
The regular retailer also benets from lower wholesale price and thus prefers MAP
policy as well.
Consumers
The analysis of the consumer surplus provides insights for legislators to guide
the market. In this part we address which policy serves consumers better based on
numerical results from our model.
Figure 3.4(c) illustrates whether RPM or MAP policies result in higher consumer
surplus. There are two major areas where consumer surplus is higher under MAP
policy. The rst area is when v is low to medium and  is large enough. Again
under MAP policy the manufacturer needs to either increase p or decrease w to
accommodate the free rider. It tends to increase p when  is low to medium, and to
decrease w as  gets larger. As the consumer surplus is very sensitive to the selling
price, a higher p typically results in smaller consumer surplus, even though more
consumers may be generated by the regular retailer. On the other hand, a lower w
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increases consumer surplus because it allows the free rider to charge lower price and
serve more low-end customers. Moreover, lower w also leads the regular retailer to
generate more customers.
We also observe another region at the top of Figure 3.4(c), where consumer surplus
is higher under MAP policy. Intuition of this can be illustrated by considering the
extreme case where v = 1. The manufacturer will set p = 1 under either policy.
Under RPM policy, all customers buy from the regular retailer and end up with zero
surplus. Under MAP policy, those customers who buy from the free rider realize
positive surplus while the others still get zero. Note that this is a situation where the
manufacturer strongly prefers RPM policy.
In Figure 3.4 there are signicantly large regions where the manufacturer's, the
regular retailer's and consumers' preferences are aligned. The crucial element is the
fact that all the demand in the supply chain is generated by the regular retailer. As
long as the incentive to generate demand is not hurt (when v is small and  is large),
entry of the free rider is benecial for all the parties. Otherwise, the entry of the free
rider makes the total number of customers generated decrease, generally none of the
parties win by itself, except in the extreme case that we discussed above where the
consumer surplus increases.
3.5 Optimal Search Cost Level
In the previous section we studied the dynamics for given market condition (; v).
Very recently, some manufacturers have come up with innovative approaches to inu-
ence the search cost . For example, accessing the price on an online retailer requires
varying number of steps, ranging from simply a few clicks to multiple email exchanges.
Accordingly, it may take anywhere from a few seconds to many hours or even days.
The free rider may also impact the search cost but only in the direction that makes
it even higher. Otherwise, it may violate the MAP policy contract in which some
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manufacturers specify how dicult the search should be for the consumers. However,
as we will see soon, free rider will never make the search harder than the set level
by the manufacturer since the search cost desired by the free rider is always smaller
than the manufacturer.
In this section we focus on what the optimal search cost is for each player. Let
C , 

M , 

R1, 

R2, 

CS be the preferred search cost of the centralized supply chain,
the manufacturer, the regular retailer, the free rider, and consumers, respectively.
All 's are plotted as a function of v in Figure 3.5. Note that on the plot for
the manufacturer, the regular retailer or consumers, there is a missing piece when
v is moderate to large. This indicates that the preferred  is innity when market
heterogeneity is small to moderate. As shown in Lemma III.4, MAP policy would be
equivalent to RPM policy as  approaches innity. This implies that MAP policy
with any search cost is dominated by RPM policy when v is moderate to large.
Centralized Supply Chain
Theorem III.7. For the centralized supply chain: C = 1  v.
Though the presence of search seems to make the supply chain less ecient, inter-
estingly, the centralized supply chain prefers a positive search cost. Search cost allows
the central controller to segment customers and sell to low-end customers through the
free rider. Recall that the surplus of a consumer whose time value is x and buying
from the free rider is v + (1  v   )x  p2. By setting  = 1  v, the free rider can
set p2 = v and thus (i) serves all the customers not served by the regular retailer and
perfectly extracts all the surplus from consumers that buy from the free rider; and
(ii) does not cannibalize the high margin sales through the regular retailer because
anyone buying from the free rider gets exactly zero surplus. This is an ideal situation
for the central controller as he segments the market, extracts all the surplus from the
lower end, and serves the remaining higher end of the market at a higher price.
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Manufacturer
Theorem III.8 (Condition:+ v  1).
For the manufacturer:
M =
8>><>>:
+1, if v  2
3
Any value in
h
max
n
1  v; 1 v
2(2 3v)
o
;max
n
1  v; 3(1 v)2
2(2 3v)
oi
, if v < 2
3
:
Though this theorem is limited to the case  + v  1, we observe in Figure 3.5
that the manufacturer would only deviate from this solution when v is very small
(smaller than 0.1).
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Intuitively the manufacturer should mimic the centralized supply chain because
their interests are somewhat consistent. However, this strategy works only when
v 2 [0:1; 0:5]. When v is close to zero, given  = 1   v the manufacturer has to
oer w  v to encourage the free rider's entry but such low wholesale price would
decrease the prot even with higher sales. Instead, the manufacturer chooses a much
smaller , enabling the free rider to capture customers at the expense of regular
retailer's market. When v is large (market is very homogenous), the free rider would
cannibalize a signicant portion of the regular retailer's market at  = 1  v. Unlike
the centralized supply chain, the manufacturer cannot control the free rider's price to
prevent such competition. As a result, the manufacturer prefers a higher, sometimes
innite, search cost to protect the regular retailer.
Retailers
The preference of  for the regular retailer, the free rider, and consumers are
summarized in the following theorem and observation.
Theorem III.9 (Condition: + v  1).
For the regular retailer, M  R1.
Observation III.1.
(1) When v < 0:9, we have R2  M  R1  CS;
(2) When v  0:9, we have R2  CS  M = R1 =1.
We rst study the retailers. Every player in the supply chain faces similar trade-
os in the  choice, but puts dierent weights on the market segmentation and the
volume of consumers generated. A smaller  makes it easier for the free rider to
compete with the regular retailer, typically resulting in higher market share for the
free rider, lower market share for the regular retailer and less volume of customers
generated by the regular retailer. A larger  leads to the opposite. The retailers care
only about the volume of customers and their own market share. The manufacturer,
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instead, capitalizes on sales through both retailers. As a result, the free rider prefers
a small  while the regular retailer prefers a high . The manufacturer's choice falls
in the middle.
Consumers
Intuitively the consumer surplus should decrease in search cost . However, by
Theorem III.10, we show a counterintuitive result that even consumer surplus may
increase in the search cost under certain conditions.
Theorem III.10 (Condition: + v  1).
When max
n
1  v; 1 v
2(2 3v)
o
   max
n
1  v; 3(1 v)2
2(2 3v)
o
, consumer surplus is increas-
ing in .
Interplay of two eects results in an increase in consumer surplus as consumer
search gets more costly. The rst one is that, as  increases, the free rider has to
respond with a lower price in order to compensate decrease in demand because of
higher search cost. The second is that, with a higher search cost, the regular retailer
faces less competition and thus generates more demand. The surplus from a larger
volume of customers served can be larger than the surplus loss due to the additional
search cost each customer pays.
In Observation III.1(2), the consumer's choice is driven by the fact that when v
is close to one (market is almost homogenous), only those who buy from the free
rider have positive surplus. This has been discussed in detail in Section 3.4.3. Now
we focus on the more general result stated in Observation III.1(1). The consumers
not only potentially benet from higher search cost, but also prefer a higher search
cost than the manufacturer and the retailers. Using Figure 3.3, we can explain the
reason by understanding how the manufacturer changes w and p to encourage the free
rider to participate under MAP policy. When  is near the value preferred by either
the manufacturer (M = 0:65) or the regular retailer (

R1 = 0:9), the manufacturer
would still increase the retail price p. At R1, the retail price under MAP policy is still
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higher than that under RPM policy. Actually the consumer surplus is very sensitive
to the price. Therefore, the consumer surplus is higher when  is even greater than
R1, where the manufacturer under MAP policy starts to decrease the retail price.
3.6 Extensions
3.6.1 Robustness of Demand Function
So far we assume a demand function where consumers' valuation and search cost
are perfectly correlated. Indexed by x, consumer valuation is expressed by a line
v+x(1  v). In this section we study the robustness of our model with respect to the
demand function. Specically, for consumer indexed by x, we assume the valuation is
uniformly distributed in [v+x(1 v); v+x(1 v)+d], where a higher d represents lower
correlation between search cost and product valuation. As d increases to innity, the
two attributes become completely independent.
In Figure 3.6, we plotted the boundary, for various values of d, where the manu-
facturer is indierent between RPM policy and MAP policy. For each d, the manu-
facturer prefers RPM above the boundary and MAP otherwise. It is clear that as the
correlation between search cost and product valuation decreases (i.e., d increases),
the region where MAP is preferred by the manufacturer gets smaller.
Based on our earlier discussion, the main advantage of MAP is that it allows
market segmentation: the free rider serves low-end consumers that the regular retailer
would not serve. If search cost and product valuation are uncorrelated, MAP becomes
less eective due to the existence of high-valuation but low-search-cost consumers.
This group, who purchase from the regular retailer under RPM, would defect to the
free rider under MAP. This leads to less incentive for the regular retailer to create
demand, and from the manufacturer's perspective this loss is likely to outweigh the
additional coverage through the free rider.
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Figure 3.6: Manufacturer's policy preference with dierent demand functions.
3.6.2 Robustness of Eort Cost Function
While quadratic function is commonly used to model eort cost, in this subsection
we numerically test the robustness of the eort function. We assume that the cost
to generate  demand is 1
2
a, smaller a represents close to linear cost function, while
large a describes more convex cost function.
In Figure 3.7, the boundaries (above which the manufacturer prefers RPM policy)
are plotted for dierent values of a. It shows that the area where MAP policy is
preferred becomes larger as the cost function becomes more convex. To describe the
intuition behind this result, rst note that in any specic market situation (charac-
terized by a combination of v and ), the demand generator would spend more eort,
due to lack of competition from the free rider, under RPM policy than that under
MAP policy. The prot under RPM may be higher due to higher eort, versus MAP,
where the smaller eort is augmented by additional low-valuations customers and
higher wholesale price. Due to convexity of cost of eort, the extra eort in RPM
case will be limited. When the cost of eort is more convex, the increment of eort
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Figure 3.7: Manufacturer's policy preference with dierent eort cost functions.
in RPM case (compared to MAP) is smaller. Consequently, the manufacturer that
chose RPM policy may switch to MAP policy with more convex eort. Despite the
shift of the threshold and the corresponding decrease in the size of area where RPM
dominates, the lessons and insights from the main model continue to hold for any
value of a.
3.6.3 Multiple Retailers
In many businesses there are often multiple regular retailers and free riders in
the market. For example, Canon cameras are carried by BestBuy and Sears stores.
Both of them are considered as regular retailers because customers can test products
and receive advise from store associates. On the other hand, the same cameras are
available at many online retailers, such as BuyDig.com and BeachCamera.com. They
do not provide much service but frequently oer hidden but lower prices under MAP
policy. While only one regular retailer and one free rider are modeled in the main
part, in this extension we show that all the results and intuitions continue to hold
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with multiple retailers.
Multiple Regular retailers
Since the regular retailer's price is dictated by the manufacturer under both RPM
and MAP, there is no direct price competition. Assume that there are M symmetric
regular retailers. Their demand generation eorts, i, are additive, i.e.,  =
PM
i=1 i.
Each of retailer gets 1
M
of consumers who are willing to buy at the regular price.
Then each regular retailer's problem, under both RPM and MAP policies, is
max

1 =
1
M
(i +
X
j 6=i
j)d1(p  w)  1
2
2i :
Solving this problem we get optimal demand generation for retailer i as i =
1
M
d1(p 
w). Since total number of customers  =
PM
i=1 

i = d1(p   w), M regular retailers
collectively create same volume of demand as in our original single regular retailer
model. Consequently, we nd that the number of regular retailers has no impact on
the manufacturer or the free rider.
Let 
(M)
R1 be each regular retailer's prot when there are M of them in the market,
and 
(1)
R1 = R1 is regular retailer's prot in our model with single regular retailer. We
have (under both policies)

(M)
R1 =
1
M

1  1
2M

d21(p  w)2 =
1
M

1  1
2M

R1:
Because each regular retailer only creates a fraction of the demand and the eort cost
is convex, the total eort cost of M retailers is smaller than that in the main model
with single regular retailer, despite of the same number of customers created. As a
result, the total prot of M regular retailers is greater than that with single regular
retailer.
Multiple Free Riders
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In our original model, the free rider sets its hidden price p2. The implicit assump-
tion here is that the free rider is a monopolist as the low cost retailer (but competes
with regular retailer), or that there are multiple free riders but consumers only ran-
domly pick one free rider without searching the others. One can argue that multiple
free riders perfectly compete in price so that they all end up selling at the wholesale
price. That is, instead of solving the maximization problem in Equation (3.3), free
riders set p2 = w. We are interested in how this changes the manufacturer's preference
over MAP and RPM.
In order to dierentiate from the original MAP policy we analyzed above, we
denote the MAP policy with multiple competitive free riders as MAP2 policy.
Theorem III.11.
(1) If  + v  1, the region where MAP outperforms RPM is smaller under MAP2
policy.
(2) If + v  1 and the manufacturer can only choose  in [1  v;+1), the optimal
search costs lead to identical prots under MAP and MAP2, i.e., MAP (

MAP ) =
MAP2(

MAP2).
(3) If the manufacturer can choose  in (0;+1), the optimal prot under MAP2 is
weakly higher than that under MAP, i.e., MAP (

MAP )  MAP2(MAP2).
Theorem III.11 is illustrated in Figure 3.8. With all free riders selling at w, the
manufacturer sells more to customers through retailers. On the other hand, this also
increases the competition between free riders and the regular retailer, and thus results
in less total demand. When  is large, there is very little competition between the
regular retailer and the free riders. Then under MAP2 the manufacturer benets from
free riders selling at low prices without compromising the regular retailer's incentive.
This fundamental trade-o faced by the manufacturer is the same as that under MAP
policy. However, under MAP2 policy the competition is more intense due to the
perfect price competition among free riders. Therefore, the manufacturer is less likely
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to choose MAP2 policy over RPM policy (as partially proved in Theorem III.11(1)
for + v  1).
0 1 2
α
M
a
n
u
fa
c
t
u
r
e
r
’s
P
r
o
fi
t
 
 
pi
∗
RPM
pi
∗
MAP
pi
∗
MAP2
Figure 3.8: Manufacturer's prot comparison under RPM, MAP, and MAP2 policies.
Under MAP2 policy free riders set price equal to the wholesale price which leads
to more intense competition with the regular retailer. This is similar to the outcome
under MAP policy but with a smaller search cost. In Figure 3.8, MAP2 prot curve
looks similar to a stretched version of the MAP prot curve. If the manufacturer is
able to set , the resulting optimal prots under MAP and MAP2 would be identical
most of the time (as partially proved in Theorem III.11(2) for  + v  1). To
summarize, while having multiple free riders changes the prices, the intuition we
derived for MAP still holds.
3.6.4 New Retailer's Choice on Roles
While what role (regular retailer or free rider) a retailer will play largely depends
on its infrastructure, capital investment and existing capabilities, some retailers may
be able to strategically choose whether they would compete as a regular retailer or
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free rider. For example, many retailers, such as Walmart and Bestbuy, have both
online and oine channels. They can serve as regular retailers if a certain product
is carried and demonstrated at brick-and-mortar stores. Under other cases, they can
sell a product only through their websites with a hidden price. In this subsection,
we analyze under MAP policy what role a retailer should choose when it enters the
market.
We assume there are already M regular retailers and N free riders in the market
(M;N > 0). Additionally free riders are assumed to be local monopolists, i.e., cus-
tomers only randomly pick a free rider without searching others. Let 
(N)
R2 be each
free rider's prot and 
(1)
R2 = R2 where R2 is the free rider's prot in the original
model. We obviously have 
(N)
R2 =
1
N
R2.
Following the discussion of multiple regular retailers in Subsection 3.6.3, each
regular retailer's prot is 
(M)
R1 =
1
M
 
1  1
2M

R1. Playing regular retailer or free
rider, the new retailer's prot is 
(M+1)
R1 or 
(N+1)
R2 , respectively. Therefore, the new
retailer should play a regular retailer if and only if

(N+1)
R2

(M+1)
R1
=
1
N+1
1
M
 
1  1
2M
  R2
R1
 1:
When M and N are given in a market, the new player's decision will rely on the
ratio R2
R1
, which is plotted in Figure 3.9. When the search cost is high and customers
are heterogeneous, this ratio is large which means less free riders may be sustained in
the market. The intuition is that, when search cost increases or customer valuations
span a wider range, low-end customers are increasingly less likely to search for low
prices oered by free riders. Consequently, it is harder for them to compete in the
market. The ratio R2
R1
is highest when  is close to zero. However, this cannot be
interpreted as that free riders would prefer zero search cost. As we discussed earlier,
small search cost leads to small prots for both regular retailers and free riders. While
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the ratio is higher, the absolute value of R2 is smaller than that with moderately
positive search cost .
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Figure 3.9: Ratio of R2=R1.
3.6.5 Manufacturer Subsidy on Sales Eort
In our model, we assume the regular retailer bears all the cost associated with
demand generation. If the retailer's eort or demand outcome is observable, the
manufacturer can subsidize the demand generation in order to have a higher volume
of demand.
In this extension, we assume the regular retailer only needs to pay a portion,
denoted by , of the eort cost, with the manufacturer subsidizing the rest. Thus,
the regular retailer's problem (3.4) becomes
max

1 = d1(p  w)  1
2
2; (3.6)
which results in
 =
1

(p  w)d1:
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The manufacturer's problem (3.5) becomes
MAP=RPM = maxMAP=RPM(w; p; ) = w
(d1 + d2)  1
2
(1  )2: (3.7)
The general formulation for RPM or MAP policy is identical as above, while the
functions of market share di's in (w; p) are dependent on specic policy.
Theorem III.12. With manufacturer subsidy, MAP policy always (weakly) outper-
forms RPM policy, from perspectives of the manufacturer, the regular retailer, and
the free rider.
With subsidy, the manufacturer is able to set the wholesale price arbitrarily close
to the retail price under RPM, and in the meantime encourages demand generation
by sharing the cost. As a result, the manufacturer extracts all the channel prot,
leaving the regular retailer zero prot.
Under MAP policy, for given , the free rider cannot enter the market protably
when the margin is small. Therefore, the manufacturer can always mimic the actions
under RPM policy without worrying about competition between retailers. However,
this is not necessarily the best strategy. This can be best illustrated by an exam-
ple. Let v = 0:4 and  = 0:6. Under RPM policy, the manufacturer's decision
would be wRPM = p

RPM = 0:5 and 

RPM = 0. The total demand generation and
manufacturer's prot are 0:417 and 0:087, respectively. Under MAP policy, the man-
ufacturer's optimal decision is wMAP = 0:4, p

RPM = 0:7, and 

RPM = 0:316, resulting
in 0:475 units of total demand generation and 0:113 units of prot for the manu-
facturer. With the free rider serving low-end customers, the manufacturer may (i)
decrease the wholesale price to get extra market share through the free rider; and
(ii) increase the retail price to incentivize demand generation without heavy subsidy.
Consequently, the manufacturer is always better o with another lever under MAP
policy.
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3.7 Conclusion
The RPM and MAP policies are widely used by the manufacturer to protect
the margin of brick-and-mortar retailers so that they have incentive to spend eort
promoting the manufacturer's products. We compares these two policies via a stylized
model and analyzes when and why one policy outperforms the other for each player
across the supply chain.
The manufacturer is most likely to be the player that chooses price restraining
policy. We nd that there is no dominant strategy for the manufacturer. The manu-
facturer prefers MAP policy when there are large search cost and large consumer val-
uation heterogeneity. Under such conditions, the free rider serves low-end customers
but does not cannibalize the regular retailer's market share. The manufacturer eec-
tively segments customers via dierent channels and gets higher sales. On the other
hand, when the search cost is low and customers are homogeneous, it is very hard to
segment customers. Contributing little extra customers, the free rider only competes
with the regular retailer and makes the latter spend less demand generation eort.
Therefore, the manufacturer would choose RPM policy to rule out free riders.
The retailers' perspectives are also studied. The free rider's decision is simple as it
always prefers MAP policy. Under RPM policy, the free rider is unable to price lower
than its brick-and-mortar competitors and, thus, gets zero market share and ends up
with zero prot. Interesting, the regular retailer may also benet from MAP policy,
when the search cost is higher and customer valuations are more heterogeneous than
those conditions for the manufacturer. The reason is that the manufacturer intends to
embrace the free rider by either increasing the retail price or decreasing the wholesale
price. This wider margin also makes the regular retailer more protable.
The total consumer surplus is also higher under similar conditions for the regular
retailer. There are two main drivers: (i) the regular retailer generates larger number
of customers; and (ii) low-end customers, who are unserved under RPM policy, are
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now served by the free rider.
Despite of the free rider, our results indicate that preference of the manufacturer,
the regular retailer and consumers is somewhat aligned. However, preference might be
dierent in the middle range of search cost and valuation heterogeneity. This implies
that the manufacturer can enforce MAP policy at the cost of the regular retailer and
consumers. These results explain the dierent stance of brick-and-mortar retailers
(typically regular retailers) and online retailers (typically free riders) about RPM and
MAP on public media. They also provide a perspective to policy makers regarding
to the legality of each policy.
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CHAPTER IV
Performance Based Contracts for Energy
Eciency Projects
4.1 Introduction
Energy eciency (EE) projects are often described as very attractive in economic
terms and promising to provide signicant environmental benets. According to the
United Nations Foundations, \energy eciency is the cheapest, fastest, and smartest
strategy available for saving money and resources and reducing greenhouse gas emis-
sions around the world."1 Yang and Yu (2015) estimates that, in 2020, capturing
the energy eciency opportunities will contribute 50% of the greenhouse gas abate-
ment goal required to cap the long-term concentration of greenhouse gas in the level
suggested by experts.
Notwithstanding these signicant benets, EE projects have not reached their full
potential in the last decade (Yang and Yu 2015). There are a few widely recognized
challenges in EE projects. The rst is lack of information about expected benets.
Clients usually under-estimate the benet provided by EE projects and, thus, hesitate
to adopt them. The second challenge is that EE projects are complicated. They typ-
ically involve long span of time, major scale of construction, operations disruptions,
1www.unfoundation.org/what-we-do/campaigns-and-initiatives/
reduce-carbon-emissions, retrieved April 16, 2015.
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and requirement for a signicant expertise. Third, EE projects tend to be expen-
sive, with large initial investment and also uncertain outcomes (Aaki et al. 2013).
This set of diculties has given a rise to a business model referred to as the energy
services companies (ESCOs): a business that has expertise in EE projects and takes
responsibilities for developing, installing and, often, also nancing of the projects.
One of the challenges ESCOs face is the appropriate form of contracts with clients.
Due to uncertainties of outcome and fairly big up-front investments, many clients,
depending on their size and their level of risk aversion, may be hesitant to get in-
volved in such projects. To overcome these challenges, Performance Based Contracts
(PBCs) have become a core part of ESCO's business, where ESCO's compensation
is linked to outcomes of a project and paid during a specied length of time (Larsen
et al. 2012). This model has been used to increase energy eciency in commercial,
municipal, and industrial sectors in both developed and emerging economies (Taylor
et al. 2008). Compared to xed payment, advantages of PBCs are multi-fold. First,
PBCs transfer a portion of operational risk to ESCOs, leaving clients less vulnerable
to uncertain operational outcome of the project. Second, PBCs provide additional in-
centives for ESCOs to spend reasonable amount of eort, thereby alleviating ESCOs'
moral hazard problem. Third, PBCs lead to more exible mechanisms for the projects
and remove the heavy burden of project nancing from the customers' shoulders.2
While many variations of PBCs exist, three most common contracts seen in prac-
tice are shared savings contract, guaranteed savings contract, and chauage contract.3
In the shared savings contract, ESCO pays a portion of client's energy costs over cer-
tain period of time after the project completion, i.e, ESCO participates in the savings
as well as participates in additional costs incurred by the client. NASA, for exam-
ple, hired Honeywell to improve energy eciency at the Johnson Space Flight Center
2Alternatively this aspect can be supported by nancial institutions.
3Readers are referred to Bullock and Caraghiaur (2001) for a comprehensive review of the ESCO
contracts.
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(JSC) in Houston. Improvements ranging from energy-ecient lighting, air condition-
ing to water management system were implemented in more than 140 buildings at
JSC. Using a shared savings contract, Honeywell will receive a portion of utility cost
savings as payment for the project.4 Guaranteed savings contract species a guaran-
teed reduction over mutually agreed period of time in client's utility bill relative to
business as usual. That is, a target is established and ESCOs are responsible for the
cost of any energy usage above target, or get penalized in other ways. As an example,
Candelas Ltd., an Irish ESCO, provides lighting retrot to poultry broiler sheds in
Ireland and UK. Candelas Ltd. guarantees savings, typically of 65%, in direct lighting
cost. If the energy savings fall short of those guaranteed, Candelas Ltd. refunds the
dierence between actual and guaranteed savings. In chauage contract, clients out-
source an energy related function (e.g. temperature, lighting level, air quality, etc.)
to an ESCO at a at rate. The ESCO owns, operates, and maintains all necessary
equipments to provide the service. For example, Dalkia, a French ESCO, provides
hospitals with heating, lighting and electricity services. While owning and nancing
projects, Dalkia charges hospitals monthly fee for services.5
Despite some success in non-residential markets, ESCOs have barely entered the
residential sector. Satchwell (2010) estimates that in 2008 the residential sector rep-
resents only 9% of ESCO revenue and, additionally, most of the residential sector
revenue are earned by ESCOs interacting with utility companies rather than directly
contracting with households. Many potential reasons have been cited to explain the
under-developed ESCO business in the residential sector (Steinberger et al. 2009, Sor-
rell 2009, Zimring et al. 2011, Hoyle 2013). Among them we focus on three major
ones. The rst one is customers' behavior and preference change after the comple-
tion of EE projects. As residential clients are only partially responsible for energy
cost under any types of PBCs, they tend to choose a higher comfort level than they
4More information at www.energy.gov/eere/femp/energy-savings-performance-contracts.
5More case examples can be found in EEB (2011) and SEAI (2012).
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had chosen prior to the project. Additionally, they also pay less attention to their
own energy-saving eorts, such as closing windows or turning o lights. This is often
labeled as the rebound eect (Greening et al. 2000) and eectively it is customers'
moral hazard. Due to rebound eect, the energy usage reduction does not fully reect
the benet of EE projects that clients receive, which undermines the eectiveness of
PBCs. Thus it is one of the key elements in this paper to design appropriate contracts
that overcome or at least partially manage rebound eect.6 The second one is that
individual clients are much more risk averse than businesses, which deters individual
clients from adopting EE projects. The third one is ESCOs' moral hazard problem
due to lack of monitoring and verication protocols.
Our study focuses on contract design issues for energy eciency projects, with
particular attention to the residential clients. The major goal is to analyze how each
type of the contracts observed in practice works, taking into account ESCOs' moral
hazard, clients' rebound eect, and risk aversion.
Using a game-theoretic framework, we model the interaction between an ESCO
and a client and characterize the optimal contracting mechanism. Energy eciency
projects are based on the premise that the same amount of energy may result in
dierent comfort level (or utility) of customers depending on the type of windows or
level of insulation of walls. That is the client's utility is based not only on energy
consumption but also on her energy eciency level which reects the condition of
client's house. The client maximizes utility level by choosing the level of energy
consumption. The ESCO oers the client an EE project, where the expected eciency
improvement depends on the ESCO's eort. A caution on both ESCO's side as
well as on customers' side is not ungrounded. Both ESCO's eort in providing the
EE project, and client's eort in saving energy are dicult to verify due to highly
6Rebound does not happen in non-residential sectors, because either the comfort level is exoge-
nously given (e.g., plant temperature, street lighting hours) or end users of energy do not pay but
their employers do.
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specialized technical nature of the projects, limited observability of the inputs (e.g.,
type of gas used in the glass panels, or the material and its density used to create
foam injected into external walls), and the client's strategic actions ex-post the project
(e.g., closing windows during winter or turning o lighting when leaving home).
Within this framework, we explore two broad issues. Firstly, we investigate what
contracts (shared savings contract, guaranteed savings contract, or chauage con-
tract) should be used in what situations, and whether rst-best outcomes can be
achieved. Given the existence of double moral hazard, one would expect that co-
ordinating contracts are unlikely to emerge. Thus, we evaluate the performance of
practical contracts and benchmark them against the rst-best solution. Secondly,
we suggest how the gap between the outcome of currently-practiced contracts and
rst-best solutions can be closed, both from the ESCO's and from policy makers'
perspectives.
We nd that, in the residential sector simple piecewise linear contracts (a general
form of shared savings contract and guaranteed savings contract) work well. While
it is widely believed that, in standard double moral hazard problem, the rst-best
outcome is not attainable even when the client is risk neutral, we show that guaranteed
savings contract can achieve the rst-best solution. Even when the client is risk
averse, 2-rate contracts (a combination of shared savings contract and guaranteed
savings contract, formally dened in Section 4.3) can still capture most benet of
performance contracting. While more complicated contracts do outperform 2-rate
contracts, the improvement is very limited. This result indicates that popular shared
savings contract and guaranteed savings contract can perform reasonably well in the
residential sector, as long as their parameters are carefully chosen, for which our
model provides useful guidance. Chauage contract, by its nature, often requires a
xed comfort level, and does not allow clients to adjust that. Therefore, while it
allows for a coordinated outcome, it is seldom applicable to residential clients.
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On top of optimal contract choice and design, some further improvements in e-
ciency of contracts are possible. ESCO can achieve the rst-best outcomes by assess-
ing post-project energy eciency. A certication of the ESCO's quality can eectively
address the client's concern about moral hazard problem. With the additional test-
ing/certication, a simple shared savings contract performs nearly as good as any
more-complicated contracts. Information disclosure programs, usually oered by pol-
icy makers, can reduce uncertainty of EE projects, and thus increase their social
benet. Policy makers can also provide monetary incentives for EE projects, such
as subsidizing such projects or charging higher utility price. While subsidy does not
change the ESCO's and client's decisions, it encourages more households to adopt EE
projects. On the other hand, higher utility price, such as carbon tax, would also result
in greater ESCO's eort and less energy usage in addition to higher adoption rate,
which leads to higher social surplus. Therefore, higher utility price is more desirable
than subsidy from economic perspective.
4.2 Literature Review
This paper draws from and contributes to the general literature of sustainable op-
erations management (Drake and Spinler 2013), in particular the sub-streams dealing
with energy eciency, contracting, and incentive coordination, in the presence of
double moral hazard problem.
Energy Eciency. During last few decades, energy eciency projects have
received increasing attention in economics and operations management literatures.
Many papers qualitatively illustrate the framework of energy eciency projects, from
opportunity assessment to project execution and valuation (Sorrell 2007, Steinberger
et al. 2009, Aaki et al. 2013). Several papers also consider the theoretical and ana-
lytical aspects of energy eciency. The focus of our paper is on interactions between
ESCO and customers in presence of double moral hazard and risk aversion. The
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role of customers and the corresponding rebound eect is not considered in most of
the papers. Eom and Sweeney (2009) and Chu and Sappington (2012) study the
interaction between policy makers and utility companies. Eom and Sweeney (2009)
examine the design of linear contracts that encourage utility companies to invest in
energy eciency and achieve socially optimal investment levels. Chu and Sappington
(2012) extend the model and assume that ESCOs have private information in their
cost structure. Thus, policy makers oer a choice of linear contracts to ESCOs, whose
eort is non-contractible. They characterize the optimal menu of contracts in dier-
ent market conditions. Neither Eom and Sweeney (2009) nor Chu and Sappington
(2012) consider behavioral aspects of consumers. While Chun et al. (2013) generalize
this framework to model consumer behavior, the paper still focuses on contract de-
sign problems between the government and utilities, rather than contracts between
ESCOs and consumers. Although consumers have the energy consumption decision,
they only respond to the new technology after the project but there is no nancial
incentive (subsidy) from either utilities or the government. Without involving con-
sumers in PBCs, the strategic behavior of consumers after implementation of EE
projects is neglected. Wirl (2000) and Wirl (2015) consider consumers implementing
themselves EE projects. Thus, the papers study contracts between the government
or utilities and consumers without considering ESCOs. Wirl (2000) proposes con-
tracts that encourage consumers' eort in energy eciency improvement. Assuming
the eort is observable, xed amount of subsidy is provided to any consumers that
spend enough eort. The focus is to design such contracts for policy makers that ad-
dress the negative eect of asymmetric and private information of consumers (such as
discount rate). Wirl (2015) is based on the framework in Wirl (2000) but assume util-
ities, rather than the government, have to induce consumers to spend certain energy
eciency investment required by the government. None of the above papers con-
siders the relationship (contracts) between ESCOs and individual consumers, which
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we concentrate on and which is important in practice, as these contracts change the
incentives for ESCOs and consumers, increasing the diculty of incentive alignment.
Besides this, this paper also includes features that are prevalent in practice but not
studied in above papers, such as piecewise linear contracts, uncertain outcome and
risk aversion.
Contracting. By studying contracts between ESCOs and clients, our paper
contributes to the stream of literature in contract theory dealing with moral hazard
through PBCs. Readers are referred to Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) for a review of
general contract theory and moral hazard problem. Our work is particularly relevant
to a subgroup of literature that concentrates on double moral hazard problem, as this
paper is an application and extension of general double moral hazard theory in en-
ergy eciency industry. Double moral hazard arises when costly and un-contractible
inputs (eorts) of both principal and agent have an impact on nal outcomes. A
few papers in the eld of economics lay the foundation for analysis of double moral
hazard problem within principle-agent context. In the standard setting, the mone-
tary output, which is a function of un-contractible eorts from both sides, has to be
divided by principal and agent. This literature shows that there exists no sharing
rule that induces globally optimal input (eort) levels for both players (the rst-best
solution), even when they are risk neutral (Holmstrom 1982). Some economics pa-
pers evaluate the eect of linear contracts: Romano (1994) and Bhattacharyya and
Lafontaine (1995) show that linear contracts, in which two parties share the outcome
proportionally after a xed money transfer, while non-coordinating, are as good as
it gets, they weakly dominate any other possible performance based contracts (the
second-best solution). Kim and Wang (1998) considers the same double-sided moral
hazard problem except with risk averse agent. They conclude that linear contracts
are no longer dominant. Our paper extends general theory into the energy eciency
context. We consider the ESCO's eort, as well as consumers' energy consumption
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decision.7 Both of their decisions contribute to the outcome of the EE project. How-
ever, contracts are based on energy consumptions rather than any monetary outcome.
Energy consumptions have dierent impacts on the ESCO's and client's utility: The
impact on the ESCO is linear while that on the client is concave. Consequently, the
general framework of zero-sum game does not apply and lessons from classic double
moral hazard problem do not necessarily carry over. In fact, we show in Section 4.5.2
that when the client is risk neutral, the rst-best outcome can be achieved, which
is dierent from standard results presented in Holmstrom (1982), Romano (1994),
Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995).
Using PBCs to deal with moral hazard problem has many applications in OM
literature. Optimal contracting mechanisms have been studied in many industries
including health insurances (So and Tang 2000, Jiang et al. 2012), after-sales services
(Kim et al. 2007), and call centers (Ren and Zhou 2008, Hasija et al. 2008) (see
Gustafsson et al. 2010, for a comprehensive review of PBCs). A number of papers
involve double moral hazard problem as well, and study contracting mechanisms
within various operational and supply chain contexts. Baiman et al. (2000) models a
situation, where a manufacturer and a supplier jointly invest in reducing failure rate
of parts produced by the supplier. In Corbett and DeCroix (2001) and Corbett et al.
(2005), a manufacturer and a supplier collaborate in reducing usage of supplies in the
manufacturing process. Roels et al. (2010) focuses on contracts that maximize output
of collaborative services, and advises when players should establish contractibility on
additional xed cost. In Kim and Netessine (2013), a manufacturer and a supplier
work together to reduce expected production cost and its variance. While sharing
similar spirit, each paper takes into consideration specics of the applied case in
dierent industries. They vary in the structures and performance measures that enter
into payment calculus. The main dierence between our paper and the double-moral-
7Another extension of our framework is to also include client's eort as her decision variable in
Section 4.6.1.
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hazard papers in OM literature is that we include the strategic behavior of consumers,
rebound eect, inuences both the observable benets (energy consumption) and
non-observable one (comfort level). We are not aware of papers that deal with such
a situation. The rebound eect also inuences the division of benets and simple
lessons from general theory do not apply and translations from other papers are non-
obvious to us.8 Also, in most other industries, the realization of eort (true eort plus
random shock) is observable and thus provides a good contingency in contracts. In
energy eciency setting, contracts are often built on energy consumption, a proxy to
but not exactly technology (eort) realization. To our best knowledge, this paper is
the rst attempt to address double moral hazard with PBCs in the energy eciency
industry.
4.3 Model and Preliminary Results
We consider a setting where an ESCO (referred to as \he") oers an energy e-
ciency project to a single client (referred to as \she"). The client's \comfort" function
is denoted as u(x+ t), where x represents energy consumption and t, for technology,
represents energy eciency level at the client's house. We assume u00 < 0 to reect
the diminishing return in both energy consumption and technology level. In order to
have analytical tractability, u000  0 is also assumed. Most popular utility functions
in fact have this property. It is worth noting that although u0 > 0 is a common
assumption, it is not necessary for most of results unless explicitly stated.
The energy cost is p per unit, which is assumed to be exogenously determined. Let
wc(x) represent the client's energy payment as a function of her energy use. Therefore,
the client's net payo is
v(x; t) = u(x+ t)  wc(x): (4.1)
8The models are typically rooted in zero-sum game, and thus the rst-best solution is not attain-
able. In our setting utility derived from energy consumption is concave and the rst-best solution
is achieved when consumers are risk neutral.
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It should be noted that wc(x) = px before the EE project, but depending on the
contract structure may not necessarily be the same after the project. As a result,
v(x; t) also depends on the contract structure.
The client's ex-ante technology and consumption levels are denoted by t0 and x0
respectively. t0 is normalized to 0 without loss of generality. So the client's pre-project
utility is u(x0)  px0 with no uncertainty present.
The ESCO can provide an energy eciency project to the client by choosing
the new technology level t with a convex cost of C(t). t can also be interpreted
as the ESCO's eort spent in the project. Given that in most cases the clients do
not have the necessary expertise to enforce or inspect the technology, t is usually
not contractible and, therefore, moral hazard arises. In order to have analytical
tractability, we also assume C 000  0.
The post-project technology suers from uncertainty reecting the unobservable
circumstances in the client's building.9 This is modeled as a random shock to the
project outcome t + . The random variable 's support is [; ] with mean 0 and
variance 2. The distribution is assumed to be common knowledge between the
ESCO and the client.
The client is risk averse and is assumed to have mean-variance risk preferences:
E[v(x; t+ )]  
2
V ar[v(x; t+ )];
where v is the utility dened in (4.1) and the risk aversion parameter   0 re-
ects client's attitude towards payo uncertainty. The mean-variance utility function
originally stems from nance literature that studies market returns, and then widely
adopted to model risk aversion in operations management literature (e.g., Chen and
Federgruen 2000, Van Mieghem 2007, Kim et al. 2007).
9There are other sources of uncertainties, e.g., weather, and these can be easily incorporated into
the model and are evaluated in Section 4.6.2.
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The ESCO has to provide a take-it-or-leave-it contract before observing . To
reect the industry practice, we consider contracts contingent on the client's post-
project energy consumption. We call them n-rate contracts, including terms (F ,
fzigi=1;:::;n 1, figi=1;:::;n) with z0 = 0 and zn = 1. An n-rate contract consists of
two part: The rst part is the up-front payment, F , from the client to the ESCO. The
second part species the portion i (0  i  1 ) of unit cost p that the client pays
for energy usage in the range [zi 1; zi). The rest of energy cost is paid by the ESCO
and considered as subsidy. Our analysis focuses on 1-rate and 2-rate contracts, as
they are exible enough to capture all of the popular practical contracts we discussed
earlier. For example, 1-rate contract (F;?; f1g) describes shared savings contract,
where the ESCO obtains (1   1) of total savings as well as additional costs. 2-
rate contract (F; fz1g; f1; 0g) describes guaranteed savings contract, where the ESCO
refunds any energy usage above threshold z1. (F;?; f0g) is chauage contract, where
xed payment F should be allocated over the period of contract term. In order to
understand the eect of more exible contracts, we also extend our results to 3-rate
contracts through numerical study.
Under an n-rate contract, the client's energy payment (energy cost minus subsidy
from the ESCO, excluding up-front payment) is
wc(x) = p
nX
i=1
i min

(x  zi 1)+; zi   zi 1
	
: (4.2)
The sequence of events is as follows: (1) The ESCO oers a contract (F; fzig; fig)
to the client. (2) The client decides whether to accept the contract. If the client
accepts the contract, then (3) the ESCO decides expected new technology level t. (4)
The new technology, t + , is observed by the client. (5) The client adjusts energy
consumption of x, based on the new technology level and contract structure. The
problem is formulated below starting with the client.
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Client
The client's energy consumption is modeled as an optimization problem. Her
pre-project energy consumption, x0, maximizes u(x)  px. That is
x0 = argmax
x
fu(x)  pxg: (4.3)
We denote v0 = u(x0)   px0 as the pre-project utility. After the completion of the
project, the client observes new energy eciency level t +  and chooses her new
energy consumption, x,
x = argmax
x
v(x; t+ ): (4.4)
The superscript  is used to denote general optimal solutions, which will be replaced
by proper superscript in each scenario.
ESCO
The ESCO's payo consists of three parts: up-front payment, cost of technology
installation, and cost of energy subsidy. We denote we(x) as cost of energy subsidy
we(x) = px  wc(x): (4.5)
After the contract is accepted and up-front payment is transferred, the ESCO chooses
the technology (eort) level as
t = argmax
t
f Ewe(x)  C(t)g ; (4.6)
where x = x(t+ ) is determined in (4.4).
In the contract design stage, the ESCO's goal is to maximize the expected payo
107
while making sure the contract is accepted. The main problem to solve is
max
F;fzig;fig
fF   Ewe(x)  C(t)g ;
s:t: E [v(x; t + )]  
2
V ar [v(x; t + )]  F  v0:
In the optimal solution the constraint must be binding, i.e. the client has strictly
zero surplus. The problem reduces, therefore, to
V = max
fzig;fig

E [v(x; t + )]  
2
V ar [v(x; t + )]  v0   Ewe(x)  C(t)

:
(4.7)
In the rest of this paper, all contracts are described as only (fzig; fig), while the
corresponding F is implied by the above constraint.
4.3.1 Benchmark: Model with Central Planner
We rst solve the model with central planner, which serves as a benchmark for
the following analysis. In this part we assume that the client's payment is any con-
tinuous functions, rather than piecewise linear functions. As n becomes large, n-rate
contracts are able to approximate any continuous payment structures. Further, since
the technology realization t +  is observable by the central planner and one-to-one
correspondence exists between t+  and x(t+ ),10 the client's and the ESCO's pay-
ment functions, wc(x) and we(x), are replaced by wc(t+ ) and we(t+ ). Then, the
central planner's problem is
max
t;x(t+);wc(t+)

E [v(x; t+ )]  
2
V ar [v(x; t+ )]  v0   Ewe(t+ )  C(t)

: (4.8)
The solution to the problem above is outlined in the following theorem. The super-
script C, for coordination, is used to denote this optimal solution.
10x(t+ ) is decreasing in t+ , as shown in the proof of Theorem IV.1.
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Theorem IV.1. The central planner's optimal strategy is:
(1) There exists a unique xC(t+ ), which satises u0(x+ t+ ) = p;
(2) wCc (t+ ) = 0;
(3) There exists a unique tC, which satises C 0(t) = p.
The outcome V C is the optimal project value for the ESCO. Clearly all uncer-
tainty is internalized by the central planner (ESCO) and marginal utility of customers
matches energy price. For analysis to come in following sections, the strategy stated
in Theorem IV.1 and its outcome are used to benchmark against.
4.3.2 Rebound Eect
As discussed earlier, rebound eect is identied as one of the key barriers that
prevent ESCOs from thriving in the residential sector (Greening et al. 2000, Sorrell
2009). Before examining the main problem, we briey discuss how the rebound eect
is reected in our model, which is a fundamental driving force for the rest of analysis.
Given the same technology level, the individual client tends to consume more
energy, deviating from what central planer would choose. Denote xD (D for decen-
tralized) as the solution to the client's problem (4.4).
Lemma IV.1. xD(t+ )  xC(t+ ):
When the ESCO provides any subsidy on the unit price, the client does not
internalize the true cost of energy and over-consumes compared to the coordinated
level { lower marginal cost leads to increased consumption. This rebound eect
makes the real benet of energy eciency project unveriable, and thus undermines
the ESCO's protability from PBCs. Formally stated, the rebound eect is a major
diculty in obtaining the rst-best solution.
In the following sections, we rst study two types of contracts that eliminate
rebound eect and lead to the rst-best solution in Section 4.4, although their use
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can be limited by practical considerations. In Section 4.5 we discuss how existence of
rebound eect, combined with customer's risk aversion, leads to lack of coordination
and study n-rate contracts.
4.4 Direct Control of Rebound Eect
In this section, we consider two practical contracts that have the potential to
directly resolve the rebound eect. First is the case where the post-project technology
is veriable { i.e., the technology realization after the EE project can be measured
with no errors { and as a consequence PBC is designed around post-project technology
rather than the client's energy consumption, directly eliminating the rebound eect.
Second is the case of chauage contracts where the client's comfort level is controlled
by the ESCO. In other words, the energy consumption is implicitly determined such
that the specied comfort level in the contracts is delivered, therefore rebound eect
is removed.
4.4.1 Veriable Post-Project Technology
When the post-project technology level can be veried, the subsidy of ESCO is
contingent on technology realization t+ rather than the client's energy consumption
xD(t + ). That is, the ESCO's subsidy becomes we(t + ) instead of we(x) in (4.5).
Accordingly the client's payment is now wc(t+ ; x) = px we(t+ ) instead of wc(x)
in (4.2).
Theorem IV.2. When the ESCO's payment is contingent on post-project technology,
the contract that species the ESCO's payment we(t+ ) = M   pt achieves the rst-
best outcome. M is any constant.
In many PBCs, the client's consumption is used as a proxy to the technology
realization. As a result, the cost sharing ratio, i, has to play multiple and conicting
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roles simultaneously. It requires the ESCO pay a large portion of variable cost to
commit his eort and to share risk from the client. On the other hand, it requires
exactly opposite to manage the client's rebound eect. The ability to verify the post-
project technology makes it possible to totally decouple these two parts. The ESCO's
subsidy driven by technology realization not only enables him to commit to certain
eort level, but also fully compensates the client for uncertain outcome. Meanwhile,
the client is responsible for all variable cost so that her rebound eect is completely
removed. As a result, both the ESCO and client have the right incentive to make
optimal decisions and the rst-best solution is achieved.
While coordinating the incentives, post-project technology verication can be very
costly relative to small project values in the residential sector, or sometimes even
impossible. In the next subsection and Section 4.5, we assume post-project technology
verication is not viable, and consider contracts contingent on energy consumption.
4.4.2 Chauage Contract
Chauage contract is also known as comfort contracting. It requires clear spec-
ication of service requirements. For example, a data center may outsource its air
conditioning service to an ESCO, requiring a temperature below 80 Fahrenheit. A
public library may outsource its lighting service to an ESCO, with guaranteed bright-
ness of 500 lumens. In this subsection we investigate whether chauage contracts
achieve the rst-best outcome.
Under chauage contracts, energy consumption is determined by technology level
and contracted comfort level. With the comfort level unchanged before and after
EE project, better technology leads to smaller energy usage. As the client does not
choose her consumption, rebound eect does not exist. To reect this fact, we denote
u0 as the required comfort level. In order to keep the comfort level unchanged after
111
the EE project, the energy consumption, x, has to satisfy
u(x + t+ ) = u0: (4.9)
The client's utility (4.1) becomes
v(x; t+ ) = u0   wc(x):
Theorem IV.3. (1) The 1-rate contract (?; f0g) is optimal; (2) There exists a unique
optimal eort level t; (3) The rst-best outcome is achieved.
The intuition is straightforward. Without rebound eect, the ESCO pays all the
variable cost and charges the client only the xed fee. The xed payment can be in
the form of either one time transfer or multiple installments. In such arrangement, all
the risk is transferred to the ESCO and the client's utility is guaranteed. Therefore,
chauage contract addresses concerns about both risk aversion and moral hazard,
and helps ESCO reach the rst-best outcome.
Theorem IV.3 fully conrms practices where chauage contract is frequently used
in non-residential sectors, where the comfort level is often exogenously given. How-
ever, its use in the residential sector is limited. Residential clients often have the desire
to change comfort level over time and each individual may dier in their preferred
comfort level. As a result, chauage contract is unlikely to work.11
To summarize, rebound eect can be resolved if the post-project technology is
veriable, or if chauage contract is viable. In either case, a simple linear contract
is optimal and achieves the rst-best outcome. However, they both have limitations
and often not feasible in the residential sector. Next, we study more general contracts
11While mostly used in non-residential sectors, chauage contract is sometimes applied to res-
idential clients as well. For example, in some apartments in Europe, heating is under chauage
contracts. Room temperature is xed at 68 Fahrenheit during days and 64 Fahrenheit during nights
for the whole complex. It does not suit to each individual apartment.
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(shared savings contract and guaranteed savings contract) that deal with situations
where rebound eect is inevitable.
4.5 Indirect Control of Rebound Eect
Facing the rebound eect, the ESCO is challenged to design appropriate contracts.
We start with a case where the ESCO's eort in improving client's technology level
is contractible and study how well 1-rate and 2-rate contracts perform in overcoming
the rebound eect and achieving the rst-best outcome (Subsection 4.5.1). Next we
relax this assumption by considering the case of moral hazard, where ESCO's eort
is not observable (Subsection 4.5.2).
4.5.1 Model with Complete Observability of ESCO's Eort
With contractibility of expected technology level, the ESCO's oering should in-
clude expected technology level and payment structure. The main problem stated in
(4.7) becomes
max
t;fzig;fig

E

v(xD; t+ )
  
2
V ar

v(xD; t+ )
  v0   Ewe(xD)  C(t) : (4.10)
In this subsection, the superscript O=n, for observability and n-rate, is used in optimal
solutions.
Theorem IV.4.
(1) Any contracts that are only contingent on consumptions (including n-rate con-
tracts) cannot reach the rst-best outcome.
(2) Under 1-rate contracts,
(2a) There exists a unique optimal eort level tO=1, which satises C 0(t) = p.
(2b) There exists a unique optimal payment rate O=1 and O=1 2 (0; 1).
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(2c) The project value, V O=1, decreases in risk aversion coecient  and project un-
certainty 2.
As Theorem IV.4(1) indicates, contracts that are contingent on energy consump-
tion are fundamentally limited. In order to completely remove rebound eect, the
ESCO has to ask the client to take full energy variable cost. This, however, exposes
the client to uncertain outcome of new technology, which decreases the overall sur-
plus due to the client's risk aversion. Unable to overcome combined eect of rebound
and risk aversion, such contracts cannot achieve the rst-best outcome. Despite of
non-existence of coordinating contracts, we evaluate how n-rate contracts perform,
with attention to 1-rate and 2-rate contracts.
Under 1-rate contracts, the ESCO needs to decide the eort level and the sin-
gle payment rate  applied to all energy usage. As Theorem IV.4(2a) shows, the
eort level tO=1 is equal to that with central planner, tC . When the eort level is
contractible, the ESCO is able to fully internalize the benet of better technology.
While ESCO only pays a fraction of the energy bill, he can charge the client up-front
for her savings. Therefore, all benet eventually goes into the ESCO's pocket, which
drives him to make decision just like the central planner.
With respect to the payment rate as concerned in Theorem IV.4(2b), if the ESCO
pays all variable cost (i.e.,  = 0), the client would use too much of energy without
considering its cost. If the client pays all the variable cost (i.e.,  = 1), she faces too
much uncertainty that generates disutility. As a trade-o, the optimal sharing ratio,
O=1, is strictly between 0 and 1. This means, both rebound eect and risk-aversion
are partially mitigated but they still exist. This reinforces the fact that ESCO cannot
get the rst-best outcome by n-rate contract.
Theorem IV.4(2c) is intuitive. The project is more protable when the client is less
risk averse (smaller ) or when the technology outcome is less uncertain (smaller 2).
The project value, ESCO's technology (eort) choice, and average energy usage are
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plotted with respect to  and 2 in Figure 4.1. The project value, V O=1, is illustrated
in Figure 4.1(a) and (d) and is compared against the rst-best outcome, V C . As the
client becomes more risk averse or the project uncertainty becomes larger, the gap
between V O=1 and V C also becomes larger. When the client is extremely risk averse,
the project value may become negative, making it impossible for the ESCO to prot
from such a project.
The energy usage increases in  and 2, as shown in Figure 4.1(c) and (f), respec-
tively. As the client is more risk reverse or the project outcome is more uncertain,
the ESCO oers to pay a larger portion of the variable cost, in order to decrease
the client's disutility associated to uncertainty. This payment structure, however,
provides undesirable incentive for the client to over consume energy.
Although so far we have focused on 1-rate contracts, it is also interesting to explore
how 2-rate (or n-rate) contracts compare with 1-rate contracts. While it is challenging
to obtain analytical results under 2-rate contracts, we rely on numerical studies to
obtain insights on how additional exibility of 2-rate contracts improves the ESCO's
prot.
As expected, the optimal 2-rate contract strictly outperforms the optimal 1-rate
contract. The underlying idea is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Assuming the ESCO's eort
is t, the client's energy consumption, the client's utility, and the ESCO's payment are
plotted for each technology realization (t+ ).
The ESCO's intention is to design a contract to make the client's consumption
closer to that with central planner, while at the same time reducing the uncertainty
faced by the client. This is equivalent to maximizing system surplus as the ESCO
can extract the whole surplus through up-front payment. Consider the ESCO starts
from the optimal 1-rate contract, (?; fO=1g). With the exibility of a second rate,
the ESCO would raise 1 (while keeping 2 = 
O=1 for this moment), and with
appropriate z, apply it to very desirable technology realizations. Hence, when t + 
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Figure 4.1: Project value, technology, and average energy usage under optimal 1-rate
contract, benchmarked with those in centralized case. Parameters: u(x+
t) = 104  (1  e (x+t)); C(t) = 104
2
t2; p = 0:3 104; 2 = 0:004 (a-c);  =
0:01 (d-f).
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Figure 4.2: Strategies under 1-rate and 2-rate contracts. Parameters: u(x + t) =
1  e (x+t); C(t) = 1
2
t2; p = 0:3;  = 300;   U [ 0:1; 0:1]. Optimal 1-rate
contract:  = 0:81; t = 0:3. Optimal 2-rate contract: 1 = 0:93; 2 =
0:79; z = 0:98; t = 0:3.
is close to the right end, the energy consumption is signicantly reduced (as seen in
Figure 4.2(a)) and much closer to the centralized consumption, xC . As a result of
greater 1, in Figure 4.2(b), the right end of the client's utility curve gets slightly
higher slope, leading to higher variance. However, if only a small piece at the right
end becomes steeper, the impact on overall variance is very small. In other words,
consumption cost reduction is linear in 1 while the variance increase is convex.
Therefore, for the whole system, the rise of variance-related disutility is outweighed
by the benet of the smaller consumption.
As a secondary eect, the ESCO would slightly decreases 2, which applies to the
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rest of technology realizations. This is because the ESCO is concerned less about
client's consumption rebound due to larger 1, while sharing more risk from the
client is benecial. Smaller 2 makes consumption a bit higher but brings down the
variance. Adjusted 1 and 2 together will typically lead to both smaller consumption
and smaller variance, thus help mitigate the rebound eect and risk aversion further
than 1-rate contracts.
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Figure 4.3: Project value under 1-rate and 2-rate contracts, benchmarked with that
in centralized case. Parameters: u(x + t) = 104  (1   e (x+t)); C(t) =
104
2
t2; p = 0:3 104;   U [ 0:1; 0:1].
While 2-rate contracts do improve the surplus, the improvement is very limited.
As shown in Figure 4.3, the optimal 2-rate contract only increases the project value
by a small margin. We also numerically study 3-rate contracts (fz1; z2g; f1; 2; 3g).
While the ESCO, with 2-rate contract, can only curb energy consumptions for either
very desirable technology realizations or very undesirable ones, now he works on both
sides by setting 1 and 3 both great than 
O=1. For those moderate realizations, a
smaller 2 allows the ESCO to take more risk from the client. Despite that 3-rate
contracts perform strictly better, we observe diminishing return of the third rate.
The analysis of model with complete observability of ESCO's eort does not only
sets an upper bound for the performance of similar contracts in the general problem
with moral hazard, but also sheds some light on eective mechanisms. Practically
speaking, government provides a wide range of certication programs for ESCOs.
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Certied by government, an ESCO earns trust from clients much easier, which es-
sentially makes their technology level observable. In such situations, optimal 1-rate
contract (shared savings contract) works well and captures most benet of perfor-
mance contracting.
4.5.2 Model with ESCO's Moral Hazard
Without contractibility of his eort, the ESCO has to consider in the contract how
to overcome moral hazard problem. That is, the payment scheme has to take care of
the ESCO's incentive, additional on the client's rebound eect and her risk aversion.
The superscriptM=n, for moral hazard and n-rate, is used to denote optimal solution
in this subsection.
Theorem IV.5.
(1) Under 1-rate contracts,
(1a) There exists a unique optimal eort level tM=1(), which satises C 0(t) = (1 )p.
(1b) There exists a unique optimal payment rate M=1 and M=1 < O=1.
(2) Under 2-rate contracts, if u0 > 0 and u() is bounded, we have V O=1  V M=2 
V O=2.
Under 1-rate contracts, the ESCO's optimal strategy is illustrated in Theorem
IV.5(1). The ESCO's eort is non-contractible and determined after the contract is
signed, and thus it is contingent on payment rate . As the eort decision takes place
after the contract is signed, the ESCO would only weigh his own portion of energy
savings into his decision but ignore the client's. This is the failure in standard moral
hazard problem and not surprisingly the ESCO spends less eort than when his eort
is contractible, i.e., tM=1() < tO=1 = tC .
The client also anticipates this failure and is willing to pay less up-front for the
project. In order to convey his commitment of reasonable eort, the ESCO has to
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take a greater share of the variable energy cost. Therefore in the optimal strategy we
have M=1 < O=1.
Theorem IV.5(2) shows that V M=2, the project value under 2-rate contracts with
moral hazard, is at least as high as V O=1. In fact, the ESCO can get exactly the
same project value as V O=1 by the 2-rate contract (zM=2, fO=1; 0g), where zM=2 is
given in the proof of Theorem IV.5(2). The intuition is illustrated in Figure 4.4.
With 2 = 0, the client would use innite amount of energy if technology realization
is below certain level. By strategically choosing z1 in the contract, this technology
threshold can be made at tO=1 + , as shown in Figure 4.4(a). The ESCO needs to
subsidize any energy usage above z1, and the total subsidy also goes innite when
the technology realization is below tO=1 + , as shown in Figure 4.4(c). To avoid
large payment under such situations, the ESCO should spend enough eort so that
this does not happen even when the realization ends up with its worst possible value.
That is, he commits to spend at least tO=1 eort. Therefore, the ESCO's moral hazard
problem is fully eliminated even though his eort is not contractible.12
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Figure 4.4: Illustration of ESCO's commitment strategy.
As discussed in the previous subsection when the ESCO's eort is contractible,
12We numerically test situations when u() is an general increasing-decreasing concave function.
Theorem IV.5(2) and the intuition continues to hold as long as the maximizer of u() is large
enough such that the ESCO would be better o to avoid paying large subsidy for poor technology
realizations.
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the optimal 1-rate contract performs reasonably well and the optimal 2-rate contract
only marginally improves the project value. Because of Theorem IV.5(2), V O=1 can be
used as an approximate for V M=2. The improvement of 3-rate contracts are limited
by corresponding contracts with contractibility (i.e., V M=3  V O=3). Therefore, in
practice using 2-rate contracts should be good enough to capture most benet of
performance contracting. The 2-rate contract can be interpreted as a combination
of guaranteed saving contract and shared savings contract. It species a guaranteed
usage threshold and ESCO is responsible for any cost above that. If there is additional
savings below the threshold, the savings is shared by the ESCO and client.
As we have seen so far, the unattainability of the rst-best solution cannot be
resolved even with observability of the ESCO's actions. The following result states
that customers' risk aversion, another signicant barrier to EE project adoption, is
mainly to blame. The superscript add-on RN is used to denote the optimal solution
when the client is risk neutral.
Corollary IV.1. If u0 > 0 and u() is bounded, when the client is risk neutral ( = 0),
the 2-rate contract (zM RN=2, f1; 0g) achieves the rst-best outcome. zM RN=2 is given
in the proof.
When the client is risk neutral, the ESCO does not have to share the risk from
the client. As the client now pays all the variable energy cost, she will voluntarily
choose globally optimal consumption amount, removing negative impact of rebound
eect. The 2-rate contract (zM RN=2, f1; 0g) is a guaranteed savings contract. With
a similar intuition as Theorem IV.5(2), it allows the ESCO to achieve the rst-best
outcome.
This result is not immediately obvious. In classic double moral hazard research,
the rst-best solution is not possible even when the client is risk neutral (Holmstrom
1982, Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995). In their studies, the two players have
to split monetary outcome of both their eorts. This zero-sum contract makes it
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impossible to give both players right incentives to exert eorts. In our paper, however,
contracts are not designed based on any monetary outcome but on amount of energy
the client uses. The critical element is that, the impact of energy consumption on the
client's utility function is concave. However, the energy consumption has linear eect
on the ESCO's surplus, because he pays a portion of energy cost. This dierence
makes the commitment strategy in Corollary IV.1 possible, which allows the ESCO
to achieve the rst-best outcome.
It is worth noting that a project with deterministic technology is a special case of
the risk neutral model, and thus the rst-best outcome can be achieved. While the
client's risk attitude is dicult to change, the ESCO and policy makers can work on
reducing the uncertainty of a project, in order to make EE projects more protable.
The ESCO may conduct inspections or measurement prior to a project. Policy mak-
ers also have a few levers in this eld. They can provide or mandate house energy
eciency rating, or set standards for energy eciency projects. For example, En-
ergy Performance Certicates (EPCs) are required in UK when a property is sold
or rented. EPCs include the property's current energy eciency, recommendations
about how to improve energy eciency (e.g., plumbing or HVAC upgrade), and es-
timated improvement after recommended projects.13 With more information, both
the ESCO and client are more condent to predict the outcome, and consequently a
project is more likely to become a success.
4.6 Extensions
We extend the model to include a number of additional frictions so that it becomes
closer to reality. Throughout this section, analysis is conducted with parametric
forms of comfort function and eort cost function, which allows us to accommodate
additional complexities such as client's eort or policy makers' preference, but still
13More information at www.gov.uk/buy-sell-your-home/energy-performance-certificates.
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have enough insights. We assume the comfort function is
u(x+ t) =  e (x+t) (4.11)
and eort cost function is
C(t) =
1
2
t2:
With specic comfort and cost functions, we rewrite strategies stated in Theorems
IV.1, IV.4, and IV.5 in their closed forms, so that it is easy to compare them with
other results.
Corollary IV.2.
(1) The central planner's optimal strategy is: xC(t+ ) =   ln p  t  ; wCc (t+ ) = 0;
tC = p.
(2) Assume ESCO's eort level is contractible. Under 1-rate contracts,
(2a) The unique optimal eort level is tO=1 = p.
(2b) The unique optimal payment rate is
O=1 =
2
1 +
p
1 + 4p2
:
(3) Assume ESCO's eort level is non-contractible. Under 1-rate contracts,
(3a) The unique optimal eort level is: tM=1() = (1  )p.
(3b) The unique optimal payment rate is:
M=1 =
2
1 +
p
1 + 4p(2 + )
:
In addition to insights discussed in Section 4.5, it is also interesting to observe in
Corollary IV.2(2b) and (3b) that the optimal payment rate is decreasing in the unit
energy price p. The intuition is that, when the energy is more expensive, the same
level of uncertainty in energy usage translates to larger uncertainty in the client's
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utility. As a result, the ESCO would have to pay more of energy variable cost in
order to manage the client's disutility related to risk aversion.
In the rest of this section, we rst look at additional factors involved in energy
eciency projects. These include three topics: (1) the client's eort to reduce energy
consumption, (2) the impact of external uncertainty (e.g., weather uncertainty), and
(3) the impact of initial technology. Then we turn to other stakeholders of energy
eciency projects. Such players are (1) utility companies that own ESCOs, and (2)
policy makers.
4.6.1 Client's Eort
Besides choosing energy usage, the client can also put eort into improving energy
eciency in many situations. For example, it helps if one client always closes windows
when using heating or turns o lighting when leaving home. To reect these observa-
tions, we slightly modify the model to include the client's eort in a similar structure
as the ESCO's eort. The client's eort is denoted as q, with convex cost structure
1
2
q2. The parameter  represents diculty of the client's eort. As it becomes more
dicult, i.e.,  ! 0, the problem will converge to the original one studied in the main
part. The client's comfort function and utility function become
u(x+ t+ + q) =  e (x+t++q) and v(x; t+ ; q) = u(x+ t+ + q)  wc(x)  1
2
q2:
After observing technology realization, the client's problem, originally stated in Equa-
tion (4.4), becomes
[x; q] = argmax
x;q
v(x; t+ ; q): (4.12)
The ESCO's problem, in Equation (4.7), does not change except the client's eort q
appearing as argument for relevant terms.
In this extension, we only consider 1-rate contracts when the ESCO's eort is
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contractible and 2-rate contracts when moral hazard on the ESCO side exists. As
argued in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, they are good enough to capture the most of
benet from performance contracting. The superscript add-on CE, for client's eort,
is used to denote optimal solutions in this extension.
Theorem IV.6.
(1) The central planner's optimal strategy is: xC CE(t + ) =   ln p   t      p,
qC CE(t+ ) = p, wC CEc (t+ ) = 0, and t
C CE = p .
(2) Assume ESCO's eort level is contractible. Under 1-rate contracts, the optimal
strategy is
O CE=1 =
2
1  p+p(1 + p)2 + 4p2 and tO CE=1 = p:
(3) Assume ESCO's eort level is non-contractible. Under 2-rate contracts, we have
V O CE=1  V M CE=2  V O CE=2.
Theorem IV.6(1) is a direct generalization of Corollary IV.2(1). In central plan-
ner's strategy, both the ESCO's and client's eorts are fully leveraged to improve
technology and to reduce energy consumption. That means, the marginal cost of the
eort equals to the full unit cost of energy.
Theorem IV.6(2) generalizes the results in Corollary IV.2(2) to incorporate the
client's eort. Similar to Corollary IV.2(2a), the contractibility of the ESCO's eort
allows him to internalize all the benet, and thus his eort decision is aligned with
that of central planner. The client's share of energy cost here, O CE=1, is greater
than O=1 in Corollary IV.2(2b), and increases for a greater . Besides balancing risk
aversion and rebound eect,  here also has to play the role to incentivize the client
to put eort. The larger portion of unit price the client is charged for energy usage,
the more eort she puts into reducing energy usage. If the client's eort is cheaper
(greater ), the ESCO will weight this incentivizing role more while compromising
125
the ability to share risk, leading to a higher .
Theorem IV.6(3) replicates the result in Theorem IV.5(2). The intuition is the
same: Oering extremely cheap energy above an appropriate threshold, the ESCO
eectively commits himself into a higher eort level to avoid huge amount of subsidy.
4.6.2 External Uncertainty
In this extension we would like to consider external uncertainties. For example,
energy consumption is heavily correlated to temperature, which is uncertain ahead
of time to both the ESCO and client. Dierent from technology uncertainty (which
is labeled as internal), external uncertainty exists and makes the risk averse client
suer despite of whether a project is adopted.
The external uncertainty is introduced to the client's comfort function (4.11) and
it becomes
u(x+ t) =  e (x+t+w):
w represents the external uncertainty and it has mean of zero and variance of 
2
w.
w is assumed to be independent from the technology uncertainty . With two ran-
dom shocks, the problem structure remains and thus all results in the main part
continue to hold. Here we are interested in how the external uncertainty inuences
the ESCO's and client's surpluses. We already know that if the ESCO's eort is
contractible, 1-rate contracts are nearly as good as any complicated contracts but
more implementable. When ESCO's eort is not contractible, 2-rate contracts are
good enough. The outcome of the optimal 2-rate contract can be approximated by
the optimal 1-rate contract with contractibility. Therefore, in this and all following
extensions, we use 1-rate contract with contractibility to illustrate results.
Theorem IV.7. The project value, V O=1, increases in external uncertainty 2w, while
the client's utility decreases in 2w.
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It is intuitive that the risk averse client suers from additional uncertainty. How-
ever, the ESCO's surplus increases in external uncertainty while it decreases in tech-
nology uncertainty as indicated in Theorem IV.4(2c). The reason is that technology
uncertainty only exists after the project, which makes the project less attractive since
the client is risk averse. On the other hand, the client has to face external uncer-
tainty both before and after the project. Through PBCs, the ESCO is able to share
some external uncertainty and reduce the client's disutility. Consequently, the client
is willing to pay a premium for the project.
4.6.3 Initial Technology
In the main part of this paper, the initial technology, t0, is normalized to 0. In this
extension, we study how the initial technology impacts project value. The client's
pre-project comfort function is
u(x+ t0) =  e (x+t0):
We consider two types of improvements. In the rst type, the technology is incre-
mental. For example, the ESCO can inject additional insulation materials into walls.
In such cases, the client's post-project comfort function is
u(x+ t0 + t+ ) =  e (x+t0+t+):
In the second type, the technology replaces the original one. For example, the ESCO
can install a new window which replaces the old one. The new window will work as
it is designed, despite of the quality of the old window. That is, the client's comfort
function is
u(x+ t+ ) =  e (x+t+);
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which is independent of initial technology. Theorem IV.8 illustrates how the project
value may depend on the initial technology level.
Theorem IV.8.
(1) If the technology is incremental, the project value, V O=1, is constant in t0.
(2) If the technology is a replacement, the project value, V O=1, decreases in t0.
The technology and the energy consumption are perfectly substitutable in the
client's comfort function. If the technology is increment, the initial technology does
not matter because any additional technology will reduce same amount of energy
usage, and thus deliver same amount of value to the client. If the technology is
a replacement, the post-project utility is not dependent on the initial technology.
Therefore, the lousier the initial technology is, the lower utility the client has before
the project, the more value the project can create.
4.6.4 Utility-owned ESCO
Energy eciency projects are delivered not only by independent ESCOs but also
by utility-owned ESCOs (Goldman et al. 2005, Larsen et al. 2012). In this extension
our model is modied to accommodate utility-owned ESCOs.
The energy retail cost, p, is assumed exogenous in the main part. Now we allow
utility-owned ESCO to change retail price. However, the cost to produce energy,
denoted by p0, is exogenously given. The ESCO's problem, presented in Equations
(4.6) and (4.7), becomes
t =argmax
t

 Ewe(x)  1
2
t2 + (p  p0)Ex

;
max
p;fzig;fig

E [v(x; t + )]  
2
V ar [v(x; t + )]  v0   Ewe(x)  1
2
t2 + (p  p0)Ex

:
(4.13)
Original solutions to Problem (4.7) are functions in exogenous retail price p. In
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Problem (4.13), with retail price p as a decision variable, solutions are functions in
production cost p0.
Theorem IV.9. Let the optimal contract in Problem (4.7) be (fzi(p)g; fi(p)g).
Then in Problem (4.13), the optimal contract is (p; fzi(p0)g; fp0p i(p0)g), where re-
tail price p can be any value.
While the ESCO has one more lever (energy price) to construct the contract, the
problem structure turns out to be equivalent to the original one. The utility-owned
ESCO now uses p0 instead of p as the energy cost to solve the original problem, and
get the optimal contract (fzig; f0ig). The solution is independent of the retail price
p, which means any p > p0 can deliver the maximal project value to the ESCO. This
seems a distortion to the client's marginal cost when the consumption decision is
made. But, it is easily recovered by adjusted i's (i.e., for any retail price p, setting
i =
p0
p
0i to achieve the same outcome). Therefore, all results shown above continue
to hold.
The implication to utility-owned ESCOs is that contracts should be based on their
real energy cost rather than the retail price. Since any retail price would work, the
ESCO can safely keep the standard retail price unchanged and choose other contract
terms accordingly. This convenience makes such contracts easy to implement.
4.6.5 Policy Implication
Energy eciency does not only save energy cost, but also has huge potential to
mitigate environmental impact of energy production, delivery and consumption. The
environmental impact is often not internalized by either the ESCO or the client.
Therefore, policy makers play a important role in this business. As Steinberger et al.
(2009) summarizes, there exist two categories of policies relevant to the ESCO indus-
try: regulations and monetary incentives. As each category is only briey covered in
the following, readers are referred to Ryan et al. (2011) and Cunningham and Cook
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(2015) for an extensive list and discussion about energy eciency policies. Regula-
tions include ESCO certication, house energy eciency grading, energy eciency
standard, etc. While in general such regulations help reduce uncertainty of energy
eciency projects or link clients to trustworthy ESCOs, modeling impacts of regula-
tions is beyond the scope of this paper.
Monetary Incentives are the focus of this extension. Common incentives include
tax credit, carbon tax, etc. Tax credit is to give certain amount or certain percentage
of project cost as tax credit. For example, one gets 10% of the cost, up to $500 as
federal tax credits for insulation improvement.14 Carbon tax is charged to all clients
despite whether energy eciency project is adopted. It is added to unit energy
price by local government. For example, Boulder, Colorado implemented the United
States' rst tax on carbon emissions from electricity, on April 1, 2007, at a level of
approximately $7 per ton of carbon.15
Most monetary incentives fall into two categories: either a lump sum subsidy or
carbon tax on each unit of energy consumption. With lump sum subsidy, we denote
the amount of subsidy to the ESCO as G. With carbon tax policy, we denote the tax
on each unit energy as r, lifting the total energy cost to p+ r. We assume each unit
energy usage incurs an environmental cost, denoted by c. It is common to quantify
environmental impact in energy and environment studies. For example, Lazer and
Farnsworth (2011) estimates that the emission cost of each KWH can be as high as 3
cents. Policy makers' objective is to maximize social surplus, including environmental
cost. This is the most common way to model environmental externalities, as seen in
many energy eciency-focused papers and beyond (Eom and Sweeney 2009, Chun
et al. 2013, Cachon 2014, Cohen et al. 2015). Same to other extensions, we use 1-rate
contract with contractibility to illustrate the two policies in Theorem IV.10.
Theorem IV.10.
14More information at www.energystar.gov/about/federal_tax_credits/insulation.
15More information at www.carbontax.org/where-carbon-is-taxed.
130
(1) With lump sum subsidy, the optimal subsidy amount is G = c(lnO=1 + p).
(2) With carbon tax policy, the optimal tax is r = c.
(3) Compared to lump sum subsidy, carbon tax policy leads to greater technology in-
vestment, lower energy consumption, and higher social surplus.
The lump sum subsidy does not change the ESCO's eort and the client's con-
sumption decisions. However, it allows the ESCO to charge a lower up-front fee, which
in turn makes more projects happen. In fact, with the optimal subsidy amount, any
socially benecial projects would also be protable for the ESCO. With carbon tax
policy, policy makers would charge exactly the environmental cost to the client. A
higher energy cost does not only make more projects happen, but also induces the
ESCO and the client to make socially better decisions. That is, the client will use less
energy and the ESCO will spend more eort. Therefore, carbon tax is more desirable
to policy makers from economic perspective.
4.7 Conclusion
Energy eciency is one of the smartest approaches to reduce energy cost and re-
duce environmental impact. Most energy eciency projects are outsourced to ESCOs
and are based on PBCs. While having thrived for decades in public, commercial and
industrial sectors, the ESCO business struggles in the residential sector. This paper
studies the contract design problem for energy eciency projects. It also focuses on
what are the enablers that make energy eciency projects more successful from both
ESCOs' and policy makers' perspectives.
Three most popular PBCs { shared savings contract, guaranteed savings contract,
and chauage contract { are examined. In the residential sector, if the ESCO's eort
is contractible, a simple linear contract (shared savings contract) performs almost
as well as other complicated contracts. The savings have to be wisely shared be-
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tween the ESCO and the client, in an eort to balance the negative impact of risk
aversion and rebound eect. When the ESCO's eort is not contractible, a 2-rate
contract (combination of guaranteed savings contract and shared savings contract)
provides reasonably good outcome and captures most benet of performance contract-
ing. While chauage contract is widely adopted in non-residential sectors, requiring
specic and xed comfort level makes it less attractive in the residential sector.
When both rebound eect and risk aversion are present, any contracts contingent
only on post-project energy consumption cannot achieve the rst-best outcome. That
said, both the ESCO and policy makers have potential approaches to increase project
value. The ESCO, for example, can develop the capability of post-project technology
measurement. If the ESCO is able to design contracts based on post-project technol-
ogy instead of energy consumption, it is optimal to ask the client to take all variable
cost and the rst-best outcome can be achieved. The ESCO can also conduct pre-
project inspection, in order to reduce uncertainty of a project, which in turn increases
the protability.
Government regulations can also help increase project value. For example, ESCO
certication identies trustworthy ESCOs and thus remove moral hazard problem.
Informational programs, such as house energy eciency rating and energy eciency
standard, play a role in reducing project uncertainty. Concerned about environmental
cost associated to energy usage, policy makers may also want to provide monetary
incentives. Both lump sum subsidy and carbon tax make more energy eciency
projects happen. Carbon tax also encourages greater ESCO's eort and less energy
consumption, and leads to higher social surplus than lump sum subsidy. Therefore,
carbon tax is more desirable for policy makers from economic perspective.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
My dissertation includes three essays on operational contracts. In Chapter II,
we consider inventory exchange contracts in competitive markets. Results show that
while rms often benet from exchanging their inventories, exceptions exist. They
may be worse o when the purchasing cost is either very high or very low, both of
which lead to excessive inventories compared to the no-trade case. Firms trading
inventories also increases consumer surplus in majority of cases as long as the pur-
chasing cost is not very low. Therefore, inventory exchange contracts are most often
a win-win solution.
In Chapter III, we study vertical price constraint contracts that are used to co-
ordinate the supply chain. The RPM and MAP policies are widely used by the
manufacturer to encourage brick-and-mortar retailers to spend sales eort. We nd
MAP policy is preferred by the manufacturer when the customer's valuations span in
a large range and the search cost is signicant. Otherwise, the manufacturer would
be better o choosing RPM policy. Regular retailers and consumers would also pre-
fer MAP policy if the search cost is even higher or consumer valuations have even
larger variance, compared to the manufacturers. Under such situations, MAP policy
provides all parties in the supply chain a higher prot or surplus.
In Chapter IV, we focus on the design of performance based contracts between
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ESCOs and residential clients. Results indicate that piecewise linear contracts per-
form nearly as well as any other complicated contracts. That said, due to client's risk
aversion and rebound eect, the rst-best outcome is not attainable. It helps x this
eciency gap, at least partially, to reduce uncertainty of technology or to develop the
ability to verify post-project energy eciency. Appropriate regulations and monetary
incentives from policy makers also make energy eciency projects more appealing,
and thus help manage environmental impact associated to energy production, delivery
and consumption.
With increasingly competitive markets and constantly changing tastes of con-
sumers, doing business is not easy. All three of my essays are inspired by practical
contractual issues in dierent industries. My research does not only provides deep
understanding of challenges in each context, but also makes recommendations to play-
ers involved, and eventually contributes to more ecient, protable and sustainable
supply chains.
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APPENDIX A
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems in Chapter II
Proof of Lemma II.1.
Part (1): Centralized Pricing.
Centralized rm solves the following problem stated in (2.1).
Cp(q1; q2) = max
p1;p20
2X
i=1
pisi + (1 + 2)
Since the term (1 + 2) is a constant,we drop it out in this proof as well as all
following proofs. We assume the demand has to be non-negative, otherwise the cen-
tralized rm can raise p2 arbitrarily high while not hurting demand in market 2 by
setting p1 =
a
b
p2.Since it is never optimal to generate demand higher than inventory,
the problem reduces to
max
(p1;p2)2S
p1(w1   ap1 + bp2) + p2(w2   ap2 + bp1)
= max
(p1;p2)2S
p1w1 + p2w2   (ap21   2bp1p2 + ap22):
where S = f(p1; p2) : 0  di  qi; i = 1; 2g. In the objective function, the only
nonlinear term  (ap21   2bp1p2 + ap22) is strictly joint concave on (p1; p2) because
a > b and S is compact and convex, so there exists a unique optimal price pair. This
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completes the proof of part (1). The optimal prices are given in Table A.1 and regions
are illustrated in Figure 2.1(a).
Region Conditions Solutions
R1
q1  12w1
q2  12w2
pC1 =
aw1+bw2
2(a2 b2)
pC2 =
aw2+bw1
2(a2 b2)
R2
2aq1 + 2bq2  aw1 + bw2
2aq2 + 2bq1  aw2 + bw1
pC1 =
a(w1 q1)+b(w2 q2)
a2 b2
pC2 =
b(w1 q1)+a(w2 q2)
a2 b2
R3
2aq1 + 2bq2  aw1 + bw2
q2  12w2
pC1 =
aw1+bw2
2(a2 b2)
pC2 =
abw1+(2a2 b2)w2 2(a2 b2)q2
2a(a2 b2)
R4
q1  12w1
2aq2 + 2bq1  aw2 + bw1
pC1 =
abw2+(2a2 b2)w1 2(a2 b2)q1
2a(a2 b2)
pC2 =
aw2+bw1
2(a2 b2)
Table A.1: Solutions to prices in centralized scenario.
Part (2): Decentralized Pricing.
The pricing problems in trade and no-trade scenarios are identical and stated in
(2.4). Dropping all constant terms, the problem is equivalent to the following:1
max
p1
p1(w1   ap1 + bp2   a   b)
s.t. w1   ap1 + bp2  q1; p1  0
After droping constant terms,  and  show always together. Therefore, we normalize
 = 1, except the nal numerical studies.The best response function of rm i is
pi = max
n
0;
wi + bpj   qi
a| {z }
A
;
wi + bpj   a  b
2a| {z }
B
o
:
Term B is the unconstrained optimum with enough inventory. Term A reects con-
strained inventory. Price 0 is optimal when the market size wi is very small. In this
case, rms are willing to give their products for free in order to earn future market
1Requiring demand not exceed the available quantity allows us to immediately claim existence
of equilibrium.
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share. Since the response function is continuous and the slope is between [0; 1), there
exists a unique intersection. This completes the proof of part (2). The optimal prices
are given in Table A.2. 
Region Conditions Solutions(X = N; T )
 (4a2   b2)q1 + 2a2w1 + abw2 + (2a3 + a2b  2ab2   b3)  0
 (4a2   b2)q2 + 2a2w2 + abw1 + (2a3 + a2b  2ab2   b3)  0
2aw1 + bw2   (2a2 + 3ab+ b2)  0
2aw2 + bw1   (2a2 + 3ab+ b2)  0
pX1 =
2aw1+bw2 (2a2+3ab+b2)
4a2 b2
pX2 =
2aw2+bw1 (2a2+3ab+b2)
4a2 b2
B
aw1 + bw2   bq2   (ab+ a2)  0
 a2w1   abw2 + (2a2   b2)q1 + abq2   (a3 + ab   ab2   b3)  0
bw1 + 2aw2   2aq2   (ab+ b2)  0
abw1 + 2a
2w2   (4a2   b2)q2 + (2a3 + a2b  2ab2   b3)  0
pX1 =
aw1+bw2 bq2 (ab+a2)
2a2 b2
pX2 =
bw1+2aw2 2aq2 (ab+b2)
2a2 b2
C
aw2 + bw1   bq1   (ab+ a2)  0
 a2w2   abw1 + (2a2   b2)q2 + abq1   (a3 + ab   ab2   b3)  0
bw2 + 2aw1   2aq1   (ab+ b2)  0
abw2 + 2a
2w1   (4a2   b2)q1 + (2a3 + a2b  2ab2   b3)  0
pX1 =
aw2+bw1 bq1 (ab+a2)
2a2 b2
pX2 =
bw2+2aw1 2aq1 (ab+b2)
2a2 b2
D
w1   (a+ b)  0
 w1 + 2q1   (a+ b)  0
 bw1   2aw2 + 2aq2 + (ab+ b2)  0
 bw1   2aw2 + (2a2 + 3ab+ b2)  0
pX1 =
w1 (a+b)
2a
pX2 = 0
E
w2   (a+ b)  0
 w2 + 2q2   (a+ b)  0
 bw2   2aw1 + 2aq1 + (ab+ b2)  0
 bw2   2aw1 + (2a2 + 3ab+ b2)  0
pX1 = 0
pX2 =
w2 (a+b)
2a
F
a2w1 + abw2   (2a2   b2)q1   abq2 + (a3 + a2b  ab2   b3)  0
a2w2 + abw1   (2a2   b2)q2   abq1 + (a3 + a2b  ab2   b3)  0
aw1 + bw2   aq1   bq2  0
aw2 + bw1   aq2   bq1  0
pX1 =
aw1+bw2 aq1 bq2
a2 b2
pX2 =
aw2+bw1 aq2 bq1
a2 b2
G
w1   2q1 + (a+ b)  0
w1   q1  0
 bw1   aw2 + bq1 + aq2  0
 bw1   aw2 + bq1 + (a2 + ab)  0
pX1 =
w1 q1
a
pX2 = 0
H
w2   2q2 + (a+ b)  0
w2   q2  0
 bw2   aw1 + bq2 + aq1  0
 bw2   aw1 + bq2 + (a2 + ab)  0
pX1 = 0
pX2 =
w2 q2
a
I
q1   w1  0
q2   w2  0
 w1 + (a+ b)  0
 w2 + (a+ b)  0
pX1 = 0
pX2 = 0
Table A.2: Solutions to prices in trade and no-trade scenarios.
Proof of Lemma II.2.
Using the pricing solution in Table A.1 in the proof of Lemma II.1(1), we can
explicitly express total prot Cpi in (2.1) for each region i and eliminate q1 by using
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q1 = K   q2:
Cp1 =
aw21 + aw
2
2 + 2bw1w2
4(a2   b2) ;
Cp2 =
 2(a  b)q22 + (a  b)(2K   w1 + w2)q2 + aKw1 + bKw2   aK2
a2   b2 ;
Cp3 =
 4(a2   b2)q22 + 4(a2   b2)w2q2 + a2w21 + 2abw1w2 + b2w22
4a(a2   b2) ;
Cp4 =
 4(a2   b2)q22 + 4(a2   b2)(2Kq2 +Kw1   w1q2  K2) + a2w22 + 2abw1w2 + b2w21
4a(a2   b2) :
q1+ q2 = K corresponds to a line with slope  1 in Figure 2.2(a). As a function of q2,
Cp1 is a constant; 
Cp
2 is concave; 
Cp
3 is increasing (because q2  w22 in R3); Cp4 is
decreasing (because q2  K   w12 in R4). Therefore, maximum cannot be in Region
3 or 4.
By solving the maximization problem in Region 1 and 2, we get the optimal
inventory allocation and revenue as following. If w1 + w2  2K, q2 is any value
in [1
2
w2; K   12w1] and Ct(K) = aw
2
1+2bw1w2+aw
2
2
4(a2 b2) . If w1   w2  2K, q2 = 0 and
Ct(K) = K(aw1+bw2 aK)
a2 b2 . If w2   w1  2K, q2 = K and Ct(K) = K(aw2+bw1 aK)a2 b2 .
Otherwise, q2 =
2K w1+w2
4
and Ct(K) = (w1 w2)
2
8(a+b)
+ K(w1+w2 K)
2(a b) . 
Proof of Lemma II.3.
Without loss of generality, we assume w1  w2. From the proof of Lemma II.2,
we have:
Ct(K) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
K(aw1+bw2 aK)
a2 b2 ; if K  w1 w22
(w1 w2)2
8(a+b)
+ K(w1+w2 K)
2(a b) ; if
w1 w2
2
< K  w1+w2
2
aw21+2bw1w2+aw
2
2
4(a2 b2) ; if K >
w1+w2
2
:
It is straightforward to verify that Ct(K) is strictly increasing and strictly concave
in the rst two subcases and constant in the third one. 
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Proof of Lemma II.4.
All the regions mentioned in this proof refer to those in Figure 2.2(b). Let (q^1; q^2)
be the intersection of all four regions and, thus, K1 = q^1+q^2. The value ofK1 depends
on the realizations of (w1; w2) and is dened in Table A.3. The rst row of the table
corresponds to the intuitive intersection of the regions, while rows 2 to 4 correspond
to the case where both prices, or one of the prices p1 and p2 is 0. The solution comes
from evaluating the conditions in Table A.2. For example case A is translated into
the rst row below, or case I is translated into row 2. In each case, we solve for q1
and q2 satisfying all of the boundary conditions resulting in the outcome below.
Conditions on (w1; w2) value of K1
2aw1 + bw2  (2a2 + 3ab+ b2),2aw2 + bw1  (2a2 + 3ab+ b2) a(w1+w2)+2(a2 b2)2a b
w1  (a+ b),w2  (a+ b) w1 + w2
w1 > (a+ b),2aw1 + bw2 < (2a
2 + 3ab+ b2) aw1+2aw2+bw1+2(a
2 b2)
2a
w2 > (a+ b),2aw2 + bw1 < (2a
2 + 3ab+ b2) aw2+2aw1+bw2+2(a
2 b2)
2a
Table A.3: Value of K1.
If K  K1, the line q1+ q2 = K, which is called allocation line, crosses region R2,
and usually also R3 and R4. Otherwise, the allocation line crossesregion R3, R1, and
R4. Dene
1(K) = max
q1+q2=K;(q1;q2)2R1 or R2
2X
i=1
Npi (q1; q2);
3(K) = max
q1+q2=K;(q1;q2)2R3
2X
i=1
Npi (q1; q2);
4(K) = max
q1+q2=K;(q1;q2)2R4
2X
i=1
Npi (q1; q2):
Therefore, we have Tt(K) = maxf1(K); 3(K); 4(K)g. We describe below the
shape of 1(K), 3(K), and 4(K). Specically, in step 1, we show that 1(K) is
increasing-decreasing constant. In step 2, we show that 3(K) (and similarly 4(K))
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is increasing for K  KR3 and then constant for K > KR3. To prove the lemma, it
is sucient to show that 3(K
R3)  1(KR3) (and similarly for Region 4).
Step 1. 1(K) is increasing in [0;
w1+w2
2
], decreasing in [w1+w2
2
; K1], constant after-
wards.
When K  K1, from Lemma II.1(2) case F, we get (assume w1  w2)
1(K) = max
q1+q2=K
 aq21   aq22   2bq1q2 + aw1q1 + aw2q2 + bw2q1 + bw1q2
a2   b2
=
8>><>>:
K(aw1+bw2 aK)
a2 b2 ; if K  w1 w22 ; (q2 = 0)
(w1 w2)2
8(a+b)
+ K(w1+w2 K)
2(a b) ; if
w1 w2
2
< K  K1; (q2 = 2K w1+w24 )
:
These cases are identical as in the proof of Lemma II.3 except the upper bound for
the region. Therefore, 1(K) is concave in [0; K1] and maximized at K =
w1+w2
2
. This
immediately implies part (2) of this lemma: when K  w1+w2
2
, 1(K) reaches 
Ct(K)
in Lemma II.2 and has the same allocation as well.. It also shows concavity of 1(K)
for K  K1.
When K > K1, in region R1 both rms have leftovers. Thus 1(K) is constant.
Formally, this involves cases (A,D,E,I) in Table A.2 and the solutions of these four
cases in Lemma II.1(2) do not involve (q1; q2).
Step 2. 3(K) is non-decreasing in [0; K
R3], and constant afterwards.
Since, in R3, rm 2 sells all inventory while rm 1 has leftovers, 3(K) depends
only on q2. This can also be conrmed by looking at cases (B,F) in Lemma II.1(2).
Let qR32 denote the maximizer of 3(K). Firm 1's sales is q
R3
1 when q2 = q
R3
2 . Let
KR3 = qR31 + q
R3
2 . Consequently, the point (q
R3
1 ; q
R3
2 ) is on the boundary of regions R2
and R3. From Figure 2.2(b) and also Table A.2 we have thatKR3 = qR31 + q
R3
2 < K1.
When K  KR3, 3(K) is non-decreasing in K because the feasible set of q2
becomes larger (while q1 does not matter). We also have 3(K)  1(K) in this range.
This is because (1) when K  w1+w2
2
, 1(K) is the same as centralized allocation and
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any other allocation results in lower prots; (2) when w1+w2
2
< K  KR3, 1(K) is
decreasing while 3(K) is non-decreasing; and (3) 3(K
R3)  1(KR3) since (qR31 ; qR32 )
is in the boundary of R2 and R3 and thus also is taken in consideration in 1.
When K > KR3, 3(K) is constant, since (K   qR32 ; qR32 ) is always feasible and
achieves maximum in R3. We also have 3(K1)  1(K1) since the only feasible point
for 1(K1), (q^1; q^2), is also feasible for 3(K1). Therefore, 3(K) must intersect 1(K)
at a point denoted as K03, where K
R3 < K03 < K1.
4(K) is symmetric to 3(K). Thus, there also exists K04 2 (KR4; K1), such that
(1) 4(K) < 1(K) when K < K04; (2) 4(K)  1(K) and 4(K) is constant when
K  K04.
Let K0 = minfK03; K04g and proof of part (1) is completed. 
Proof of Lemma II.5.
In Region 1, the prices and sales do not change across dierent allocation, as
there are leftovers in both markets. Obviously the consumer surplus is constant in
q1. Region 3 and 4 are symmetric and thus we only show in the following results for
Region 2 and 4.
Region 2. In Region 2 all units are sold. We can apply equilibrium prices (Region
F in Table A.2) to the consumer surplus(Equation (2.9)), and have
CSF =
aq21 + 2bq1q2 + aq
2
2
2(a2   b2) :
Constrained by q1 + q2 = K, the consumer surplus reaches its minimum at q1 = q2 =
K
2
.
Region 4. Region 4 may consist of situations C, G, or both (from Table A.2). In
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situation C, applying the equilibrium prices from Table A.2, we get
CSC =
1
2(a2   b2)(2a2   b2)2

a(a2   b2)(4a2   3b2)q21
+ 2b(a2   b2)[(a  b)(a+ b)2+ abw1 + a2w2]q1
+ a[(a  b)(a+ b)2+ abw1 + a2w2]2

:
CSC is convex and we have
d CSC
d q1

q1=0
> 0:
Therefore, the consumer surplus is increasing in situation C in q1.
In situation G, we repeat the same calculation and get
CSG =
(a2   b2)q21 + (aw2 + bw1)2
2a(a2   b2) :
CSG is convex and we have
d CSG
d q1

q1=0
> 0:
Therefore, the consumer surplus is increasing in q1 in situation G. Consequently, the
consumer surplus is increasing in q1 in Region 4. 
Proof of Theorem II.1.
As the market sizes are deterministic, we have Co(K) = Ct(K), which is given
in proof of Lemma II.3. Taking derivative, we obtain
Co
0
(K) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
aw1+bw2 2aK
a2 b2 if K  w1 w22
w1+w2 2K
2(a b) if
w1 w2
2
< K  w1+w2
2
0 if K > w1+w2
2
:
Let Co
0
(K) = c and KC is solved. 
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Proof of Theorem II.2.
Part (1): No-trade Scenario.
As the market size is known up front, without trading no rm would order more
than they can sell (case F in Table A.2). Using equilibrium prices pNi into rms'
revenue function 2.4, we obtain:
Noi (q1; q2) = 
Np
i (q1; q2) =
 aq2i + (awi + bwi + a2  b2  bqj)qi   (a2   b2)qj
a2   b2 :
Again, due to no trade and additionally due to deterministic market sizes, the revenue
functions in trading stage and ordering stage are identical. The response function,
thus, becomes:
qi = min

max

(a+ b)w + (a2   b2)  (a2   b2)c  bqj
2a
; 0

;
(a2 + ab)w + (a3 + a2b  ab2   b3)  abqj
2a2   b2 ;
(a+ b)w   bqj
a

:
The rst term above is from the rst-order condition, while the last two terms are
the boundary of the region R2 in Figure 2.1(b).When neither rm has leftovers (i.e.,
in region R2), the response function is continuous and decreasing. The slope of the
response function is greater than  1. Consequently there exists a unique equilibrium
qNi , which satises 0  qNi  K12 (see Table A.3 for K1).
Unique equilibrium implies that the equilibrium is symmetric. In the response
function above, the second term is always larger than the rst, whenever qj  K12
and, thus, can be dropped. Based on evaluation of the other two terms and extreme
points, the analytical form of qNi is obtained.
Part (2): Trade Scenario.
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To simplify notation, we denote (only in this proof)
f(q1 + q2) =
1
2
Tt(q1 + q2);
g(q1; q2) =
1
2
(Np1 (q1; q2)  Np2 (q1; q2))  cq1:
Referring to Figure A.1(left), f() is concave when q1 + q2  K0, and constant after-
wards (Lemma II.4). g(q1; q2) is concave in q1 in areas (i) and (iii) (which are jointly
R2), and decreases at constant slope  c in area (ii) (Lemma II.1). Firm 1's prot
function is Tt1 (q1; q2)  cq1 = f(q1 + q2) + g(q1; q2).
q1
q2
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
A
B
D E
qA
2
qB
2
K0
K0
q1
q2
B
C
qC
1
qC
2
qB
1 K0
K0
F
Figure A.1: Proof of Theorem II.2.
Consider now rm 1's response function for q2  qB2 (refer to the left part of Figure
A.1). Note that for q1+q2 > K0, the total revenues of both rms, 
Tt(q1+q2), do not
change if rm 1 increases q1. Also, in no-trade scenario the revenues do not change in
Regions R1, R3, and R4. Thus, outside of areas (i), (ii), and (iii), the marginal eect
of increasing q1 is simply  c. Consequently, rm 1's best response must be areas (i),
(ii), or (iii), for q2  qB2 .
Step 1: Separability of g(q1; q2).
By explicitly writing g(q1; q2) for region R2, it is easy to see that it is separable
in q1 and q2. Specically, this is because, the revenue function in the pricing stage is
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(from case F in Table A.2):
Npi (qi; qj) =
 aq2i   bqiqj + (aw1 + bw1 + a2  b2)qi   (a2   b2)qj
a2   b2 (A.1)
and, thus, the terms q1q2 cancel out, implying that g(q1; q2) is separable. Conse-
quently, g(q1; q2) = g1(q1) + g2(q2). Additionally, g1(q1) is concave.
Step 2: At most one jump between areas (i) and (iii).
While the maximizer of Tt1 (q1; q2) as function of q2 is continuous, within each of
the area (i), (ii), or (iii) individually, it may, however, jump between areas. In this
step we consider q2 2 [qA2 ; qB2 ) and show that the response function q1(q2) (right part
of Figure A.1) has at most one jump (point of discontinuity as a function of q2) when
considering jointly areas (i) and (iii). It suces to show that, if for a given q2, q

1(q2) is
in area (iii), then for any larger argument q2+ ( > 0), q

1(q2+ ) is also in area (iii).
Consider points D and E, as shown in Figure A.1, and assume that when q2 = q
D
2
(the dotted line),the best response q1(q
D
2 ) 2 (qD1 ; qE1 ) in area (iii). For points D' and
E' on the higher lines, with qD
0
2 = q
D
2 + ( > 0), we have q
D0
1 = q
D
1   , and (as long
as qD
0
2  qB2 , we also have qE01 > qE1   . For any q1 2 [0; qD01 ], we have
Tt1 (q1; q2 + )  cq1
= f(q1 + q2 + ) + g1(q1) + g2(q2 + )
= f(q1 +  + q2) + g1(q1 + ) + g2(q2)  g1(q1 + )  g2(q2) + g1(q1) + g2(q2 + )
 f(q1(q2) + q2) + g1(q1(q2))  [g1(q1 + )  g1(q1)] + g2(q2 + )
the above inequality is becauseq1(q2) is best response for q2
 f(q1(q2) + q2) + g1(q1(q2))  [g1(q1(q2))  g1(q1(q2)  )] + g2(q2 + )
because g1 is concave and q1 +  < q

1(q2)
= f(q1(q2) + q2) + g1(q

1(q2)  ) + g2(q2 + )
= f(q1(q2)   + q2 + ) + g1(q1(q2)  ) + g2(q2 + )
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= Tt1 (q

1(q2)  ; q2 + )  c(q1(q2)  ):
Thus, (q1(q2)   ; q2 + ) results in higher prot, for rm 1, than any (q1; q2 + ) in
area (i). Note that (q1(q2)   ; q2 + ) is in area (iii). Therefore, the best response
q1(q2 + ) is in area (iii). Consequently, there is at most one jump from area (i) to
region (iii).
Step 3: Jumps between areas (i) and (ii) cannot result in symmetric equi-
libria.
Now consider any q2 2 [0; qA2 ]. If there is any jump between area (i) and (ii),
assuming the jump points are C(qC1 ; q
C
2 ) and F(q
F
1 ; q
F
2 ) with q
C
2 = q
F
2 , we must have
qC1 > q
B
1 (refer to Figure A.1).
As qC1 and q
F
1 are both the best responses for the same q2, we must have
@
@q1
Tt1 (q
C
1 ; q
C
2 ) =
@
@q1
Tt1 (q
F
1 ; q
F
2 ) = c.
If we take into account the shape of Tt and (Np1   Np2 ) (both are concave at
rst and then constant), we get @
@q1
Np1 (q
F
1 ; q
F
2 )  @@q1
Np
2 (q
F
1 ; q2) = 0. From Equation
(2.7), we can express 1
2
Tt(qF1 + q
F
2 ) = 
Tt
1 (q
F
1 ; q
F
2 )   12(Np1 (qF1 ; qF2 )   Np2 (qF1 ; qF2 )).
Thus, 1
2
@
@q1
Tt(qF1 ; q2) = c  0 = c. As qC1 < qF1 and Tt is concave for q1 + q2  K0,
we have 1
2
@
@q1
Tt(qC1 ; q
C
2 ) >
1
2
@
@q1
Tt(qF1 ; q
F
2 ) = c. Using Equation (2.7) again,we get
@
@q1
Np1 (q
C
1 ; q
C
2 )  @@q1
Np
2 (q
C
1 ; q
C
2 ) < 0. In order to compare q
B
1 and q
C
1 , we rst identify
q^1that maximizes 
Np
1 (q1; q
C
2 )   Np2 (q1; qC2 ) = 0. From Equation(A.1) above, we get
q^1 =
(a+b)w+2(a2 b2)
2a
. From concavity of g1(q1), we have q
C
1 > q^1. Also, it is easy to
verify that q^1 > q
B
1 (q
B
1 = K1=2 from Lemma II.4). Thus, the jump between areas(i)
and (ii), if any, may only take place for q1 > q
B
1 . Consequently, for the purpose of
identifying symmetric equilibria, it can be ignored.
Step 4: Characterization of equilibria.
The jump between areas (i) and (iii), described in Step 2, is positive. The existence
of positive jumps still leads to existence of equilibria (possibly multiple) and for
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symmetric response functions, a symmetric equilibrium must exist in either area (i)
or area (iii) or both.
From Lemma II.4 and its proof, we express Tt(K) in the symmetric setting as
Tt(K) =
8>><>>:
K(2w K)
2(a b) if K  K0
constant if K > K0
: (A.2)
In areas (i) and (iii) the prot function in trading case is given by Equations (2.7),
(A.1), and (A.2). Taking derivatives and making them equal to 0 results in two
necessary conditions for (low and high) equlibria. If equilibrium is in area (i), it is
(low equilibrium)
qTi =
(a+ b)w + (a2   b2)(  c)
2a+ b
:
If equilibrium in in area (iii), it is (high equilibrium)
qTi = min

(a+ b)w + 2(a2   b2)(  c)
2a
;
aw + (a2   b2)
2a  b ; w

:
Whether the high or low equilibria exist apparently depends on cost c. If for
a given c^, low equilibrium exists, then for 8c  c^, the response function will have
lower values and, thus, the response functions will continue to intersect in area (i),
resulting in existence of low equilibrium. Hence there exists a threshold c1 such that
for 8c  c1, low equilibrium exists. Using a similar argument, we show that there
exists a thresholdc2 such that for 8c  c2, high equilibrium exists. Note that we
must have c1  c2, because otherwise there is no equilibrium for c 2 (c2; c1), which
contradicts the proved-above existence result.
Step 5: Comparison of low and high equilibria.
In the symmetric setting, the nal prot is 1
2
Tt(2qTi )   cqTi . In Lemma II.4,
we showed Tt(K) is increasing and equals Ct(K) when K < w1+w2
2
; decreasing
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when w1+w2
2
< K < K0; constant afterwards. While maximizers of 
Ct(K)   cK,
Tt   cK are the same K = KC, the equilibrium point for trade solution may be
dierent. Assume that both equilibria exist and let qHi and q
L
i denote the high and
low equilibria, respectively. Since the jump is between regions (i) and (iii) separated
by line q1 + q2 = K0 (and explicitly comparing with K
C), we have
KC  2qLi < K0 < 2qHi :
Since Tt(K) cK is decreasing for K  KC, we have Tt(2qLi ) 2cqLi > Tt(2qHi ) 
2cqHi . 
Proof of Theorem II.3.
When c  c1, two rms order the same quantities in trade and no-trade scenarios.
As the market is deterministic and two rms are symmetric, in trade scenario there
is actually no inventory exchange, even though it is allowed. Thus, we have exactly
the same outcomes in these two (trade and no-trade) scenarios.
When c < c1, let (c) be the dierence between each rm's prot in two scenarios
(using rm 1's prot for the purpose of illustration throughout this proof).
(c) = (To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 )  cqT1 )  (No1 (qN1 ; qN2 )  cqN1 ):
When c = c1, in trade scenario the low equilibrium still exists but will disappear
for any smaller c. If low equilibrium is played, the prot is the same as rms in no
trade scenario. If the high equilibrium is played, the prot is lower than that from
low equilibrium, thus lower than that from no trade scenario. Therefore, we have
(c 1 ) < 0. Next we show, for case of small and big w, that (c) can intersect 0 at
most once in 0  c < c1.
Case 1: w < (a+ b).
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We re-write the result of Theorem II.2 to dierentiate between the cases listed in
the theorem: We denote cT1 = 2(a+b) w
2(a+b)
, such that
qTi =
8>><>>:
w if c  cT1
(a+b)w+2(a2 b2)( c)
2a
if c > cT1
:
And, similarly, to compare no-trade cases, we use the threshold cN = (a
2 b2) wa
a2 b2 . As
cN < cT1, we have.
qNi =
8>><>>:
w if c  cN
(a+b)w+(a2 b2)( c)
2a+b
if c > cN
:
Therefore, we have
(c) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 ) if c  cN
To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 )  [(a
2 b2)(c )+aw][(a2 ab)c+(a2 b2)+(a+b)w]
(a b)(2a+b)2 if c
N < c  cT1
To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 ) +
(a+b)(A1c2+A2c+A3)
2a(a b)(2a+b)2 if c > c
T1
;
where
A1 = 2(3a+ b)(a+ b)(a  b)2 > 0;
A2 =  (a  b)(4a+ b)(2a2  2b2+ bw);
A3 = 2a(w + a  b)(a2  b2  aw):
First note that, even though quantities qTi depend on c, we have that 
To
1 (q
T
i ; q
T
i )
is constant in c forK  K0:First, recall that the high equilibrium satises: qT1 +qT2 >
K0. Second, 
To
1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 ) =
1
2
Tt(qT1 + q
T
2 ) and 
Tt is constant for K > K0. Thus,
To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 ) is also constant, i.e., independent of c. Therefore, we only need to
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consider the remaining terms in (c).
From above, we have that for c  cN , (c) is a constant. For cN < c  cT1, (c)
is concave and decreasing. For c > cT1, (c) is convex. Hence, with (c 1 ) < 0 and
due to its continuity, (c) can intersect 0 at most once in 0  c < c1.
Case 2: w  (a+ b).
Comparing again the terms in Theorem II.2, we dierentiate between the relevant
cases. We denote cT2 = 2a
2 2b2+wb
4a2+2ab 2b2 , such that
qTi =
8>><>>:
aw+(a2 b2)
2a b if c  cT2
(a+b)w+2(a2 b2)( c)
2a
if c > cT2
:
In this case, cN < 0. thus, we have
(c) =
8>><>>:
To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 )  B1c
2+B2c+B3
(a b)(2a b)(2a+b)2 if c  cT2
To1 (q
T
1 ; q
T
2 ) +
(a+b)(A1c2+A2c+A3)
2a(a b)(2a+b)2 if c > c
T2
;
where
B1 = a(2a  b)(a+ b)(a  b)2 > 0;
B2 = a(a  b)(2a+ 3b)(2a2  2b2+ bw) > 0;
B3 =  (2a  b)(a+ b)(w + a  b)(a2  b2  aw):
Similarly, for c  cT2, (c) is concave and decreasing. For c > cT2, (c) is convex.
Hence, (c) can intersect 0 at most once in 0  c < c1.
If (0) < 0, we have (c) < 0 if 0  c < c1.2 Otherwise, we let c0 < c1 be the
unique cost such that (c0) = 0, which satises the theorem's statement. 
2Formally, we can denote c0 =  1.
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Proof of Theorem II.4.
Let CST=N(c) be the consumer surplus in trade/no-trade scenario as a function of
unit cost c. As long as the high equilibrium is played (c < c1), CS
T (c) is a constant
across all purchasing costs c (even though purchased quantities change, the prices
and the resulting sales are not inuenced). Thus, it is sucient to show that CSN(c)
is decreasing in c 2 [0; c1]. In the no-trade equilibrium, both rms order qNi . From
the inverse demand function we have pi =
awi+bwj aqi bqj
a2 b2 , and the consumer surplus
can be evaluated (using Equation (2.9)) as
CSN(c) =
(qNi (c))
2
a  b :
Since qNi (c), given in Theorem II.2, is non-increasing in cost c, we also have that
CSN(c) is non-increasing in c.3 
Proof of Theorem II.5.
Part (1): Centralized Scenario.
Order quantity and prot are not inuenced, which is intuitive and follows directly
from the proof of Theorem II.1. With the same order quantity, the price and sales do
not change either (follows right away from the pricing results in Table A.1). Therefore,
the consumer surplus is also constant as  or  changes.
Part (2): No-trade Scenario.
The order quantity, qNi is non-decreasing in both  and , as can be easily veried
based on Theorem II.2. The consumer surplus is also non-decreasing, as it increases
in qNi , with other factors independent of  and , as shown in the proof of Theorem
II.4.
From the proof of Lemma II.1, using solution for region F in Table A.2, the prot
3Note that the theorem allows consumer surplus in trade case to be higher for all c 2 (0; c1). If
CST (c 1 ) > CS
N (c 1 ), then there exist c3 such that CS
T (c) > CSN (c) for c3 < c < c1. (c3 may be
0.) Otherwise if CST (c 1 )  CSN (c 1 ), CST (c)  CSN (c) always holds.
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function for no-trade scenario simplies to
Noi (q
N
i ; q
N
i ) =
qNi (w   qNi )
a  b   cq
N
i :
From Theorem II.2, we have that qNi >
1
2
(w   ac + bc), which immediately implies
that Noi (q
N
i ; q
N
i ) is non-increasing when q
N
i is non-decreasing.
Part (3): Trade Scenario.
In the low equilibrium, the ordering quantity, prot, and consumer surplus are
the same as in no-trade scenario, thus monotonicity holds as shown above.
In the high equilibrium, it is easy to verify, based on Theorem II.2, that the
ordering quantity is non-decreasing in both  and . Therefore, in the rest of the
proof we focus on monotonicity of the prot and of the consumer surplus for the high
equilibrium.
Recall that the prot is: Tti (q
T
i ; q
T
i )   cqTi = 12Tt(2qTi )   cqTi . Tt(2qTi )
is independent of qTi (because in high equilibrium we have leftovers, 2q
T
i > K0),
but it changes with  and . We will show that Tt is non-increasing in  and .
With qTi non-decreasing, this will imply that 
Tt
i must be non-increasing. Below we
show that: Total revenue, Tt, is non-increasing in  and ; and consumer surplus is
non-decreasing in  and .
In the high equilibrium, trade always results in an asymmetric allocation, as dis-
cussed below Lemma II.4. In the symmetric setting, the nal resource allocation is
either in R3 or R4 (Figure 2.2(b)). Without loss of generality, we assume that it is in
R4. Recall that in R4 rm 2 has leftovers so each rm's nal revenue, Npi , depends
on rm 1's nal inventory q1.
Two subregions C and G. Optimal allocation (bargaining outcome) q1 for given
 or .
Even within R4, Np1 + 
Np
2 is not always concave in q1. Referring to Figure A.2,
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R4 is divided into two subregions, labeled as C and G corresponding to cases C and
G in Table A.2. Denote the unconstrained maximizer in subregions C and G are q
[C]
1
and q
[G]
1 .
4
q1
q2
( qT∗1 , q
T∗
2 )
q¯C1 q¯
G
1
C
︷ ︸︸ ︷
G
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Figure A.2: Proof of Theorem II.5.
Analysis of subregion C.
From Table A.2, we obtain the total revenue function and derive its maximizer,
q
[C]
1 :
q
[C]
1 =
(4a3   4ab2   b3)w   2b(a  b)(a+ b)2
2a(4a2   3b2)
If q
[C]
1 > 0, the optimized total revenue in subregion C, labeled as 
[C], is
[C] =
(8a2 + 8ab+ b2)w2   4b(a+ b)2w   4(a  b)(a+ b)32
4a(4a2   3b2)
=
 4(+ 2)32   4w(+ 2)2+ w2(82 + 24 + 172)
4(+ )(42 + 8 + 2)
:
4We use [C] to denote subregion C, to dierentiate it from centralized solution C.
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[C] is clearly non-increasing in . We also show that it is non-increasing in .
(Formal verication requires a few additional steps.)
Using the same approach, we derive the consumer surplus in subregion C, labeled
as CS[C],
CS[C] =
4(a  b)2(a+ b)32 + 8aw(a  b)(a+ b)2+ w2(8a3 + 4a2b  3ab2   b3)
8a(a  b)(4a2   3b2)
=
42(+ 2)32 + 8w(+ )(+ 2)2+ w2(83 + 282 + 292 + 83)
8(+ )(42 + 8 + 2)
:
CS[C] is again non-decreasing in  and with a few additional steps can be shown to
be non-decreasing in .
If q
[C]
1  0, q1 = 0 is optimal in subregion C. Following the same approach, the
total revenue ([0]) and consumer surplus (CS[0]) are as follows.
[0] =
(w   a)(a+ b)2(a2+ aw   b2)
(2a2   b2)2
=
(+ 2)2(w     )(w + w + 2+ 2)
(22 + 4 + 2)2
;
CS[0] =
a(a+ b)(a2+ aw   b2)2
2(a  b)(2a2   b2)2
=
(+ )(+ 2)(w + w + 2+ 2)2
2(22 + 4 + 2)2
:
Again, it can be veried that [0] is non-increasing in both  and  and that CS[0] is
non-decreasing in both  and .
Analysis of subregion G.
From table A.2, we use optimal price for subregion G and,solving the maximization
problem, we obtain the optimal quantity q
[G]
1 =
w
2
.
With the optimal q
[G]
1 , the total revenue (
[G]) and consumer surplus (CS[G])
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become
[G] =
w2
4a
=
w2
4(+ )
;
CS[G] =
(5a+ 3b)w2
8a(a  b) =
(5+ 8)w2
8(+ )
:
[G] and CS[G] are independent of  and non-increasing in .
Potential discontinuity results in at most one jump in q1. The allocation, q1,
changes smoothly in  and  except at most one jump from subregion C to subregion
G.
While the jump will not eect the revenue (as revenues must be equal when
switching between two forms of allocations), it may inuence the consumer surplus.
Therefore, we need to explicitly describe these two cases. The optimal q1 can be
either maxf0; q[C]1 g or q[G]1 . Since maxf0; q[C]1 g < q[G]1 (and the revenue is concave in
each subregion), the boundary between subregions C and G is never optimal. From
Table A.2, when w  a, only subregion G exists (subregion C is empty); When
a < w < (a + b), both subregions C and G exist; When w  (a + b), only
subregion C exists. Thus, we only need to show that, when a < w < (a+ b), choice
of q1 only has one jump from maxf0; q[C]1 g to q[G]1 as  or  increases. In order to
prove this, we show [G]   [C] and [G]   [0] are nondecreasing in  and . That
is, as  or  increases, once q1 switches to q
[G]
1 , it never returns to subregion C.
For  the result is straightforward: Since [G] is constant in  while [0] and [C]
are non-increasing in , we must have [G]  [C] and [G]  [0] are non-decreasing
in .
For , we have:
[G]   [C] = (+ 2)
2(22 + 22 + w   w2)
(+ )(42 + 8 + 2)
;
[G]   [0] = 1
4(+ )(22 + 4 + 2)2
(4(+ )2(+ 2)32
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+ 42w(+ )(+ 2)2  w2(2+ 3)(42 + 10 + 52)):
Both [G]   [C] and [G]   [0] can be shown to be non-decreasing in .
The eect of discontinuity of q1 on consumer surplus.
At the jump point, the revenues are equal. The consumer surplus, however, may
potentially change. Let CS
[C]
(q1) and CS
[G]
(q1) be the consumer surplus in subregions
C and G, before q1 is optimally chosen. Using optimal prices from Table A.2, consumer
surplus (2.9) becomes
CS
[C]
(q1) =
1
2(a  b)(2a2   b2)2 (a(a  b)(4a
2   3b2)q21
+ 2b(a  b)(a+ b)(a2+ aw   b2)q1 + a(a+ b)(a2+ aw   b2)2);
CS
[G]
(q1) =
(a  b)q21 + (a+ b)w2
2a(a  b) :
Both CS
[C]
(q1) and CS
[G]
(q1) are increasing for q1  0. As a result, when rm 1's
inventory increases from maxf0; q[C]1 g to q[G]1 , the consumer surplus also increases.
Summary for Prot and Consumer Surplus with High Equilibrium in (3)
Trade Scenarios.
Re-iterating, we have shown above: The prot changes in the same direction as
the total revenue. Both total revenue and consumer surplus depend on rm 1's nal
inventory q1. The optimal q1 can be either maxf0; q[C]1 g or q[G]1 . If q1 remains in the
same subregion (C or G), the total revenue is non-increasing the consumer surplus
non-decreasing in  and . For a certain  or , optimal q1 jumps from subregion C
to subregion G. The total revenue remains the same in the jump while the consumer
surplus goes up. 
Proof of Theorem II.6.
Part (1): Centralized Scenario.
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For any market realization, Ct(K) is concave, according to Lemma II.3. There-
fore, Co(K) is concave as well. Thus, there exists a unique optimal ordering quantity
KC.
Part (2): No-trade Scenario.
As  =  = 0 and there is no trade option, the two rms are essentially operating
completely independently. Their prot functions are concave and, thus, there exists
a unique optimal solution qNi for each rm.
Part (3): Trade Scenario.
Denote rm 1's best response function as BR(q2). Below we prove that BR(q2)
is continuous and its slope is between [ 1; 0].
Since  =  = 0, the pricing stage revenue Npi is a function of only qi (independent
of qj), and it is increasing and strictly concave when qi  wi2 , and constant when
qi >
wi
2
. In Lemma II.4,  =  = 0 leads to K1 =
w1+w2
2
. As a result, Tt(K) is
increasing and strictly concave when K  w1+w2
2
, and constant when K > w1+w2
2
.
Recall that Tt1 (q1; q2) =
1
2
(Tt(q1+q2)+
Np
1 (q1) Np2 (q2)). Therefore, Tt1 (q1; q2jw1; w2)
is increasing and strictly concave for q1  maxfw1+w22   q2; w12 g, and constant other-
wise. The ordering stage revenue To1 (q1; q2) =
R
w1;w2
Tt1 (q1; q2jw1; w2) is also increas-
ing and strictly concave up to a threshold, and constant for any greater q1. Solving
@
@q1
To1 (q1; q2) = c, we get BR(q2) and at (BR(q2); q2), 1 must be strictly concave.
Therefore the response function must be continuous.
Assume rm 2's order quantity increases from q2 to q2 + " (" > 0). Then we have
@
@q1
Tt1 (BR(q2); q2 + "jw1; w2)
=
1
2
@
@q1
Tt(BR(q2) + q2 + "jw1; w2) + 1
2
@
@q1
Np1 (BR(q2)jw1)
 1
2
@
@q1
Tt(BR(q2) + q2jw1; w2) + 1
2
@
@q1
Np1 (BR(q2)jw1)
=
@
@q1
Tt1 (BR(q2); q2jw1; w2):
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Then we have
@
@q1
To1 (BR(q2); q2 + ") 
@
@q1
To1 (BR(q2); q2) = c:
On the other hand, we also have
@
@q1
Tt1 (BR(q2)  "; q2 + "jw1; w2)
=
1
2
@
@q1
Tt(BR(q2) + q2jw1; w2) + 1
2
@
@q1
Np1 (BR(q2)  "jw1)
 1
2
@
@q1
Tt(BR(q2) + q2jw1; w2) + 1
2
@
@q1
Np1 (BR(q2)jw1)
=
@
@q1
Tt1 (BR(q2); q2)
(A.3)
and
@
@q1
To1 (BR(q2)  "; q2 + ") 
@
@q1
To1 (BR(q2); q2) = c: (A.4)
Since @
@q1
To1 (BR(q2 + "); q2 + ") = c and the partial derivative is non-decreasing, we
immediately have
BR(q2)  "  BR(q2 + ")  BR(q2):
Thus, the slope of the response function is between [ 1; 0].
To guarantee the uniqueness, we next show that the two response functions cannot
have slope of  1 at the same point. Let ui be the upper bound of wi's distribution.
Firm 1's ordering quantity q1 should never exceed maxfu12 ; u1+u22 g because for any
market realization extra units have zero marginal benet. That is represented by
regions B1, F, C1 and C2 in Figure A.3 (regions named after Table A.2).
In region B1, Np1 (q1jw1) is constant for any w1 realization, and thus equality holds
in (A.3) and (A.4). Consequently, the part of response function that falls into region
B1 has slope  1. In region F, C1 and C2, Np1 (q1jw1) is strictly concave if w1 realizes
to be greater than 2q1 and constant otherwise. That is, in (A.3), strictly inequality
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Figure A.3: Proof of Theorem II.6.
holds at least for some realization of w1. Since 
To
1 is the average of 
Np
1 (q1jw1) over
all possible w1, the inequality in (A.3) must hold. That is, when the response function
falls into region F, C1 and C2, the slope must be strictly greater than  1.
Similarly, the slope of rm 2's response function is  1 in region C1, and strictly
greater than  1 in region F, B1 and B2. Therefore, slopes of their response functions
cannot simultaneously be  1. 
Proof of Theorem II.7.
For any given market size realization, the revenue function in independent markets
is
Tt1 (q1; q2jw1; w2) =
1
2
Tt(q1 + q2jw1; w2) + 1
2
Np1 (q1jw1; w2) 
1
2
Np2 (q2jw1; w2):
Taking derivative with respect to q1, we have
@
@q1
Tt1 (q1; q2jw1; w2) =
1
2
@
@q1
Tt(q1 + q2jw1; w2) + 1
2
@
@q1
Np1 (q1; q2jw1; w2):
160
From Lemma II.4 we have that Tt(K) = Ct(K), when K  w1+w2
2
and that
these two functions are constant for K  K1. However, in the special case when  =
 = 0, K1 =
w1+w2
2
, implying Tt(K) = Ct(K) for all K. Therefore, the derivative
function in trade scenario is an average of that in centralized scenario and no-trade
scenario, implying that the response function in trade scenario is always between that
in centralized scenario and no-trade scenario. In no-trade scenario, response function
is a horizontal line since the decision is not aected by the competitor. Let (qN1 ; q
N
2 )
be optimal decisions in no-trade scenario, KC be the optimal total inventory level
in centralized scenario. Then (qT1 ; q
T
2 ) must fall into the triangle given by x = q
N
1 ,
y = qN2 , and x+ y = K
C. Therefore, we have either
qN1  qT1 ; qN2  qT2 ; qT1 + qTw  KC;
or
qN1  qT1 ; qN2  qT2 ; qT1 + qTw  KC:

Proof of Theorem II.8.
Given initial inventory (q1; q2) and market size realization (w1; w2), we have
Tt1 (q1; q2) =
1
2
(Tt(q1 + q2) + 
Np
1 (q1)  Np2 (q2))
 1
2
(Np1 (q1) + 
Np
2 (q2) + 
Np
1 (q1)  Np2 (q2)) = Np1 (q1):
We immediately extend this result to the order stage prot by integration
To1 (q1; q2)  No1 (q1):
Now let qTi and q
N
i be the equilibrium ordering quantities in trade and no-trade
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scenarios, we have
No1 (q
N
1 )  cqN1  To1 (qN1 ; qT2 )  cqN1  To1 (qT1 ; qT2 )  cqT1 :

Proof of Theorem II.9.
Part (1): Centralized Scenario.
For any market realization, Ct(K) is concave, according to Lemma II.3. There-
fore, Co(K) is concave as well. Since the prot is Co(K)  cK and Co is strictly
concave until the maximum, the uniqueness follows.
Part (2): No-trade Scenario.
For given (w1; w2), rms sell all inventories only in region R2 (see Figure II.1(b)),
which we refer to as clearance region. The intersection of the four regions is (2a
2w1+abw2
4a2 b2 ,
2a2w2+abw1
4a2 b2 ) (from Lemma II.1 case A). Since wi  U [l; u], the clearance region R2 is
largest when w1 = w2 = u. Therefore, the symmetric equilibrium in the ordering
stage, if it exists, has to have each of the order quantities in the interval [0; au
2a b ].
In Figure A.4, the order quantities (q1; q2) are xed, and the axis are the market
realization (w1; w2). This is another representation of the result in Figure 2.1(b) and
Regions 1 through 4 are labeled in the same way. The revenue function in the ordering
stage, No1 (q1; q2), is calculated by integrating the pricing-stage revenue, 
Np
1 (q1; q2),
over [l; u]2 (dashed square). As the regions change in (q1; q2), the overall revenue
function consists of many cases (the regions have dierent analytical form and the
revenue depends also on relationships between market realizations and quantities).
The closed-form expression for No1 (q1; q2) are fairly complicated and they are omitted
here. However, the expressions are available from the authors upon request.
The general idea of the proof is as follows: When q2 2 [0; au2a b ], we want to show
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Figure A.4: Proof of Theorem II.9
No1 (q1; q2) is unimodal in q1. It suces to show that 
No0
1 (q1; q2) is quasi-convex in
q1 and limq1!1 
No0
1 (q1; q2) = 0. When 0  q2  2a
2u+abl
4a2 b2 , this can be proved without
any additional conditions. When 2a
2u+abl
4a2 b2 < q2  au2a b , we show the same property
with additional conditions:
4a3   4a2b  2ab2 + b3  0;
u  4
3
l:
With conditions above, the response function is continuous in [0; au
2a b ] and q

2(
au
2a b) <
au
2a b . Since two rms are symmetric, there must exist at least one symmetric equilib-
rium in area [0; au
2a b ]
2. The details of the proof are available on request.
Part (3): Trade Scenario.
The sucient conditions require that the purchasing cost is suciently high and
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they eectively imply that both rms sell all inventory.5 We show below that c 
c(a; b; l; u) is a sucient condition leading to no leftovers.
For given (w1; w2), rms sell all inventories only in region R2 (Figure II.1(b)) and
the intersection of the four regions is (2a
2w1+abw2
4a2 b2 ,
2a2w2+abw1
4a2 b2 ) (from Lemma II.1 case A).
Since l=2 < al
2a b , if the optimal order quantity (q

1; q

2) 2 [0; l=2]2, rms can always sell
all the inventory, even for the least favorable market-size realizations. Recall that rm
1's revenue function is Tt1 (q1; q2) =
1
2

Tt(q1 + q2) + 
Np
1 (q1; q2)  Np2 (q1; q2)

. In
order to show existence of equilibrium, we modify the prot function for q1 >
aw1+bw2
2a
and replace it by a higher prot. The modied function is well behaved and easier to
analyze. For the modied function, we show that the equilibrium would anyhow be
q1  l2 (that is in the region, where the values are not modied).
Specically, we construct ^Tt1 (q1; q2) by replacing 
Tt by Ct and replacing Np1  
Np2 by ^
Np
1 , where 
Ct is the centralized revenue of both rms and
^Np1 (q1; q2) =
8>><>>:
Np1 (q1; q2)  Np2 (q1; q2) if q1  aw1+bw22a
Np1 (
aw1+bw2
2a
; q2)  Np2 (aw1+bw22a ; q2) otherwise
:
We have Ct is non-decreasing and concave (from Lemma II.3). Additionally, Ct 
Tt and these two are equal when K  w1+w2
2
(from Lemma II.4). Thus ^Tt1 (q1; q2) =
Tt1 (q1; q2) for q1  aw1+bw22a .
We also have Np1 (q1; q2)   Np2 (q1; q2) is concave and increasing in q1 when q1 
aw1+bw2
2a
, and it is constant when q1 >
aw1+bw2
2a
. Therefore, ^Np1 (q1; q2) is non-decreasing
and concave in q1. Additionally, ^
Np
1 (q1; q2)  Np1 (q1; q2)  Np2 (q1; q2). Therefore,
^Tt1 (q1; q2) =
1
2
(Ct(q1 + q2) + ^
Np
1 (q1; q2))  Tt1 (q1; q2)
5If for some realization rms have leftovers after trading and pricing, the revenue function is not
necessarily unimodal.
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where equality holds when q1  minfw1+w22   q2; aw1+bw22a g. Denote
^To(q1; q2) =
Z
w1;w2
^Tt(q1; q2):
We immediately have ^To  To, where equality holds when (q1; q2) 2 [0; l=2]2. Ad-
ditionally, ^To(q1; q2) is concave in q1 if q2  l2 . Let q^1(q2) be the q1 that solves
@^To(q1;q2)
@q1
= c. If
q^1(q2 =
l
2
)  l
2
; (A.5)
q^1(q2) must intersect the diagonal line at (q^; q^) with q^  l2 . In fact, (q^; q^) is also an
equilibrium for the original problem.
The condition (A.5) is equivalent to:
c  @^
To
1
@q1

(l=2;l=2)
;
which can easily be translated into the condition stated in the theorem. 
Proof of Theorem II.10.
Part (1): Centralized Scenario.
As terms of  cancel out in the total revenue function Co(K),  does not play any
role in the centralized decision. Therefore, the proof is same as the proof of Theorem
II.6(1).
Part (2): No-trade Scenario.
For any given (w1; w2) and qj, 
Np
i (qi; qj) is increasing and concave in qi. The
concavity is strict for the increasing part. Therefore, Noi (qi; qj) is also increasing and
concave in qi and similarly strictly concave while increasing. Therefore, there exists
unique solution qi satisfying
@Noi (qi; qj)
@qi
= c:
165
Note that (i   s2) is a constant for any given qj, hence qi is independent of qj,
which means it is a dominant strategy.
Part (3): Trade Scenario.
In symmetric settings, if the response function of a rm only has positive jumps,
then it must intersect the diagonal line. The intersection is obviously a symmetric
equilibrium. In the following, we prove the theorem by showing that the response
function may only have positive jumps.
Recall (from the Model section) that the revenue of rm 1 in the trading stage is
Tt1 (q1; q2) =
1
2

Tt(q1 + q2) + 
Np
1 (q1; q2)  Np2 (q1; q2)

:
The terms Npi 's, based on the proof of Lemma II.1, can be expressed as:
If wi   a  0,
Npi =
8>><>>:
qi
a
(wi + a  qi) + (i   sj) if qi  wi+a2
1
4a
(wi + a)
2 + (i   sj) if qi > wi+a2
;
If wi   a < 0,
Npi =
8>><>>:
qi
a
(wi + a  qi) + (i   sj) if qi  wi
wi + (i   sj) if qi > wi
:
Taking derivative with respect to q1, we get:
@Np1
@q1
=
8>><>>:
(w1+a 2q1)
a
if q1  minfw1+a2 ; w1g
0 if q1 > minfw1+a2 ; w1g
;
@Np2
@q1
=
8>><>>:
  if q1  minfw1+a2 ; w1g
0 if q1 > minfw1+a2 ; w1g
:
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It is straightforward to see that Np
0
1 is non-increasing in q1 and 
Np0
2 is non-decreasing
in q1. For any market realization (w1; w2), we can easily check that
Np
0
1 (q1   "; q2 + ")  Np
0
1 (q1; q2);
Np
0
2 (q1   "; q2 + ")  Np
0
2 (q1; q2);
for 8" > 0, where the derivatives are with respect to K. Therefore, we have
Tt
0
1 (q1   "; q2 + ")  Tt
0
1 (q1; q2):
By taking integration, we extends this result to the ordering stage revenue:
To
0
1 (q1   "; q2 + ")  To
0
1 (q1; q2):
For a given q2, let q

1(q2) be the optimal response. We immediately have
q1(q2 + ")  q1(q2)  " for 8" > 0:
Even though we have not excluded the possibility that q1(q2) may be decreasing, it
cannot decrease faster than with slope of  1 and, thus, it can only have positive
jumps, if any. 
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APPENDIX B
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems in Chapter III
Proof of Lemma III.1.
The results immediately follow by checking the close form solution of p2 in Table
3.2. 
Proof of Theorem III.1.
Taking rst order condition on  from Equation (3.1), we obtain
 = pd1 + p2d2 and M =
1
2
2:
Therefore, it suces to choose (p; p2) such that pd1 + p2d2 is maximized. The proof
is approached by plugging di(p; p2) into pd1 + p2d2.
(1) When + v  1.
It is obvious that optimal p2 2 [v; 1 ], and for given p2, optimal p 2 [v; p2+].
Within the reduced set, we have two cases:
If v  p  (1 v)p2 v
1 v  , we have
d1 =
1  p
1  v ; d2 = 0:
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Therefore p = maxf1
2
; vg. p2 does not matter since d2 = 0.
If (1 v)p2 v
1 v  < p  p2 + , we have
d1 = 1  p  p2

; d2 =
p  p2

  p2   v
1  v   :
From the rst order condition on p, we get p = p2 + =2. Replacing p, p2 is solve as
p2 = (1  )=2. Recall that p2 is bounded by v from lower end, we have
p2 = max

v;
1  
2

; p = p2 +

2
:
Comparing the optimal solutions from two cases, we nd that the second pricing
policy is always better than the rst one.
(2) When + v > 1.
It is obvious that optimal p 2 [v; 1], and for given p, optimal p2 2
h
v; p  (p v)
1 v
i
.
From the rst order condition on p2, we get
p2 =
8>><>>:
v
2
; if p > v(2+v 1)
2(+v 1)
p  (p v)
1 v ; otherwise
:
Then we solve p:
p =
8>><>>:
1
2
; if (1  2v)  (1  v)2 > 0
2v 2v+v2+1
2
; otherwise
:

Proof of Theorem III.2.
Results immediately follow by taking the rst order derivative of the prot func-
tion (3.2). 
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Proof of Lemma III.2.
When v = 0, the feasible regions reduce to S1
S
S2
S
S3. As M1 = 0, we focus
on S2
S
S3, the reduced forms of which are
S2 =f(w; p) : maxf(1 + )p  2; (  1)pg < w < (1  )pg;
S3 =f(w; p) : (1  )p < w < pg:
The proof consists of three parts: (1)  1; (2)1
2
  < 1; (3) < 1=2.
(1) When   1.
When   1, S2 = ? and MAP (w; p) = RPM(w; p) for any (w; p) 2 S3. Thus
MAP = 

RPM .
In part (2) and (3), S2 reduces to S2 = f(w; p) : (1 + )p  2 < w < (1  )pg.
(2) When 1
2
  < 1.
We show in the following that the optimal solution has to satisfy w > (1   )p,
i.e. the maximizer is not in S2.
(2a) If p  2=3.
Recall that in the range:
M2 =
1
4(1  )(2  (1 + )p+ w)(p  w)(2  2  (1  )p  w)w:
If we let M2 = 0 and solve w, we get the following four roots:
w1 = 0; w2 = (1 + )p  2;w3 = 2  2  (1  )p; w4 = p;
and the following inequality holds:
maxfw1; w2g  (1  )p  minfw3; w4g:
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This means, M2 is unimodal in w. Then we look at the rst order derivative:
@M2
@w
jw=(1 )p = p(2  3p)(1  p)(2  1)=2  0; if p  2=3:
As a result, when maxf(1+)p  2; 0g < w  (1 )p with p  2=3, M2 is always
increasing in w. Therefore they are not optimal.
(2b) If p > 2=3.
We rearrange (1+)p  2 < w  (1 )p as w
1   p  w+21+ . Then in this part
we show that (w; p) is not optimal if maxf w
1  ;
2
3
g  p  w+2
1+
. (we consider when
w+2
1+
> 2
3
, otherwise the proof is done.)
Let M2 = 0 and solve p, we get the following three roots:
p1 = w; p2 =
w + 2
1 + 
; p3 = 2  w
1  ;
and we have p1  maxf w1  ; 23g  p2  p3.
If w
1   2=3, we evaluate
@M2
@p

p= w
1 
=
w(1    w)(2  2  (3 + 2)w)
2(1  )2  0; if
w
1   
2
3
:
If w
1  <
2
3
, we evaluate
@M2
@p

p=2=3
=
w[( 6  3)w2 + ( 82 + 2+ 8)w + 4  4]
12(1  )  0; if
w
1   < 2=3:
In either case, M2 is decreasing in p when maxf w1  ; 2=3g  p  w+21+ . Therefore,
such (w; p) 2 S2 is not optimal.
Combining (2a) and (2b), we conclude that optimal solution is always contained
in S3. Solve M3 and get optimal solution: w
 = 1=4; p = 1=2; MAP = 1=64 = 

RPM
when   1=2.
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(3) When  < 1=2.
When  < 1=2, we have (1 + )p  2 < w  (1  )p  p+ 1  2. Therefore,
[2  (1 + )p+ w][2  2  (1  )p  w]
 [2  (1 + )p+ (1  )p][2  2  (1  )p  (1  )p]
= 4(1  )(1  p)2:
For any (w; p) 2 S2, we have
M2 =
1
4(1  )w(p  w)[2  (1 + )p+ w][2  2  (1  )p  w]
<= (1  p)2(p  w)w = RPM(w; p):
For any (w; p) 2 S3, we have M3 = RPM . Therefore we have MAP  RPM . 
Proof of Lemma III.3.
For notational simplicity, we drop the subscript MAP . As shown in Lemma III.2,
we have w() = 1=4 and p() = 1=2 if   1=2. If 0 <  < 1=2, M3(w; p; )
is decreasing in w in S3. Therefore, (w
; p) must fall in S2 (S2 is the interior). As
shown in Figure 3.1, this is a triangle in (w; p) coordinate. Next we prove a sequence
of properties, which lead to the result step by step.
Step 1: (w; p) 2 S2 (not on the boundaries of S2).
This essentially says the optimal solution is not in the boundary of the triangle
when 0 <  < 1=2. When w = 0 or p = w+2
1+
, which dene the left boundary of S2,
we have M2(w; p; ) = 0 so they cannot be optimal. It suces to show that optimal
solution does not exist on the right boundary, dened by w = (1 )p. This is proved
in the following by contradiction.
If the optimal solution satises w = (1 )p, we substitutes w with (1 )p and
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get:
M2(w; p; ) = (1  )p2(1  p)2:
So the optimal solution should be p = 1=2; w = (1  )=2. However, if we evaluate
the rst order condition with respect to w, we nd
@M2
@w

p= 1
2
;w= 1 
2
=
2  1
16
< 0:
The manufacturer can always decrease w a little (which remains in S2) to get a higher
prot. Therefore, the optimal solution does not exist on the right boundary either.
Step 2: M2(w; p; ) is quasi-concave for (w; p) 2 S2.
Let p = bw + c (b and c are arbitrary coecients). After replacing p, the prot
function is dependent only in w. M2(w; p; ) is quasi-concave for (w; p) 2 S2, if and
only if, for any (b; c) such that p = bw + c intersects S2, M2(w; p(w); ) is quasi-
concave in w. We can prove the latter statement by dividing (b; c) and conquering
case by case.
We use b <   1
1  as an illustration of the proof. The proof for other cases is
similar and thus omitted here.
After replacing p, the prot function is 4th degree polynomial in w with quartic
coecient (1 + b   b)(1   b)(1   b   b) (which is negative in this case). The four
roots are:
r1 = 0; r2 =
c
1  b; r3 =
(1  )(2  c)
1 + b  b ; r4 =
c+ c  2
1 + c  c  2b:
There are two subcases.
(2a) If 2
1+
 c < 1  b+ b.
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Under such conditions, p = bw + c intersects S2 when w 2 (w1; w2), where
w1 =
c+ c  2
1 + c  c  2b = r4; w2 =
c  c
1  b+ b:
Given all the conditions, we can prove the following inequality:
max(r1; r3) < r4 = w1 < w2:
Therefore, M2(p(w); w; ) is quasi-concave in w 2 (w1; w2).
(2b) If 0 < c < 2
1+
.
Now p = bw + c intersects S2 when w 2 (w1; w2), where
w1 = 0 = r1; w2 =
c  c
1  b+ b:
Given all the conditions, we can prove the following inequality:
max(r3; r4) < 0 = r1 = w1 < w2:
Therefore, M2(p(w); w; ) is quasi-concave in w 2 (w1; w2).
Step 3: Fix w, p() is increasing in .
The rst order condition with respect to p is:
@M2
@p
=
w
4(1  )
h
(3  32)p2 + (4w   2w   4+ 22w + 82   4)p
  42w   42   2w2   2w + 4  w2 + 4w
i
= 0:
Dene h1(w; p; ) as
h1(w; p; ) =(3  32)p2 + (4w   2w   4+ 22w + 82   4)p
  42w   42   2w2   2w + 4  w2 + 4w = 0:
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By implicit function theorem, we have
dp
d
=  @h1=@
@h1=@p
:
Note that @h1=@p < 0 (second order condition). We only need to prove @h1=@ > 0
for (w; p) 2 S2. We have
@h1
@
=  6p2 + (16+ 4w + 4w   4)p+ 4  2w   8w   2w2   8:
By checking the boundary of S2, we showed that this is negative for any (w; p) 2 S2.
Step 4: Fix p, w() is decreasing in .
First we want to rene the candidate set for the optimal solution. Dene
T = f(w; p) : p
2
< w < 1  ; w
1   < p <
w + 2
1 + 
g:
Apparently we have T  S2. Given (w; p) 2 S2, if w > p=2, we can conclude that
(w; p) 2 T .
@M2
@w
=
1
4(1  )
h
(1  2)p3 + (4w   2w   2+ 22w + 42   2)p2
+ ( 82w   42   6w2   4w + 4  3w2 + 8w)p
+ 82w + 12w2   8w + 4w3   6w2
i
= 0:
We dene the terms in square bracket as h2(w; p; ).
Substituting w with p=2, we obtain
h2(p=2; p; ) =
1
4
p2(2  p)(1  2) > 0;
if  2 (0; 1=2). Therefore, w > p=2 and thus (w; p) 2 T .
The rest of the proof is similar as that in step 3. Again we only need to show
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@h2=@ < 0 for (w; p) 2 T . We have
@h2
@
= 2(2  p)[p2 + (1  2w   2w   2)p+ 4w   2w + 3w2]:
By checking the boundary of T , we showed that @h2
@
is negative for any (w; p) 2 T .
Step 5: p() is increasing in .
Let w(p) be the optimal w for a given p and . The prot function is M2(w(p); p; ).
The rst order condition with respect p is:
dM2
dp
=
@M2
@w
@w
@p
+
@M2
@p
= 0:
By envelope theorem, we have @M2
@w
= 0 when w is the optimal value given p. So rst
order condition reduces to h1(w(p); p; ) = 0 which is exactly same as in step (3). We
already showed in step (3) that
@h1
@
> 0:
Note @h1
@p
< 0 (second order condition). We then have
dp
d
=   @h1=@p
@h1=@
> 0:
Step 6: w() is decreasing in .
The proof is same as step 5. Just need to switch the roles of w and p.

Proof of Theorem III.3.
It holds directly from Lemma III.2 and Lemma III.3. 
Proof of Theorem III.4.
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When v +  < 1, the optimizer has to be in S2
S
S3
S
S4. We have
lim
!0
S2 = lim
!0
S3 = f(w; p) : w = p; v < w < 1g; lim
!0
S4 = f(w; p) : w = p = vg:
Therefore, we also have lim!0 pMAP   wMAP = 0
The second part of the theorem will be proved in Lemma III.4. 
Proof of Lemma III.4.
Any (w; p) eventually falls into S3, S5, or S7 as  ! 1. For any (w; p), we also
have
lim
!1
MAP (w; p) = RPM(w; p):
Therefore, we get: (1) lim!1wMAP = w

RPM ; (2) lim!1 p

MAP = p

RPM ; (3)
lim!1 MAP = 

RPM . 
Proof of Lemma III.5.
From Theorem III.2 we immediately get RPM is increasing in v. We focus on the
MAP policy in the following.
The idea of the proof for MAP is to show for any (w; p), MAP (w; p) is non-
decreasing in v. Note that S1 thought S7 are dened all as open sets. Given the
continuity of prot function, the boundary will not inuence our analysis.
It is easy to see that Mi(i = 1; 3; 4; 5; 6) are non-decreasing in v. In the rest of
the proof we deal with Mi(i = 2; 7). We divide M7 into two sets:
S71 =

(w; p) : + v > 1; 1   < w < v; v + (1  v)(v   w)
2(+ v   1) < p < 1

;
S72 =

(w; p) : + v > 1; 2  2  v < w < 1  ; v + (1  v)(v   w)
2(+ v   1) < p < 1

:
(1) M2 is non-decreasing in v.
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M2 can be written as
M2 = w(p  w)d1(d1 + d2);
where
d1 =
1
2

1 +
1  p
1  v

  p  w
2
;
d2 =
p  w
2
+
1
2

1    w
1    v   1

:
Clearly both d1 and d2 are increasing in v (with p < 1 and w < 1   in S2). Hence
M2 is non-decreasing in v.
(2) M7 is non-decreasing in v in S71.
Taking derivative with respect to v, we have (positive denominator being dropped)
dM7
dv
=  4(+v 1)2p+2w 7v 7+7v w 4vw+2v2w+42+5v2 v3+vw+3:
For all (w; p) 2 S71, we have dM7dv > 0.
(3) The optimal solution cannot exist in S72.
First we show that M7 is unimodal in p. M7 is positive 3-order polynomial in
p. Additionally, we have M7(p = w) = M7(p = 1) = 0. For w < p < 1, M7 is
unimodal, given M7  0.
Then we show that for given w and v, M7 is decreasing in p within S72. It suces
to prove dM7
dp

p=v+
(1 v)(v w)
2(+v 1)
< 0. We have (positive denominator being dropped)
dM7
dp

p=v+
(1 v)(v w)
2(+v 1)
=(2+ v   1)w2 + (6v   2v   10+ 82 + 2)w
  122v + 42   16v2 + 26v   8  5v3 + 15v2   14v + 4:
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Checking the range of w,
dM7
dp

p=v+
(1 v)(v w)
2(+v 1) ;w=2 2 v
=  4(+ v   1)2(2+ v   1) < 0;
dM7
dp

p=v+
(1 v)(v w)
2(+v 1) ;w=1 v
=  (+ vl   1)2(6+ 5v   5) < 0:
Therefore, we conclude that for 2  2  v < w < 1  , the optimal p is not in S72.

Proof of Theorem III.5.
Part (1).
The proof for Part (1) only requires + v  1, instead of   1.
Recall that under MAP policy the optimal solution can only exist in regions
S6
S
S7
S
S3 (refer to Figure 3.1). M6 and M3 are clearly independent of , while
M7 is decreasing in , with other parameter unchanged. Reorganize M7 to see this:
M7 =
w(p  w)(1  p)
(1  v)2

1  p+ (1  v)(v   w)
2(+ v   1)

:
Step 1: Only one boundary, the left one of S6, may contain the maximizer.
The right boundary (w = p) and the top boundary (p = 1) may never contain the
optimizer because those decisions result in zero prot. Only the left boundary of S6
(w = p+ 2 v p
1 v ) is concerned.
Maximizing M6 without constraint, we get
w6 = 1=3; p

6 = 2=3:
(w6; p

6) 2 S6 is equivalent to the following conditions:
v <
2
3
and
1
6

1 +
1
2  3v

   3(1  v)
2
2(2  3v) :
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αv
v = 23
v = 14
α = 16
(
1 + 12−3v
)
α = 3(1−v)
2
2(2−3v)
Figure B.1: Proof of Theorem III.5 part (1).
Step 2: MAP is increasing in  when v  23 or v < 23 with  < 16
 
1 + 1
2 3v

.
Under above conditions, the maximizer in S6, denoted as (w
o
6; p
o
6), is on the
right boundary of S6. We rst show that (w
o
6; p
o
6) is also the overall maximizer in
S6
S
S7
S
S3.
Maximizing M3 without constraint, we get
w3 = 1=4; p

3 = 1=2:
As M3 is unimodal, the maximizer cannot exist in S3 when v > 1=4.
When  = 1  v, S7 = ?. As  increases, the boundary between S6 and S7 shift
towards left and (w; p) pairs enter S7 from S6. Now we consider any (w0; p0) 2 S7.
It must starts in S6 and turn into S7 as  increases. So we must have M6(w0; p0) 
M7(w0; p0) because both M6 and M7 are non-increasing in . We also have
M6(w
o
6; p
o
6)  M6(w0; p0) because the unconstrained maximizer (1=3; 2=3) is on the
left side of S6 and M6 is unimodal in S6
S
S7. Therefore, we showed that (w
o
6; p
o
6) is
the maximizer over S6
S
S7
S
S3.
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Then we show that MAP increases in  within this region. As  increases, the
left boundary of S6 shifts leftwards, getting closer to the unconstrained maximizer
(w6; p

6). Combining the facts that M6 is unimodal and the constrained maximizer
is on the left boundary of S6, we establish that 

MAP is strictly increasing in .
Step 3: MAP is constant in  when (w

6; p

6) 2 S6.
As both (w6; p

6) and M6 are independent of , it suces to show that (w

6; p

6) is
the maximizer not only in S6 but also globally.
In this region we also have v > 1
4
, thus the maximizer cannot exist in S3. Us-
ing similar logic as the last step, we also see that: M6(w

6; p

6)  M6(w0; p0) 
M7(w0; p0) for any (w0; p0) 2 S7. Therefore, (w6; p6) is the global maximizer.
Step 4: MAP is non-increasing in  when v <
2
3
and  > 3(1 v)
2
2(2 3v) .
Within this region, (w6; p

6) is to the right of S6. The global maximizer is not in
S6 because M6 is unimodal. Recall that for any (w0; p0) 2 S3
S
S7, M3 or M7 is
non-increaseing in . Hence, piMAP is non-increasing in .
When v  1
4
, S3 does not include the maximizer and thus pi

MAP is always decreas-
ing in . When v < 1
4
, the maximizer would eventually be (1
4
; 1
2
) in S3 and pi

MAP is
a constant in  once the maximizer becomes (1
4
; 1
2
).
Step 5: Claim the threshold property in v.
For any given v, MAP is either always strictly increasing (when v  2=3) or
strictly increasing until  = 1
6
 
1 + 1
2 3v

and then remain weakly decreasing. As
 ! 1, MAP converges to RPM (from Lemma III.4). Therefore, the threshold
property stated in Part (1) must be true.
We can actually solve (wo6; p
o
6) and get
MAP =
2
27(2+ v   1)2
(82 + 4v   8+ 2v2   2v + 2)
p
42 + 2v   4+ v2   v + 1
  163   122v + 242 + 6v2 + 12v   12+ 2v3   3v2   3v + 2

:
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Then when + v > 1, we have MAP  RPM if and only if
(128 192v)3 (12v2 192v+128)2 (76v3 60v2+48v 32) 27v2(1 v)2  0:
Denote the left hand side of the above inequality as (; v) For v 2 [0; 2=3), (; v) =
0 denes 1. For v 2 [2=3; 1], 1 = +1.
Part (2).
(2a) Existence of v2.
The proof for existence of v2 only requires + v  1, instead of   1.
The existence of threshold 1 also implies that
@
@
 0 when (; v) = 0. We
only need to show @
@v
< 0 when (; v) = 0.
Note that (1=2; 1=2) = 0. It suces to show that @
@v
< 0 when   v 2
[1
2
;+1] [1
2
; 2
3
]. In this region, we have:

@
@v
00
= 324  648v   456 < 0;
@
@v
0
=  324v2 + (324  456)v   242 + 120  54 < 0;
@
@v
=  108v3 + (162  228)v2 + ( 242 + 120  54)v   1923 + 1922   48 < 0:
Thus we have
dv
d
=
@=@
@=@v
 0;
meaning (; v) = 0 is an increasing curve in -v coordinate. This is equivalent to
the existence of threshold v2. For any , v2 is dened by (; v2) = 0.
(2b) Existence of v1.
As only piM3(w; p) = piRPM(w; p), if 

MAP = 

RPM holds in a non-degenerate
interval of either  or v, the maximizer under MAP policy has to be in S3. Recall
that the unconstrained maximizer of piM3 is (w

3; p

3) = (
1
4
; 1
2
). As a result, v  1=4
is a sucient condition for global maximizer being in S3. In the rest of the proof we
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limit v 2 [0; 1
4
], as the other region is irrelevant here.
Also recall that the unconstrained maximizer in S6 is (w

6; p

6) = (
1
3
; 2
3
). Hence for
v  1=4, (w6; p6) is on the right side of S6, and thus M6  M7, where Mi is the
constrained optimal value in Si. The existence of v1 is equivalent of the following
statement: There exists v1 2 [0; 14 ], such that M7 < M3 if and only if v 2 [0; v1).
We already know that
M3 =
1
64(1  v)2 = 

RPM :
The main task here is to study the behavior of M7. Denote (w

7; p

7) as the maximizer
in S7.
Step 1: Show w7  (1 v)
2

+ 2v   1.
For any policy A(w0; p0) 2 S7 with w0 < (1 v)2 + 2v   1, we can dene two other
policies (A,B,C refer to Figure B.2): B(w0;
1+w0
2
) and C(1+w0 v 2+ 1 w01 v ; 1+w02 ).
B is the optimal policy within S6 for given w0. C is on the boundary between S6 and
S7. Recall that for any (w; p) 2 S7, we have M7(w; p) < M6(w; p). We also have
M6(B) < M6(C) because (i) M6 is unimodal in w; and (ii) w = p=2 would be
optimal for given p and both B and C are on the left side of w = p=2. Thus,
M7(A) < M6(A) < M6(B) < M6(C) = M7(C)  M7:
Therefore A(w; p) is not the maximizer. Note that if w > (1 v)
2

+ 2v   1, B is no
longer in S6 and thus the above inequality does not hold.
Then the candidate region reduces to S 07 from S7, where
S 07 = f(w; p) :
(1  v)2

+ 2v   1  w  v; v + (1  v)(v   w)
2(+ v   1)  p  1g:
It is obvious that the top boundary of S 07, p = 1, cannot be the maximizer. The left
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(w∗3, p
∗
3)
A
B C
w
p
S3
S6
S7
w = (1−v)
2
α
+ 2v − 1
w = 2p − v − 2α p−v1−v
Figure B.2: Proof of Theorem III.5 part (2).
boundary, w7 =
(1 v)2

+2v 1, is considered as interior points since they are included
in S7. Three subcases are discussed regarding whether (w

7; p

7) is on the other two
boundaries or in the interior.
Step 2: If (w7; p

7) is an interior maximizer.
For any (w; p) in the interior of S 07:
M7(w; p)  M3 =
1
(1  v)2

w(p  w)(1  p)

1  p+ (1  v)(v   w)
2(+ v   1)

  1
64

:
Since (All derivatives in this proof are with respect to v)

(1  v)(v   w)
(+ v   1)
0
=
w   (1  v)2   2v + 
(+ v   1)2  0:
Therefore, if M7(w; p)  M3 > 0 for a given v, it is also true for any greater v. This
property extends to M7   M3 as well.
Step 3: If (w7; p

7) satises w = 2p  v   2p v1 v (boundary maximizer).
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Let the margin d = p w be the new variable in M7. Plug in w = 2p v 2p v1 v
and d = p  w, we get:
M7(d) =
d(2+ v   1  d)(2d  2d  2vd+ v2 + 2v   v)
(2+ v   1)2 :
Then for any d:
M7(d)  M3
=
1
(1  v)2

(1  v)2d(2+ v   1  d)(2d  2d  2vd+ v2 + 2v   v)
(2+ v   1)2  
1
64

:
And for  2 [1;+1) (Note: This is the only step in the proof that requires   1):

(1  v)2(2+ v   1  d)(2d  2d  2vd+ v2 + 2v   v)
(2+ v   1)2
0
 0
for any d 2 (0; (1 v)(2+v 1)
2
], which is equivalent to w 2 [ (1 v)2

+ 2v   1; v).
Therefore, if M7(d) M3 > 0 for a given v, it is also true for any greater v. This
property extends to M7   M3 as well.
Step 4: If (w7; p

7) satises w = v (boundary maximizer).
For any (w; p) on the right boundary, w = v, we have (for v  1
4
)
M7(w; p) = M3(w; p)  M3(w3; p3):
Therefore, M7  M3 in this case.
Summary of part (2b).
With step 2, 3 and 4, it can be concluded that once M7   M3 > 0 for a given v,
it holds for any greater v. This completes the proof of existence of threshold v1
Part (3).
The proof for the existence of 1,2 and v2 is same as part (1) and (2). In Table
B.1 is an example that threshold v1 does not exist when + v  1 and  < 1.
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 v wMAP p

MAP 

MAP 

RPM
0.919 0.085 0.0811 0.5312 0.01870 0.01866
0.919 0.100 0.0831 0.4992 0.01925 0.01929
0.919 0.115 0.0874 0.4744 0.02009 0.01995
Table B.1: Example where v1 does not exist.

Proof of Theorem III.6.
Recall from Equation (3.4) that the regular retailer's prot (under either policy)
is
1 = d1(p  w)  1
2
2:
Note the optimal decision is  = d1(p  w). Therefore, we have
1 =
1
2
2:
This means, we only need to compare , which is a perfect indicator of the regular
retailer's prot.
We examine the three regions in Figure 3.4(a).
(1) The region where the manufacturer prefers RPM.
In this region, we have RPM  MAP . That is:
wRPMRPMd1RPM  wMAP MAP (d1MAP + d2MAP ):
In the proof of Theorem III.5 Part (1), we showed that MAP is increasing in
 when v  2
3
or when v < 2
3
and   1
6
 
1 + 1
2 3v

. Under such conditions, the
maximizer is on the left boundary of S6 (refer to Figure 3.1). As  increases and
crosses this threshold, MAP becomes non-increasing. Hence the boundary between
RPM region and MAP region must fall into (i) v  2
3
; or (ii)   1
6
 
1 + 1
2 3v

and
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v < 2
3
. So we have v > 1
2
in this region.
Under RPM policy, since v > 1=2, we have wRPM = v=2 and d1RPM = 1 (from
Theorem III.2). Under MAP policy, in this region the maximizer (w; p) is on the left
boundary of S6. Therefore, we have d1MAP +d2MAP = 1 (from Table 3.2) and the left
boundary of S6:
p =
2v   w + vw
2+ v   1 :
Replacing p in M6:
M6 =
2w(v   w)(2+ w   1)
(2+ v   1)2 :
We have M6 is unimodal in w 2 [1  2; v]. Taking derivative with respect to w and
plugging in w = wRPM :
0M6jw=wRPM =
v2
2(2+ v   1)2 > 0:
Therefore we have wRPM < wMAP . Combining with d1RPM = d1MAP + d2MAP = 1,
we get
RPM > MAP :
That is, the regular retailer prefers RPM policy in this region.
(2) The region where the manufacturer is indierent between RPM and
MAP.
Since in this region, the free rider is not involved in the business and both w and
p are identical under the two policies, the regular retailer is also indierent.
(3) The region where the manufacturer prefers MAP.
The regular retailer may prefer either MAP or RPM, depending on market con-
ditions. 
Proof of Theorem III.7.
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It is straight-forward to check that, M() in Theorem III.1 is increasing when
 < 1  v and decreasing afterwards. 
Proof of Theorem III.8.
In Theorem III.5 Part (1), we have proved that MAP is increasing in  when
 < 1 v
2(2 3v) , constant when
1 v
2(2 3v)    3(1 v)
2
2(2 3v) , and decreasing when  >
3(1 v)2
2(2 3v) .

Proof of Theorem III.9.
(1) When 2
3
 v  1.
In this part we show that 1() is always increasing in  so 

R1 = +1.
When 2
3
 v  1, the manufacturer's decision is on the left boundary of region
6 (as shown in Theorem III.5). Its prot function is (with w = p   2p v
1 v already
plugged in)
M(p) =
2(1  p)(p  v)(2p  p  2v + pv)
(1  v)3 :
The rst order condition in p is (dened as f):
f(p; ) = (6+ 3v   3)p2 + ( 2v2   8v   4+ 2)p+ 4v   v + 2v2 + v2 = 0:
By implicit function theorem, we get:
dp
d
=  @f=@
@f=@p
=
(p  v)(3p  v   2)
3(1  2  v)p+ 4v + 2+ v2   1 :
The denominator is positive because the second order condition @f=@p < 0 when p
is at its optimum.
188
On the other hand, the retailer's prot function is (w is also substituted):
1(p; ) =
2(p  v)(1  p)
(1  v)2 :
When p is at its optimum, we have
d1
d
=
2
(1  v)2

(p  v)(1  p) + (1 + v   2p) dp
d

=
4(1  v)(p  v)[ 3p2 + (v   + 4)p  v + v   1]
3(1  v)2((1  2  v)p+ 4v + 2+ v2   1) :
We only need to verify that the terms within square brackets is positive when
2
3
 v  1 and   1  v and p satises f(p; ) = 0. This can be easily checked true.
The arithmetic is omitted.
(b) When 1
3
 v < 2
3
.
Recall that M is any value in [maxf1   v; 1 v2(2 3v)g; 3(1 v)
2
2(2 3v) ]. When 1   v   
1 v
2(2 3v) , 1 is increasing in , the proof of which is same as above because the maxi-
mizer is still on the left boundary of S6. When
1 v
2(2 3v)    3(1 v)
2
2(2 3v) , the manufac-
turer's decision remains at (w; p) = (1
3
; 2
3
). From Table 3.2 we see that d1 is constant
in  in S6. As a result, 1 is also a constant in .
Therefore, R is non-decreasing when 1  v    3(1 v)22(2 3v) while M  3(1 v)
2
2(2 3v) . So
we have M  R1.
(c) When 0  v < 1
3
.
In this region M = 1  v so we must have M  R as this theorem is considered
when   1  v.

Proof of Theorem III.10.
Within this region, manufacturer's decision is (w; p) = (1
3
; 2
3
), independent of
 (as shown in Theorem III.5). In the row of S6 in Table 3.2, we see that (1) the
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free rider's price drops in ; and (2) d1 and d2 are independent of . The number
of consumers is  = d1(p   w), which remains unchanged in  as well. The total
consumer surplus must be higher. 
Proof of Theorem III.11.
Part (1) and (2): When + v  1.
Consider MAP policy. For a given   1   v, let (w; p) be the optimizer.
That is: MAP () = MAP (w
; p; ). We can always nd 0  , such that:
MAP (w
; p; ) = MAP2(w; p; 0). This is because: when   1   v, there is
no competition between the regular retailer and the free rider. Under MAP2, free
rider's market share, d2, would be higher than that under MAP. When increasing ,
d2 decreases continuously. Thus there exists 
0 such that d2 is same as that under
MAP (with original ) and d1 is also the same.
Consider MAP2 policy. For a given   1  v, let (w2; p2) be the optimizer. That
is: MAP2() = MAP2(w

2; p

2; ). We can always nd 1   v  0  , such that:
MAP2(w

2; p

2; ) = MAP (w

2; p

2; 
0). The argument for this is similar to that above.
The continuity of d2 in  results from Table 3.2. The threshold 
0 is greater than
1   v because if 0 = 1   v under MAP, the free rider must have a higher market
share than original d2 under MAP2.
In Theorem III.5 we showed that for  + v  1, under MAP there exists 1 such
that MAP () < 

RPM if and only if  < 1. Then for any  < 1 we have
MAP2() = MAP2(w
; p; )  MAP (w; p; 0)  MAP (0) < RPM ;
where 1  v  0  . This completes proof of part (1).
Let MAP and 

MAP2 be the optimal  for the manufacturer under MAP and
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MAP2. From the inequality above, we know that:
MAP2(

MAP2)  MAP (0)  MAP (MAP );
where 1  v  0  MAP2. Similarly, we also have
MAP (

MAP )  MAP2(0)  MAP2(MAP2);
where 0  MAP . This completes the proof of part (2).
Part (3): When + v < 1.
Consider MAP policy. For  < 1   v, there is competition between the regular
retailer and the free rider. So changing d2 also inuences d1. As a result, for the same
pair of (w; p), in general we cannot nd a 0 under MAP2 such that d1 and d2 are
identical as those under MAP with original . For a given  < 1  v, let (w; p) be
the optimizer. That is: MAP () = MAP (w
; p; ).
Under MAP2, we can always nd 0   (may be greater than 1  v), such that
d1 is the same but d2 is weakly higher compared to those under MAP with . This is
because d1 is continuous in  under MAP2. Therefore, we obtain: MAP (w
; p; ) 
MAP2(w
; p; 0). This, along with analysis for  + v  1, completes the proof of
part (3).
Consider MAP2 policy. There is no analogous property. Actually, MAP (

MAP ) <
MAP2(

MAP2) may happen when both 

MAP and 

MAP2 smaller than 1  v.

Proof of Theorem III.12.
First we prove the result from the manufacturer's perspective. The manufacturer's
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prot is (plugging  into Equation (3.7))
MAP=RPM(w; p; ) =
1

w(p  w)d1(d1 + d2)  1
2
(
1
2
  1

)d21(p  w)2:
We rst optimize this prot over  taking the others as given and get
 =
2d1(p  w)
wd1 + pd1 + 2wd2
:
Using , we get
MAP=RPM(w; p) =
1
8
(pd1 + wd1 + 2wd2)
2: (B.1)
Now consider the RPM policy. Recall that d1 =
1 p
1 v (with p  v) and d2 = 0.
Equation (B.1) reduces to
RPM(w; p) =
1
8

(w + p)
1  p
1  v
2
:
Optimizing RPM(w; p) with constraints w  p and p  v (as p < v is never the
optimal), we get the solution
pRPM = max

1
2
; v

; wRPM = p

RPM :
Then consider the MAP policy. Under MAP policy, if w = p, we notice that
d1(w; p) =
1  p
1  v and d2(w; p) = 0:
Therefore,
MAP (w

RPM ; p

RPM) = p

RPM :
That mean, the manufacturer under MAP policy can always mimic the best action
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under RPM policy and get the same level of prot. Consequently, we have
pMAP  pRPM :
Next we consider the protability of the retailers under dierent policies. Under
RPM policy, the free rider is ruled out and thus has zero prot. Since the manufac-
turer will set wholesale price equal to retail price, the regular retailer also end up zero
prot. Therefore, both retailers weakly prefer MAP policy over RPM policy.

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APPENDIX C
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems in Chapter IV
Proof of Theorem IV.1.
First we show Part (1). The central planner always choose x that maximizes
surplus after technology realization. For any realization of , the central planner
maximizes u(x+t+) px. xC(t+) must satisfy the rst order condition u0(x+t+) =
p. Additionally, we have
dxC(t+ )
dt
=  1 < 0:
That is, xC(t) is decreasing in t.
Then we show Part (2). As v(x; t+) we(t+) = u(x+ t+) px is independent
of functional form of wc(t+), the client's payment only matters in the variance term.
By setting wc(t + ) = u(x
C + t + ) + C, the variance term is reduced to zero, and
thus the objective function is maximized. In fact, since xC satises u0(x+ t+ ) = p,
u(xC + t + ) is also a constant in t and . Therefore, it is equivalent to choose
wc(t+ ) = 0.
Now we show Part (3). In fact, for any realization of  we have
d
dt

u(xC + t+ )  pxC	 = u0(xC + t+ ) = p:
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Proof of Lemma IV.1.
For any x^  xC(t + ), we have u0(x^ + t + )  p from Theorem IV.1(1). In
decentralized setting,
dv(x; t+ )
dx

x=x^
 u0(x^+ t+ )  p maxfig  u0(x^+ t+ )  p  0:
Hence, xD(t+ )  xC(t+ ). 
Proof of Theorem IV.2.
We verify both the ESCO's and client's decisions are the same as those with
central planner shown in Theorem IV.1.
First we consider the client. Now the ESCO's subsidy is independent of consump-
tion. The client internalizes the full energy price p. Her consumption has to satisfy
u0(x+t+) = p, which is the same as that in Theorem IV.1(1). Let y0 be the constant
that satises u0(y0) = p. We have
xD(t+ ) + t+  = y0: (C.1)
For any realization , the client's utility is
vD(xD; t+ ) = u(xD + t+ )  pxD + we(t+ ) = u(y0)  py0 +M:
vD(xD; t+ ) is a constant independent of . Therefore the uncertainty related disu-
tility, 
2
V AR[vD(xD; t+ )], is zero.
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Then we examine the ESCO. The eort decision problem (4.6) becomes
max
t
f (M   pt)  C(t)g :
The solution t satises C 0(t) = p, which is the same to tC in Theorem IV.1(3).
As both the ESCO's and client's decisions are the same as those with central
planner, the outcome is also the same. 
Proof of Theorem IV.3.
Under chauage contracts, consumption x is implied by Equation (4.9). Only
technology level (eort) t is chosen. Let y0 be the constant such that u(y0) = u0. For
any technology realization t+ , the implied energy consumption is x = y0   t  .
We consider contract (?; f0g) in the decentralized setting. The payments are
wc(x) = 0 and we(x) = px. The ESCO's eort decision becomes
max
t
f p(y0   t)  C(t)g :
The solution t satises C 0(t) = p, which is the same to tC in Theorem IV.1(3).
Therefore, the outcome is also the same. 
Proof of Theorem IV.4.
Part (1): N-rate Contract.
Similar to Theorem IV.1, we consider the client's payment, wc(x), is a continuous
function in consumption, x. This is general enough to represent any contract that is
only contingent on consumptions, including all the n-rate contracts.
In order to reach the rst-best outcome, for a given technology realization t + ,
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x(t+ ) has to satisfy (from Theorem IV.1(1))
u0(x+ t+ ) = p:
On the other hand, with payment structure wc(x), the client's decision will be derived
from the rst order condition
u0(x+ t+ )  w0c(x) = 0:
Combining the two equations above, we get w0c(x) = p or wc(x) = px. This means,
in order to get the client's consumption depiction right, she has to internalize all the
variable cost.
If the ESCO lets wc(x) = px, however, the client's utility v(x
; t + ) = u(x +
t + )   px is not a constant. That means, the disutility due to risk aversion can
only be reduced but not fully eliminated. Therefore, the rst-best outcome cannot
be reached by this type of contracts.
Part (2): 1-rate Contract.
We rst prove Part (2a) and (2b). In 1-rate contracts, the ESCO needs to decide
t and  simultaneously. For given technology realization t + , xD has to satisfy
u0(xD + t + ) = p. Dene y() be the value that satises u0(y()) = p. Then we
have
xD(t+ ) = y()  t   and vD(xD; t+ ) = u(y())  p(y()  t  ): (C.2)
And we also have
y0() =
p
u00(y())
< 0;
y00() =   p
(u00(y()))2
 u000(y())  y0()  0:
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The last inequality holds because we assume u000  0 in our model.
The objective function (4.10) becomes
max
t;

u(y())  py() + pt  
2
2p22   v0   C(t)

: (C.3)
Note t and  are separable. Obviously tO=1 satises C 0(t) = p.
Then it suces to show the objective function, denoted as VOBS(), is concave in
. To see this, we have
V 0OBS() =  (1  )py0()  p22;
V 00OBS() = y
0()  (1  )y00()  p22 < 0:
(C.4)
Therefore, there exists a unique optimal payment rate O=1. To see O=1 2 (0; 1), we
have
V 0OBS(0) =  py0(0) > 0;
V 0OBS(1) =  p22 < 0:
Next we prove Part (2c). We have
dVOBS(
O=1)
d
=  1
2
p22(O=1)2 < 0;
dVOBS(
O=1)
d2
=  
2
p2(O=1)2 < 0:
Therefore, V O=1 = VOBS(
O=1) decreases in  and 2. 
Proof of Theorem IV.5.
Part (1): 1-rate Contract.
Substituting xD in Equation (C.2) into ESCO's eort decision problem (4.6), we
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have
max
t
f (1  )p(y()  t)  C(t)g :
Thus tM=1() must satisfy C 0(t) = (1  )p. Additionally, we also have
tM=1
0
() =   p
C 00(tM=1())
< 0;
tM=1
00
() =
p
(C 00(tM=1()))2
 C 000(tM=1())  tM=10()  0:
The last inequality holds because we assume C 000  0 in our model.
Under 1-rate contracts, the objective function (4.7) becomes
max


u(y())  py() + ptM=1()  
2
2p22   v0   C(tM=1())

: (C.5)
We need to show the objective function, denoted as VMH(), is concave in . In fact,
we have
V 0MH() = V
0
OBS() + pt
M=10();
V 00MH() = V
00
OBS() + pt
M=10() + ptM=1
00
() < 0:
Therefore, there exists a unique optimal payment rate M=1. We also have
VMH0(
O=1) = VOBS0(
O=1) + ptM=1
0
() = ptM=1
0
(O=1) < 0:
Therefore, M=1 < O=1.
Part (2): 2-rate Contract.
The right inequality is obvious. To prove the left inequality, we show that, the
optimal contract (O=1; tO=1) in Theorem IV.4(2) and its outcome can be replicated
with 2-rate contracts with moral hazard.
Since comfort function u() is increasing and bounded, we denoteM = limx!1 u(x+
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t). Consider the 2-rate contract (z; f1; 0g). Under this contract, the client's utility
is
vD(x; t+ ) =
8>><>>:
u(x+ t+ )  1px if x  z
u(x+ t+ )  1pz if x > z:
The solution to the client's problem (4.4) is
xD(t+ ) =
8>><>>:
y(1)  t   if t+   11p [M   u(y(1))] + y(1)  z
+1 otherwise ;
where y() is the value that satises u0(y()) = p.
If the technology realization t +  is smaller than the threshold above, the client
would consume innite amount of energy, which leads to negative innite payo for
the ESCO. In order to avoid such situations, the ESCO would exert enough eort
such that even the worst technology realization is above the threshold. Recall  is
bounded below by . By choosing
z =
1
1p
[M   u(y(1))] + y(1)  (tO=1 + ); (C.6)
we make sure that t  tO=1. Then the ESCO's eort problem (4.6) becomes
max
ttO=1
f (1  1)p(y(1)  t)  C(t)g ;
which is concave in t and maximizes at t = tM=1(1) < t
O=1. Therefore, the ESCO
would choose t = tO=1.
If the ESCO also chooses 1 = 
O=1, the resulting outcome is the same as V O=1. 
Proof of Corollary IV.1.
First of all we prove with observability of the ESCO's eort, the 1-rate contract
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(?; f1g), with tO=1 dened in Theorem IV.4(2a), achieves the rst-best outcome.
Using  = 0 in the objective function (C.3) and its rst order derivative (C.4),
we get  = 1. As a result, the induced client's consumption decision, xD, must
satisfy u0(x+ t+ ) = p. Both the ESCO's and client's decisions are identical to those
with central planner, stated in Theorem IV.1. Therefore, the rst-best outcome is
achieved, i.e., V O RN=1 = V C .
Then we consider the case with moral hazard. From Theorem IV.5(2) we have
V M RN=2  V O RN=1. Therefore, 2-rate contracts with ESCO's moral hazard also
achieve the rst-best solution. The optimal contract is (zM RN=2; f1; 0g), where
zM RN=2 is given in (C.6) with 1 = 1. 
Proof of Corollary IV.2.
Part (1): Central Planner.
The results are immediately obtained by using u(x + t + ) =  e (x+t+) and
C(t) = 1
2
t2 in Theorem IV.1.
Part (2): Observability of ESCO's Eort.
Under 1-rate contracts and comfort function u(x+ t+ ) =  e (x+t+), the energy
consumption and client's utility are
xD(t+ ) =   lnp  t  ;
vD(xD; t+ ) = p(lnp+ t+   1):
(C.7)
The objective function (C.3) reduces to
max
t;

p(lnp  ) + pt  
2
2p22   v0   1
2
t2

:
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The rst order conditions are
p  t

= 0;
1

  1  p2 = 0:
(C.8)
The closed form solutions to t and  are immediately obtained from the equations
above.
Plugging in u(x) =  e x into Equation (4.3), we get the pre-project energy con-
sumption and client's utility
x0 =   ln p;
v0 = p(ln p  1):
(C.9)
Substituting O=1 and tO=1 into the objective function above, we get
V O=1 = p(lnO=1p  O=1) + 1
2
p2   
2
(O=1p)22   v0
=
1
2
p[(lnO=1 + p) + (lnO=1 + 1  O=1)]:
(C.10)
The second line holds because O=1 satises the rst order condition (C.8).
Part (3): Moral Hazard.
From Theorem IV.5, we get tM=1() = (1   )p. The objective function (C.5)
reduces to
max


p(lnp  ) + (1  )p2   
2
2p22   v0   1
2
(1  )2p2

:
The rst order condition in  is
p(
1

  1)  p2(2 + ) = 0:
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M=1 can be obtained from the rst order condition above. 
Proof of Theorem IV.6.
Part (1): Generalization of Corollary IV.2(1). The results are direct general-
ization of Corollary IV.2. Proof details are omitted here.
Part (2): Generalization of Corollary IV.2(2).
The client's consumption must satisfy u0(x+ t+ + q) = p. Therefore, we have
xD CE(t+ + q) =   lnp  (t+ + q):
The client's utility is
vD CE(xD CE; t+ ; q) =  1p[1  ln1p  t    q]  1
2
q2:
Hence, the client's optimal eort is qD CE = p and the resulting utility is
v(xD CE; t+ ; qD CE) =  p[1  lnp  t  ] + 1
2
2p2:
Plugging this into the ESCO's problem (4.10), we get rst order conditions
p  t

= 0;
1

  1  p2  p+ p = 0:
The closed form solutions to t and  are immediately obtained from the equations
above.
Part (3): Generalization of Theorem IV.5(2).
The right inequality is obvious. We focus on the left inequality. By choosing
1 = 
O CE=1; 2 = 0; z = 1  ln1p  1
2
1p  (tO CE=1 + );
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the ESCO eectively commits himself to spend eort tO CE=1. So the ESCO is able
to replicate the outcome in Part (2), which gives V O CE=1  V M CE=2. The details
of this proof are similar to Theorem IV.5(2), and thus omitted. 
Proof of Theorem IV.7.
Using u(x) =  e (x+w) in Equation (4.3), we get the client's consumption and
resulting utility before the project:
x0 =   ln p  w;
v0 = p(ln p  1)  
2
p22w:
(C.11)
Obviously, v0 decreases in 
2
w. The client always have the same utility before and
after the project as the ESCO is able to take all surplus. Therefore, the client's
post-project utility decreases in 2w.
Then we consider the ESCO's surplus. To keep notations short, we drop any
superscript for optimal values, or replace it with * if necessary. Based on Equation
(C.10), we have
V (2w) =
1
2
p[(ln + p) + (ln + 1  )] + 
2
p22w:
where  is generalized from Corollary IV.2(2b) as
 =
2
1 +
p
1 + 4p(2 + 2w)
:
Then, we have
d V (2w)
d2w
=
1
2
p2 (1  ) > 0:
Therefore, the ESCO's surplus increases in 2w. 
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Proof of Theorem IV.8.
Part (1): Incremental Technology.
The project value is function of p, , , and t0. According to the objective function
(4.7), we have
V (p; ; ; t0) = e
 t0V (et0p; e t0; e t0; 0)
and the problem is equivalent to the one in the main part. From Corollary IV.2(2),
we have
 =
2
1 +
p
1 + 4p2
and t = p;
which is actually independent of t0. From Equation (C.10), we have
V (p; ; ; t0) =
1
2
p(2 ln + 1  ln + p):
which is also independent of t0.
Part (2): Replacement Technology.
In this case, t0 only matters for pre-project utility. Generalizing Equation (C.9),
we get
v0 = p(ln p+ t0   1):
v0 increases in t0 and post-project surplus is constant in t0. Therefore, project value
V O=1 decreases in t0. 
Proof of Theorem IV.9.
For the clarity of this proof, we put retail price p and decision variable i's as
arguments, e.g., we(x; p; fig) and wc(x; p; fig). For any retail price p, we dene
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0i =
p
p0
i. From Equation (4.2) we have
wc(x; p; fig) =
nX
i=1
ipminfmaxf0; x  zi 1g; zi   zi 1g
=
nX
i=1
p
p0
ip0minfmaxf0; x  zi 1g; zi   zi 1g
= wc(x; p0; f0ig):
From Equation (4.5) we have
 we(x; p; fig) + (p  p0)x =  px+ wc(x; p; fig) + (p  p0)x
=  p0x+ wc(x; p0; f0ig)
=  we(x; p0; f0ig):
If we use 0i's to replace i's as decision variables, Problem (4.13) becomes
t =argmax
t

 Ewe(x; p0; f0ig) 
1
2
t2

;
max
fzig;f0ig

E [v(x; t + )]  
2
V ar [v(x; t + )]  v0   Ewe(x; p0; f0ig) 
1
2
t2

:
This is exactly same to Problem (4.7), except retail price p in (4.7) replaced by energy
cost p0. Assume the optimal contract for above problem is (fzi(p0)g; f0i(p0)g). Then
the optimal contract for Problem (4.13) is (p; fzi(p0)g; fp0p 0i(p0)g), where retail price
p can be any value. 
Proof of Theorem IV.10.
We start with dening each player's utility or surplus in Table C.1.  is used
to denote utilities with appropriate superscript (E/C/PM for ESCO/client/policy
makers respectively). The subscript 0 or 1 indicates utility before and after the
project. v0(p) and x0(p) are given in Equation (C.9). V0(p) is given in Equation
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(C.10). x(p) is given in Equation (C.7). To keep notations short, we drop any
superscript for optimal values, or replace it with * if necessary.
E0 
C
0 
PM
0 
E
1 
C
1 
PM
1
No policy 0 v0(p)  cx0(p) V (p) v0(p)  cEx(p)
Lump sum subsidy 0 v0(p)  cx0(p) V (p) +G v0(p)  cEx(p) G
Carbon tax 0 v0(p+ r) (r   c)x0(p+ r) V (p+ r) v0(p+ r) (r   c)Ex(p+ r)
Table C.1: Utilities for each player before and after the project.
PMi includes any subsidy, carbon tax income, and environmental cost. The total
social surplus, denoted by i, is
i = 
E
i + 
C
i + 
PM
i :
Part (1): Lump Sum Subsidy.
With lump sum subsidy, policy makers cannot change the ESCO's eort and the
client's consumption decisions. However, it encourages the ESCO to oer a lower
price to residents and thus more projects will be adopted.
Without subsidy, a project is done if and only if
E1 = V (p) +G  0:
Policy makers would execute a project if and only if 1  0. That is
V (p) + v0(p)  cEx(p)  v0(p)  cx0(p):
Policy makers want the ESCO decision to be equivalent to their own. Therefore, we
have
G = c(x0(p)  Ex(p)) = c(ln + p):
Part (2): Carbon Tax.
In cases the project is not adopted, policy makers maximize social surplus 1.
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That is,
max
r
0 = v0(p+ r) + (r   c)x0(p+ r):
Taking derivative with respect to r, we get
d0
dr
= v00(p+ r) + x0(p+ r) + (r   c)x00(p+ r) =  
r   c
p
:
The optimal solution is apparently r = c.
In cases the project is adopted, policy makers solve
max
r
1 = V (p+ r) + v0(p+ r) + (r   c)Ex(p+ r);
where  is given in Corollary IV.2(2). We then have
dEx(p+ r)
dr
=
d
dr
[  ln(p+ r)  (p+ r)]
=   1
2(p+ r)
 
1 +
1p
1 + 4(p+ r)2
!
   < 0
(C.12)
and
d1
dr
=
dV (p+ r)
dr
+
dv0(p+ r)
dr
+ Ex(p+ r) + (r   c)dEx
(p+ r)
dr
= (r   c)dEx
(p+ r)
dr
:
Let d1=dr = 0 and we get r
 = c.
Despite of whether the project is adopted, it is always optimal to have r = c. It
is also worth noting that with r = c, E1  0 and 1  0 are equivalent, which
means the ESCO's decision is perfectly aligned with policy makers.
Part (3): Comparison.
We rst show that if E1  0 with lump sum subsidy, it is also true with carbon
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tax policy. Denote E1 as
E1 = V (p+ r
)  V (p) G = V (p+ c)  V (p)  c(ln(p) + p):
Note  is a function of p and we make it clear because it is dierent under two
policies. When c = 0, E1 = 0. We also have
dE1
dc
= [ln(p+ c) + (p+ c)]  [ln(p) + p] > 0:
The inequality holds because of Equation (C.12). Therefore, the ESCO's surplus is
higher with carbon tax policy. If a project is adopted with lump sum subsidy, it
should also be adopted with carbon tax policy.
Next we compare two policies under three scenarios: (a) A project is adopted
with both policies; (b) A project is adopted with neither policies; and (c) A project is
adopted with carbon tax policy, but not with lump sum subsidy. Denote t, x, and
 as dierence in technology investment, consumption, and social surplus (value in
carbon tax policy minus that in lump sum subsidy).
(3a) A project is adopted with both policies:
We have t = (p + c)   p = c > 0 and x = Ex(p + c)   Ex(p) < 0. The
latter inequality holds because of Equation (C.12).
Note if r = 0 with carbon tax policy, social surplus 1 under two policies are
identical. In Part (2) we showed that 1 is increasing in r when r  c. Since policy
makers choose r = c > 0, we must have  > 0.
(3b) A project is adopted with neither policies:
Since no project would be adopted with both policies, we have t = 0. Similar
to Part (3a), we have 1 is increasing in r when r  c (shown in Part (2)), and thus
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 > 0 also holds. To see the dierence in energy consumptions, we have
x = x0(p+ c)  x0(p) =   ln (p+ c) + ln p < 0:
(3c) A project is adopted with carbon tax policy, but not with lump sum subsidy:
In this scenario, t > 0 is obvious. Next we prove x < 0. According to Equation
(C.10), we have
V (p+ c) =
1
2
(p+ c)[(ln + (p+ c)) + (ln + 1  )]:
Since V (p+ c)  0 (because a project is adopted with carbon tax policy) and ln+
1   < 0 (for  2 (0; 1)), we must have
ln + (p+ c) > 0:
On the other hand, we have
Ex(p+ c)  x0(p+ c) =  [ln + (p+ c)] < 0:
Therefore,
x = Ex(p+ c)  x0(p) < x0(p+ c)  x0(p) =   ln (p+ c) + ln p < 0:
To see the dierence in social surplus, we have
1 with carbon tax policy  0 with carbon tax policy > 0 with lump sum subsidy:
The rst inequality holds because a project is adopted and the ESCO's decision is
aligned with policy makers, as shown at the end of the proof of Part (2). The second
210
inequality holds because of the result in (3b). 
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